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of the intellective faculty。 After strong stimulation of a sense we are less able to exercise it than before； as e。g。 in the case of a loud sound we cannot hear easily immediately after； or in the case of a bright colour or a powerful odour we cannot see or smell； but in the case of mind thought about an object that is highly intelligible renders it more and not less able afterwards to think objects that are less intelligible： the reason is that while the faculty of sensation is dependent upon the body； mind is separable from it。 Once the mind has become each set of its possible objects； as a man of science has； when this phrase is used of one who is actually a man of science （this happens when he is now able to exercise the power on his own initiative）； its condition is still one of potentiality； but in a different sense from the potentiality which preceded the acquisition of knowledge by learning or discovery： the mind too is then able to think itself。 Since we can distinguish between a spatial magnitude and what it is to be such； and between water and what it is to be water； and so in many other cases （though not in all； for in certain cases the thing and its form are identical）； flesh and what it is to be flesh are discriminated either by different faculties； or by the same faculty in two different states： for flesh necessarily involves matter and is like what is snub…nosed； a this in a this。 Now it is by means of the sensitive faculty that we discriminate the hot and the cold； i。e。 the factors which combined in a certain ratio constitute flesh： the essential character of flesh is apprehended by something different either wholly separate from the sensitive faculty or related to it as a bent line to the same line when it has been straightened out。 Again in the case of abstract objects what is straight is analogous to what is snub…nosed； for it necessarily implies a continuum as its matter： its constitutive essence is different； if we may distinguish between straightness and what is straight： let us take it to be two…ness。 It must be apprehended； therefore； by a different power or by the same power in a different state。 To sum up； in so far as the realities it knows are capable of being separated from their matter； so it is also with the powers of mind。 The problem might be suggested： if thinking is a passive affection； then if mind is simple and impassible and has nothing in common with anything else； as Anaxagoras says； how can it come to think at all？ For interaction between two factors is held to require a precedent community of nature between the factors。 Again it might be asked； is mind a possible object of thought to itself？ For if mind is thinkable per se and what is thinkable is in kind one and the same； then either （a） mind will belong to everything； or （b） mind will contain some element common to it with all other realities which makes them all thinkable。 （1） Have not we already disposed of the difficulty about interaction involving a common element； when we said that mind is in a sense potentially whatever is thinkable； though actually it is nothing until it has thought？ What it thinks must be in it just as characters may be said to be on a writingtablet on which as yet nothing actually stands written： this is exactly what happens with mind。 （Mind is itself thinkable in exactly the same way as its objects are。 For （a） in the case of objects which involve no matter； what thinks and what is thought are identical； for speculative knowledge and its object are identical。 （Why mind is not always thinking we must consider later。） （b） In the case of those which contain matter each of the objects of thought is only potentially present。 It follows that while they will not have mind in them （for mind is a potentiality of them only in so far as they are capable of being disengaged from matter） mind may yet be thinkable。 5
Since in every class of things； as in nature as a whole； we find two factors involved； （1） a matter which is potentially all the particulars included in the class； （2） a cause which is productive in the sense that it makes them all （the latter standing to the former； as e。g。 an art to its material）； these distinct elements must likewise be found within the soul。 And in fact mind as we have described it is what it is what it is by virtue of becoming all things； while there is another which is what it is by virtue of making all things： this is a sort of positive state like light； for in a sense light makes potential colours into actual colours。 Mind in this sense of it is separable； impassible； unmixed； since it is in its essential nature activity （for always the active is superior to the passive factor； the originating force to the matter which it forms）。 Actual knowledge is identical with its object： in the individual； potential knowledge is in time prior to actual knowledge； but in the universe as a whole it is not prior even in time。 Mind is not at one time knowing and at another not。 When mind is set free from its present conditions it appears as just what it is and nothing more： this alone is immortal and eternal （we do not； however； remember its former activity because； while mind in this sense is impassible； mind as passive is destructible）； and without it nothing thinks。
6
The thinking then of the simple objects of thought is found in those cases where falsehood is impossible： where the alternative of true or false applies； there we always find a putting together of objects of thought in a quasi…unity。 As Empedocles said that 'where heads of many a creature sprouted without necks' they afterwards by Love's power were combined； so here too objects of thought which were given separate are combined； e。g。 'incommensurate' and 'diagonal'： if the combination be of objects past or future the combination of thought includes in its content the date。 For falsehood always involves a synthesis； for even if you assert that what is white is not white you have included not white in a synthesis。 It is possible also to call all these cases division as well as combination。 However that may be； there is not only the true or false assertion that Cleon is white but also the true or false assertion that he was or will he white。 In each and every case that which unifies is mind。 Since the word 'simple' has two senses； i。e。 may mean either （a） 'not capable of being divided' or （b） 'not actually divided'； there is nothing to prevent mind from knowing what is undivided； e。g。 when it apprehends a length （which is actually undivided） and that in an undivided time； for the time is divided or undivided in the same manner as the line。 It is not possible； then； to tell what part of the line it was apprehending in each half of the time： the object has no actual parts until it has been divided： if in thought you think each half separately； then by the same act you divide the time also； the half…lines becoming as it were new wholes of length。 But if you think it as a whole consisting of these two possible parts； then also you think it in a time which corresponds to both parts together。 （But what is not quantitatively but qualitatively simple is thought in a simple time and by a simple act of the soul。） But that which mind thinks and the time in which it thinks are in this case divisible only incidentally and not as such。 For in them too there is something indivisible （though； it may be； not isolable） which gives unity to the time and the whole of length； and this is found equally in every continuum whether temporal or spatial。 Points and similar instances of things that divide； themselves being indivisible； are realized in consciousness in the same manner as privations。 A similar account may be given of all other cases； e。g。 how evil or black is cognized； they are cognized； in a sense； by means of their contraries。 That which cognizes must have an element of potentiality in its being； and one of the contraries must be in it。 But if there is anything that has no contrary； then it knows itself and is actually and possesses independent existence。 Assertion is the saying of something concerning something； e。g。 affirmation； and is in every case either true or false： this is not always the case with mind： the thinking of the definition in the sense of the constitutive essence is never in error nor is it the assertion of something concerning something； but； just as while the seeing of the special object of sight can never be in error； the belief that the white object seen is a man may be mistaken； so too in the case of objects which are without matter。
7
Actual knowledge is identical with its object： potential knowledge in the individual is in time prior to actual knowledge but in the universe it has no priority even in time； for all things that come into being arise from what actually is。 In the case of sense clearly the sensitive faculty already was potentially what the object makes it to be actually； the faculty is not affected or altered。 This must therefore be a different kind from movement； for movement is； as we saw； an activity of what is imperfect； activity in the unqualified sense； i。e。 that of wh