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从1991年到1993年，可口可乐与吉列刮胡刀每股获利的增加幅度分别为38％与37％，但是同期间股票市价的涨幅却只有11％与6％，换句话说，这些公司的表现超越股票市场，主要的原因还在于华尔街对于品牌有很深的疑虑，但是不管怎样，真正重要的还是这些公司本身的获利情况，如果他们经营顺利，Berkshire也就跟着水涨船高，虽然不是依照一步步稳定的方式前进。
Let me add a lesson from history： Coke went public in 1919 at 40 per share。 By the end of 1920 the market； coldly reevaluating Coke's future prospects； had battered the stock down by more than 50％； to 19。50。 At yearend 1993； that single share； with dividends reinvested； was worth more than 2。1 million。 As Ben Graham said： 〃In the short…run； the market is a voting machine … reflecting a voter…registration test that requires only money； not intelligence or emotional stability … but in the long…run； the market is a weighing machine。〃
接着让我为各位上一次历史课，1919年可口可乐股票以每股40美元公开上市，到了1920年由于市场对于可口可乐的前景看法相当冷淡，而将股价下修一半至19。5美元，然而时至今日，1993年底，若是将收到的股利再重复投资下去，则当初股票的价值将变成210万美元，就像葛拉罕所说：「短期而言，市场是投票机器，投资人不须靠智能或情绪控制，只要有钱都可以登记参加投票，但就长期而言，股票市场却是一个体重机。」
So how should Berkshire's over…performance in the market last year be viewed？ Clearly； Berkshire was selling at a higher percentage of intrinsic value at the end of 1993 than was the case at the beginning of the year。 On the other hand； in a world of 6％ or 7％ long…term interest rates； Berkshire's market price was not inappropriate if … and you should understand that this is a huge if … Charlie Munger； Berkshire's Vice Chairman； and I can attain our long…standing goal of increasing Berkshire's per…share intrinsic value at an average annual rate of 15％。 We have not retreated from this goal。 But we again emphasize； as we have for many years； that the growth in our capital base makes 15％ an ever…more difficult target to hit。
所以我们应该如何看待Berkshire去年的股价超越本质的表现呢？ 很明显的在1993年底Berkshire的股价占实质价值比重较年初为高，另外一方面，在长期利率只有6％到7％的投资环境下，同时若是你了解查理孟格跟本人只能让Berkshire的实质价值每年达到15％的成长的话，你就知道Berkshire去年这样的股价表现实在是有点反常，虽然对于这样的目标我们从不妥协，但我们必须再一次强调，随着资本规模的日益扩大，想要达到这个目标的困难度也与日俱增。
What we have going for us is a growing collection of good…sized operating businesses that possess economic characteristics ranging from good to terrific； run by managers whose performance ranges from terrific to terrific。 You need have no worries about this group。
不过另一方面，伴随我们的是由一些相当规模且拥有竞争优势的企业，并且由杰出的经理人所经营，对于这样的梦幻组合大家大可以放心。
The capital…allocation work that Charlie and I do at the parent pany； using the funds that our managers deliver to us； has a less certain oute： It is not easy to find new businesses and managers parable to those we have。 Despite that difficulty； Charlie and I relish the search； and we are happy to report an important success in 1993。
倒是查理跟我在母公司利用子公司所贡献资金所作的资金分配工作，所面临的不确定性就比较高，要找到像我们现在拥有一样好的企业并不容易，但是虽然难度高，查理跟我却绝对不会放弃追寻，而很高兴在1993年我们能有相当成功的斩获。
Dexter ShoeDetxter 鞋业
What we did last year was build on our 1991 purchase of H。 H。 Brown； a superbly…run manufacturer of work shoes； boots and other footwear。 Brown has been a real winner： Though we had high hopes to begin with； these expectations have been considerably exceeded thanks to Frank Rooney； Jim Issler and the talented managers who work with them。 Because of our confidence in Frank's team； we next acquired Lowell Shoe； at the end of 1992。 Lowell was a long…established manufacturer of women's and nurses' shoes； but its business needed some fixing。 Again； results have surpassed our expectations。 So we promptly jumped at the chance last year to acquire Dexter Shoe of Dexter； Maine； which manufactures popular…priced men's and women's shoes。 Dexter； I can assure you； needs no fixing： It is one of the best…managed panies Charlie and I have seen in our business lifetimes。
去年我们所做的乃是基于1991年买进HH布朗鞋业…一家管理良善的鞋子、靴子制造公司的续曲，布朗鞋业成为一家真正成功的赢家，虽然一开始我们就对他就有相当高的标准，但是在Frank与其它经理人的努力之下，这家公司的表现甚至还超过我们的预期，基于我们对Frank团队的信心，接着在1992年年底我们又买下Lowell鞋业，Lowell是一家女鞋与护士鞋的老牌制造公司，不过他的管理还需要改进，再一次他的表现又超乎我们的预期，所以我们立刻又再接再厉在去年又趁机买下缅因州的Dexter鞋业，一家专门制造高级男女鞋的品牌，这次我可以向大家保证Dexter并不需要改造，Dexter是查理跟我在职业生涯中，所见过最好的公司之一。
Harold Alfond； who started working in a shoe factory at 25 cents an hour when he was 20； founded Dexter in 1956 with 10；000 of capital。 He was joined in 1958 by Peter Lunder； his nephew。 The two of them have since built a business that now produces over 7。5 million pairs of shoes annually； most of them made in Maine and the balance in Puerto Rico。 As you probably know； the domestic shoe industry is generally thought to be unable to pete with imports from low…wage countries。 But someone forgot to tell this to the ingenious managements of Dexter and H。 H。 Brown and to their skilled labor forces； which together make the U。S。 plants of both panies highly petitive against all ers。
话说Harold Alfond从20岁以时薪25美分开始到制鞋工厂做工，并在1956年靠着一万美元的资本创立Dexter，1958年他的侄子Peter加入，从此两人建立起年产750万双鞋子的企业，大部分的鞋子都在缅因州生产，其余的则在波多黎各，就像大家都知道的，国内的制鞋业，一般被认为无法与国外进口低价产品竞争，但是大家似乎忘记提醒布朗鞋业与Dexter经营团队有这么一回事，是他们让两家公司位于美国的工厂拥有高度的竞争力以对抗外来的入侵者。
Dexter's business includes 77 retail outlets； located primarily in the Northeast。 The pany is also a major manufacturer of golf shoes； producing about 15％ of U。S。 output。 Its bread and butter； though； is the manufacture of traditional shoes for traditional retailers； a job at which it excels： Last year both Nordstrom and J。C。 Penney bestowed special awards upon Dexter for its performance as a supplier during 1992。
Dexter还包含77家的零售门市，主要集中在西北地区，该公司同时也是高尔夫球鞋的主要制造商，全美的市场占有率约为15％，不过他的主要业务还是传统通路商的传统鞋类，这也是它最擅长的领域，去年Dexter还获得Nordstrom与JC Penny所颁发的年度最佳供货商奖项。
Our 1993 results include Dexter only from our date of merger； November 7th。 In 1994； we expect Berkshire's shoe operations to have more than 550 million in sales； and we would not be surprised if the bined pre…tax earnings of these businesses topped 85 million。 Five years ago we had no thought of getting into shoes。 Now we have 7；200 employees in that industry； and I sing 〃There's No Business Like Shoe Business〃 as I drive to work。 So much for strategic plans。
Berkshire只能从1993年11月7号购并日后开始计入Dexter的业绩，在1994年我们预计Berkshire光是在鞋类方面的销售额就达到5。5亿美元，而总计税前获利极有可能超过8；500万，记得在五年前我们根本就没想到会跨进鞋类这一行，现在光是在这个产业所雇用的员工就超过7；200人，现在我每天上班，都会边开车边唱，没有一个行业会像卖鞋这一行，策略计画还有很多发挥的空间。
At Berkshire； we have no view of the future that dictates what businesses or industries we will enter。 Indeed； we think it's usually poison for a corporate giant's shareholders if it embarks upon new ventures pursuant to some grand vision。 We prefer instead to focus on the economic characteristics of businesses that we wish to own and the personal characteristics of managers with whom we wish to associate … and then to hope we get lucky in finding the two in bination。 At Dexter； we did。
在Berkshire，对于将来会进入那个产业，我们并没有特定的看法，事实上，我们常在想对于一家大型企业的股东来说，与其追求具有远景的新创事业有时反而有害，所以我们比较偏爱专注于那些我们想要拥有的经济型态以及我们喜爱一起共事的经理人，剩下的就只看我们有没有足够的运气，找到同时拥有这两项特点的组合了，在Dexter我们确实找到了。
And now we pause for a short mercial： Though they owned a business jewel； we believe that Harold and Peter （who were not interested in cash） made a sound decision in exchanging their Dexter stock for shares of Berkshire。 What they did； in effect； was trade a 100％ interest in a single terrific business for a smaller interest in a large group of terrific businesses。 They incurred no tax on this exchange and now own a security that can be easily used for charitable or personal gifts； or that can be converted to cash in amounts； and at times； of their own choosing。 Should members of their families desire to； they can pursue varying financial paths without running into the plications that often arise when assets are concentrated in a private business。
接下来让我们休息一下，进段小广告，虽然他们拥有商业界的宝石，但我们也相信Harold与Peter（他们对于现金都不感兴趣）做了一个正确的决定，将Dexter的股份转为Berkshire的股份，他们所做的，实际上等于将一家规模小的好公司的全部权益转成一家大规模好公司的一部份权益，这样的转换并不会产生租税负担，同时还可享有依个人意愿随时进行赠与或变现的好处，如果他们的家族成员有意愿，他们可以依照自己的想法追求不同的目标，而不必像过去那样所有的