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first of all that is。 All； both those who assert that the soul； because of its knowledge or perception of what is compounded out of the elements； and is those who assert that it is of all things the most originative of movement； fail to take into consideration all kinds of soul。 In fact （1） not all beings that perceive can originate movement； there appear to be certain animals which stationary； and yet local movement is the only one； so it seems； which the soul originates in animals。 And （2） the same object…on holds against all those who construct mind and the perceptive faculty out of the elements； for it appears that plants live； and yet are not endowed with locomotion or perception； while a large number of animals are without discourse of reason。 Even if these points were waived and mind admitted to be a part of the soul （and so too the perceptive faculty）； still； even so； there would be kinds and parts of soul of which they had failed to give any account。 The same objection lies against the view expressed in the 'Orphic' poems： there it is said that the soul comes in from the whole when breathing takes place； being borne in upon the winds。 Now this cannot take place in the case of plants； nor indeed in the case of certain classes of animal； for not all classes of animal breathe。 This fact has escaped the notice of the holders of this view。 If we must construct the soul out of the elements； there is no necessity to suppose that all the elements enter into its construction； one element in each pair of contraries will suffice to enable it to know both that element itself and its contrary。 By means of the straight line we know both itself and the curved…the carpenter's rule enables us to test both…but what is curved does not enable us to distinguish either itself or the straight。 Certain thinkers say that soul is intermingled in the whole universe； and it is perhaps for that reason that Thales came to the opinion that all things are full of gods。 This presents some difficulties： Why does the soul when it resides in air or fire not form an animal； while it does so when it resides in mixtures of the elements； and that although it is held to be of higher quality when contained in the former？ （One might add the question； why the soul in air is maintained to be higher and more immortal than that in animals。） Both possible ways of replying to the former question lead to absurdity or paradox； for it is beyond paradox to say that fire or air is an animal； and it is absurd to refuse the name of animal to what has soul in it。 The opinion that the elements have soul in them seems to have arisen from the doctrine that a whole must be homogeneous with its parts。 If it is true that animals become animate by drawing into themselves a portion of what surrounds them； the partisans of this view are bound to say that the soul of the Whole too is homogeneous with all its parts。 If the air sucked in is homogeneous； but soul heterogeneous； clearly while some part of soul will exist in the inbreathed air； some other part will not。 The soul must either be homogeneous； or such that there are some parts of the Whole in which it is not to be found。 From what has been said it is now clear that knowing as an attribute of soul cannot be explained by soul's being composed of the elements； and that it is neither sound nor true to speak of soul as moved。 But since （a） knowing； perceiving； opining； and further （b） desiring； wishing； and generally all other modes of appetition； belong to soul； and （c） the local movements of animals； and （d） growth； maturity； and decay are produced by the soul； we must ask whether each of these is an attribute of the soul as a whole； i。e。 whether it is with the whole soul we think； perceive； move ourselves； act or are acted upon； or whether each of them requires a different part of the soul？ So too with regard to life。 Does it depend on one of the parts of soul？ Or is it dependent on more than one？ Or on all？ Or has it some quite other cause？ Some hold that the soul is divisible； and that one part thinks； another desires。 If； then； its nature admits of its being divided； what can it be that holds the parts together？ Surely not the body； on the contrary it seems rather to be the soul that holds the body together； at any rate when the soul departs the body disintegrates and decays。 If； then； there is something else which makes the soul one； this unifying agency would have the best right to the name of soul； and we shall have to repeat for it the question： Is it one or multipartite？ If it is one； why not at once admit that 'the soul' is one？ If it has parts； once more the question must be put： What holds its parts together； and so ad infinitum？ The question might also be raised about the parts of the soul： What is the separate role of each in relation to the body？ For； if the whole soul holds together the whole body； we should expect each part of the soul to hold together a part of the body。 But this seems an impossibility； it is difficult even to imagine what sort of bodily part mind will hold together； or how it will do this。 It is a fact of observation that plants and certain insects go on living when divided into segments； this means that each of the segments has a soul in it identical in species； though not numerically identical in the different segments； for both of the segments for a time possess the power of sensation and local movement。 That this does not last is not surprising； for they no longer possess the organs necessary for self…maintenance。 But； all the same； in each of the bodily parts there are present all the parts of soul； and the souls so present are homogeneous with one another and with the whole； this means that the several parts of the soul are indisseverable from one another； although the whole soul is divisible。 It seems also that the principle found in plants is also a kind of soul； for this is the only principle which is common to both animals and plants； and this exists in isolation from the principle of sensation； though there nothing which has the latter without the former。
Book II 1
LET the foregoing suffice as our account of the views concerning the soul which have been handed on by our predecessors； let us now dismiss them and make as it were a completely fresh start； endeavouring to give a precise answer to the question； What is soul？ i。e。 to formulate the most general possible definition of it。 We are in the habit of recognizing； as one determinate kind of what is； substance； and that in several senses； （a） in the sense of matter or that which in itself is not 'a this'； and （b） in the sense of form or essence； which is that precisely in virtue of which a thing is called 'a this'； and thirdly （c） in the sense of that which is compounded of both （a） and （b）。 Now matter is potentiality； form actuality； of the latter there are two grades related to one another as e。g。 knowledge to the exercise of knowledge。 Among substances are by general consent reckoned bodies and especially natural bodies； for they are the principles of all other bodies。 Of natural bodies some have life in them； others not； by life we mean self…nutrition and growth （with its correlative decay）。 It follows that every natural body which has life in it is a substance in the sense of a composite。 But since it is also a body of such and such a kind； viz。 having life； the body cannot be soul； the body is the subject or matter； not what is attributed to it。 Hence the soul must be a substance in the sense of the form of a natural body having life potentially within it。 But substance is actuality； and thus soul is the actuality of a body as above characterized。 Now the word actuality has two senses corresponding respectively to the possession of knowledge and the actual exercise of knowledge。 It is obvious that the soul is actuality in the first sense； viz。 that of knowledge as possessed； for both sleeping and waking presuppose the existence of soul； and of these waking corresponds to actual knowing； sleeping to knowledge possessed but not employed； and； in the history of the individual； knowledge comes before its employment or exercise。 That is why the soul is the first grade of actuality of a natural body having life potentially in it。 The body so described is a body which is organized。 The parts of plants in spite of their extreme simplicity are 'organs'； e。g。 the leaf serves to shelter the pericarp； the pericarp to shelter the fruit； while the roots of plants are analogous to the mouth of animals； both serving for the absorption of food。 If； then； we have to give a general formula applicable to all kinds of soul； we must describe it as the first grade of actuality of a natural organized body。 That is why we can wholly dismiss as unnecessary the question whether the soul and the body are one： it is as meaningless as to ask whether the wax and the shape given to it by the stamp are one； or generally the matter of a thing and that of which it is the matter。 Unity has many senses （as many as 'is' has）； but the most proper and fundamental sense of both is the relation of an actuality to that of which it is the actuality。 We have now given an answer to the quest