按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
bject some other part）。 Further； even when the mind does command and thought bids us pursue or avoid something； sometimes no movement is produced； we act in accordance with desire； as in the case of moral weakness。 And； generally； we observe that the possessor of medical knowledge is not necessarily healing； which shows that something else is required to produce action in accordance with knowledge； the knowledge alone is not the cause。 Lastly； appetite too is incompetent to account fully for movement； for those who successfully resist temptation have appetite and desire and yet follow mind and refuse to enact that for which they have appetite。
10
These two at all events appear to be sources of movement： appetite and mind （if one may venture to regard imagination as a kind of thinking； for many men follow their imaginations contrary to knowledge； and in all animals other than man there is no thinking or calculation but only imagination）。 Both of these then are capable of originating local movement； mind and appetite： （1） mind； that is； which calculates means to an end； i。e。 mind practical （it differs from mind speculative in the character of its end）； while （2） appetite is in every form of it relative to an end： for that which is the object of appetite is the stimulant of mind practical； and that which is last in the process of thinking is the beginning of the action。 It follows that there is a justification for regarding these two as the sources of movement； i。e。 appetite and practical thought； for the object of appetite starts a movement and as a result of that thought gives rise to movement； the object of appetite being it a source of stimulation。 So too when imagination originates movement； it necessarily involves appetite。 That which moves therefore is a single faculty and the faculty of appetite； for if there had been two sources of movement…mind and appetite…they would have produced movement in virtue of some common character。 As it is； mind is never found producing movement without appetite （for wish is a form of appetite； and when movement is produced according to calculation it is also according to wish）； but appetite can originate movement contrary to calculation； for desire is a form of appetite。 Now mind is always right； but appetite and imagination may be either right or wrong。 That is why； though in any case it is the object of appetite which originates movement； this object may be either the real or the apparent good。 To produce movement the object must be more than this： it must be good that can be brought into being by action； and only what can be otherwise than as it is can thus be brought into being。 That then such a power in the soul as has been described； i。e。 that called appetite； originates movement is clear。 Those who distinguish parts in the soul； if they distinguish and divide in accordance with differences of power； find themselves with a very large number of parts； a nutritive； a sensitive； an intellective； a deliberative； and now an appetitive part； for these are more different from one another than the faculties of desire and passion。 Since appetites run counter to one another； which happens when a principle of reason and a desire are contrary and is possible only in beings with a sense of time （for while mind bids us hold back because of what is future； desire is influenced by what is just at hand： a pleasant object which is just at hand presents itself as both pleasant and good； without condition in either case； because of want of foresight into what is farther away in time）； it follows that while that which originates movement must be specifically one； viz。 the faculty of appetite as such （or rather farthest back of all the object of that faculty； for it is it that itself remaining unmoved originates the movement by being apprehended in thought or imagination）； the things that originate movement are numerically many。 All movement involves three factors； （1） that which originates the movement； （2） that by means of which it originates it； and （3） that which is moved。 The expression 'that which originates the movement' is ambiguous： it may mean either （a） something which itself is unmoved or （b） that which at once moves and is moved。 Here that which moves without itself being moved is the realizable good； that which at once moves and is moved is the faculty of appetite （for that which is influenced by appetite so far as it is actually so influenced is set in movement； and appetite in the sense of actual appetite is a kind of movement）； while that which is in motion is the animal。 The instrument which appetite employs to produce movement is no longer psychical but bodily： hence the examination of it falls within the province of the functions common to body and soul。 To state the matter summarily at present； that which is the instrument in the production of movement is to be found where a beginning and an end coincide as e。g。 in a ball and socket joint； for there the convex and the concave sides are respectively an end and a beginning （that is why while the one remains at rest； the other is moved）： they are separate in definition but not separable spatially。 For everything is moved by pushing and pulling。 Hence just as in the case of a wheel； so here there must be a point which remains at rest； and from that point the movement must originate。 To sum up； then； and repeat what I have said； inasmuch as an animal is capable of appetite it is capable of self…movement； it is not capable of appetite without possessing imagination； and all imagination is either （1） calculative or （2） sensitive。 In the latter an animals； and not only man； partake。
11
We must consider also in the case of imperfect animals； sc。 those which have no sense but touch； what it is that in them originates movement。 Can they have imagination or not？ or desire？ Clearly they have feelings of pleasure and pain； and if they have these they must have desire。 But how can they have imagination？ Must not we say that； as their movements are indefinite； they have imagination and desire； but indefinitely？ Sensitive imagination； as we have said； is found in all animals； deliberative imagination only in those that are calculative： for whether this or that shall be enacted is already a task requiring calculation； and there must be a single standard to measure by； for that is pursued which is greater。 It follows that what acts in this way must be able to make a unity out of several images。 This is the reason why imagination is held not to involve opinion； in that it does not involve opinion based on inference； though opinion involves imagination。 Hence appetite contains no deliberative element。 Sometimes it overpowers wish and sets it in movement： at times wish acts thus upon appetite； like one sphere imparting its movement to another； or appetite acts thus upon appetite； i。e。 in the condition of moral weakness （though by nature the higher faculty is always more authoritative and gives rise to movement）。 Thus three modes of movement are possible。 The faculty of knowing is never moved but remains at rest。 Since the one premiss or judgement is universal and the other deals with the particular （for the first tells us that such and such a kind of man should do such and such a kind of act； and the second that this is an act of the kind meant； and I a person of the type intended）； it is the latter opinion that really originates movement； not the universal； or rather it is both； but the one does so while it remains in a state more like rest； while the other partakes in movement。
12
The nutritive soul then must be possessed by everything that is alive； and every such thing is endowed with soul from its birth to its death。 For what has been born must grow； reach maturity； and decay…all of which are impossible without nutrition。 Therefore the nutritive faculty must be found in everything that grows and decays。 But sensation need not be found in all things that live。 For it is impossible for touch to belong either （1） to those whose body is uncompounded or （2） to those which are incapable of taking in the forms without their matter。 But animals must be endowed with sensation； since Nature does nothing in vain。 For all things that exist by Nature are means to an end； or will be concomitants of means to an end。 Every body capable of forward movement would； if unendowed with sensation； perish and fail to reach its end； which is the aim of Nature； for how could it obtain nutriment？ Stationary living things； it is true； have as their nutriment that from which they have arisen； but it is not possible that a body which is not stationary but produced by generation should have a soul and a discerning mind without also having sensation。 （Nor yet even if it were not produced by generation。 Why should it not have sensation？ Because it were better so either for the body or for the soul？ But clearly it would not be better for either： the absence of sensation will not enable the one to think better or the other to exist better。） Therefore no body which is not stationary has soul without sensation。 But if a body has sensation； it must be either sim