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ind is always thinking…what can this be？ For all practical processes of thinking have limits…they all go on for the sake of something outside the process； and all theoretical processes come to a close in the same way as the phrases in speech which express processes and results of thinking。 Every such linguistic phrase is either definitory or demonstrative。 Demonstration has both a starting…point and may be said to end in a conclusion or inferred result； even if the process never reaches final completion； at any rate it never returns upon itself again to its starting…point； it goes on assuming a fresh middle term or a fresh extreme； and moves straight forward； but circular movement returns to its starting…point。 Definitions； too； are closed groups of terms。 Further； if the same revolution is repeated； mind must repeatedly think the same object。 Further； thinking has more resemblance to a coming to rest or arrest than to a movement； the same may be said of inferring。 It might also be urged that what is difficult and enforced is incompatible with blessedness； if the movement of the soul is not of its essence； movement of the soul must be contrary to its nature。 It must also be painful for the soul to be inextricably bound up with the body； nay more； if； as is frequently said and widely accepted； it is better for mind not to be embodied； the union must be for it undesirable。 Further； the cause of the revolution of the heavens is left obscure。 It is not the essence of soul which is the cause of this circular movement…that movement is only incidental to soul…nor is； a fortiori； the body its cause。 Again； it is not even asserted that it is better that soul should be so moved； and yet the reason for which God caused the soul to move in a circle can only have been that movement was better for it than rest； and movement of this kind better than any other。 But since this sort of consideration is more appropriate to another field of speculation； let us dismiss it for the present。 The view we have just been examining； in company with most theories about the soul； involves the following absurdity： they all join the soul to a body； or place it in a body； without adding any specification of the reason of their union； or of the bodily conditions required for it。 Yet such explanation can scarcely be omitted； for some community of nature is presupposed by the fact that the one acts and the other is acted upon； the one moves and the other is moved； interaction always implies a special nature in the two interagents。 All； however； that these thinkers do is to describe the specific characteristics of the soul； they do not try to determine anything about the body which is to contain it； as if it were possible； as in the Pythagorean myths； that any soul could be clothed upon with any body…an absurd view； for each body seems to have a form and shape of its own。 It is as absurd as to say that the art of carpentry could embody itself in flutes； each art must use its tools； each soul its body。
4
There is yet another theory about soul； which has commended itself to many as no less probable than any of those we have hitherto mentioned； and has rendered public account of itself in the court of popular discussion。 Its supporters say that the soul is a kind of harmony； for （a） harmony is a blend or composition of contraries； and （b） the body is compounded out of contraries。 Harmony； however； is a certain proportion or composition of the constituents blended； and soul can be neither the one nor the other of these。 Further； the power of originating movement cannot belong to a harmony； while almost all concur in regarding this as a principal attribute of soul。 It is more appropriate to call health （or generally one of the good states of the body） a harmony than to predicate it of the soul。 The absurdity becomes most apparent when we try to attribute the active and passive affections of the soul to a harmony； the necessary readjustment of their conceptions is difficult。 Further； in using the word 'harmony' we have one or other of two cases in our mind； the most proper sense is in relation to spatial magnitudes which have motion and position； where harmony means the disposition and cohesion of their parts in such a manner as to prevent the introduction into the whole of anything homogeneous with it； and the secondary sense； derived from the former； is that in which it means the ratio between the constituents so blended； in neither of these senses is it plausible to predicate it of soul。 That soul is a harmony in the sense of the mode of composition of the parts of the body is a view easily refutable； for there are many composite parts and those variously compounded； of what bodily part is mind or the sensitive or the appetitive faculty the mode of composition？ And what is the mode of composition which constitutes each of them？ It is equally absurd to identify the soul with the ratio of the mixture； for the mixture which makes flesh has a different ratio between the elements from that which makes bone。 The consequence of this view will therefore be that distributed throughout the whole body there will be many souls； since every one of the bodily parts is a different mixture of the elements； and the ratio of mixture is in each case a harmony； i。e。 a soul。 From Empedocles at any rate we might demand an answer to the following question for he says that each of the parts of the body is what it is in virtue of a ratio between the elements： is the soul identical with this ratio； or is it not rather something over and above this which is formed in the parts？ Is love the cause of any and every mixture； or only of those that are in the right ratio？ Is love this ratio itself； or is love something over and above this？ Such are the problems raised by this account。 But； on the other hand； if the soul is different from the mixture； why does it disappear at one and the same moment with that relation between the elements which constitutes flesh or the other parts of the animal body？ Further； if the soul is not identical with the ratio of mixture； and it is consequently not the case that each of the parts has a soul； what is that which perishes when the soul quits the body？ That the soul cannot either be a harmony； or be moved in a circle； is clear from what we have said。 Yet that it can be moved incidentally is； as we said above； possible； and even that in a sense it can move itself； i。e。 in the sense that the vehicle in which it is can be moved； and moved by it； in no other sense can the soul be moved in space。 More legitimate doubts might remain as to its movement in view of the following facts。 We speak of the soul as being pained or pleased； being bold or fearful； being angry； perceiving； thinking。 All these are regarded as modes of movement； and hence it might be inferred that the soul is moved。 This； however； does not necessarily follow。 We may admit to the full that being pained or pleased； or thinking； are movements （each of them a 'being moved'）； and that the movement is originated by the soul。 For example we may regard anger or fear as such and such movements of the heart； and thinking as such and such another movement of that organ； or of some other； these modifications may arise either from changes of place in certain parts or from qualitative alterations （the special nature of the parts and the special modes of their changes being for our present purpose irrelevant）。 Yet to say that it is the soul which is angry is as inexact as it would be to say that it is the soul that weaves webs or builds houses。 It is doubtless better to avoid saying that the soul pities or learns or thinks and rather to say that it is the man who does this with his soul。 What we mean is not that the movement is in the soul； but that sometimes it terminates in the soul and sometimes starts from it； sensation e。g。 coming from without inwards； and reminiscence starting from the soul and terminating with the movements； actual or residual； in the sense organs。 The case of mind is different； it seems to be an independent substance implanted within the soul and to be incapable of being destroyed。 If it could be destroyed at all； it would be under the blunting influence of old age。 What really happens in respect of mind in old age is； however； exactly parallel to what happens in the case of the sense organs； if the old man could recover the proper kind of eye； he would see just as well as the young man。 The incapacity of old age is due to an affection not of the soul but of its vehicle； as occurs in drunkenness or disease。 Thus it is that in old age the activity of mind or intellectual apprehension declines only through the decay of some other inward part； mind itself is impassible。 Thinking； loving； and hating are affections not of mind； but of that which has mind； so far as it has it。 That is why； when this vehicle decays； memory and love cease； they were activities not of mind； but of the composite which has perished； mind is； no doubt； something more divine and impassible。 That the soul cannot be moved is therefore clear from what we have said； and if it cannot be moved at all； manifestly it cannot be moved by itself。 Of all the opinions we have enume