按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
million。 Because we've since expanded our super…cat business； a similar storm today could cost us 600 million。
不过我们确实知道，当损失真正降临时，铁定是件轰动的事，以后可能会发生三倍或四倍于我们在1993年所赚到的盈余那样大的意外事件，1992年Andrew飓风发生的那次，我们总共赔了1。25亿美元，时至今日由于我们已大幅扩大在霹雳猫保险的业务量，所以同样规模的飓风可能会造成我们六亿美元左右的理赔损失。
So far； we have been lucky in 1994。 As I write this letter； we are estimating that our losses from the Los Angeles earthquake will be nominal。 But if the quake had been a 7。5 instead of a 6。8； it would have been a different story。
1994年到目前为止，我们还算是幸运，在我写这封信时，我们因为洛杉矶大地震所造成的损失还算在正常范围之内，不过要是当时地震发生的规模不是6。8而是7。5的话，那么最后的结果就完全不是那么一回事了。
Berkshire is ideally positioned to write super…cat policies。 In Ajit Jain； we have by far the best manager in this business。 Additionally； panies writing these policies need enormous capital； and our net worth is ten to twenty times larger than that of our main petitors。 In most lines of insurance； huge resources aren't that important： An insurer can diversify the risks it writes and； if necessary； can lay off risks to reduce concentration in its portfolio。 That isn't possible in the super…cat business。 So these petitors are forced into offering far smaller limits than those we can provide。 Were they bolder； they would run the risk that a mega…catastrophe … or a confluence of smaller catastrophes … would wipe them out。
Berkshire本身很适合从事霹雳猫保险的业务，我们有业界最优秀的经理人Ajit Jain，此外从事这行需要相当雄厚的资金实力，在这点我们公司的净值大概是其他主要竞争对手的10到20倍，对大部分的保险业务而言，背后所拥有的资源还不是那么地重要，一家保险公司可以很轻易地就把它所承担的风险分散出去，若有必要，也可以降低险种集中度以减低风险，但是对霹雳猫保险这种特殊的保险就没有办法这样子做，所以其它的竞争同业只能被迫降低理赔的上限来因应，而要是他们胆敢承担更高的风险，则一个超大型的意外灾害或是连续发生几个较小型的灾害，就有可能让他们粉身碎骨。
One indication of our premier strength and reputation is that each of the four largest reinsurance panies in the world buys very significant reinsurance coverage from Berkshire。 Better than anyone else； these giants understand that the test of a reinsurer is its ability and willingness to pay losses under trying circumstances； not its readiness to accept premiums when things look rosy。
有一件事情可以显示我们超强的竞争力与卓越的声誉，那就是全世界前四大再保公司全部都向Berkshire投保钜额的霹雳猫保险，这些大公司比谁都清楚，对于再保公司来说，真正要考验的是他们在困难的状况下，愿意且能够支付理赔金的能力与意愿，而绝对不是在太平时期勇于接受保费收入的意愿。
One caution： There has recently been a substantial increase in reinsurance capacity。 Close to 5 billion of equity capital has been raised by reinsurers； almost all of them newly…formed entities。 Naturally these new entrants are hungry to write business so that they can justify the projections they utilized in attracting capital。 This new petition won't affect our 1994 operations； we're filled up there； primarily with business written in 1993。 But we are now seeing signs of price deterioration。 If this trend continues； we will resign ourselves to much…reduced volume； keeping ourselves available； though； for the large； sophisticated buyer who requires a super…cat insurer with large capacity and a sure ability to pay losses。
值得注意的是，近年来愿意接受再保业务的供给量大幅增加，再保业者总共募集了近50亿美元的资金来进军这类业务，且大部分都是新成立的公司，很自然的这些新进的业者急欲承接业务以证明当初他们吸收资金时所作的预估，这些新加入的竞争并不会影响我们1994年的营运，因为我们早已经接满了生意，主要是在1993年签下的，不过我们已经看到保费价格有恶化的趋势，如果这种情况持续下去，我们将会大幅降低承接的业务量，但随时准备好接下大型且复杂的保险业者所欲寻找确定能够理赔损失的保证。
In other areas of our insurance business； our homestate operation； led by Rod Eldred； our workers' pensation business； headed by Brad Kinstler； our credit…card operation； managed by the Kizer family； and National Indemnity's traditional auto and general liability business； led by Don Wurster； all achieved excellent results。 In bination； these four units produced a significant underwriting profit and substantial float。
在我们其它保险业务方面，我们由Rod领导的住宅保险、Brad带领的员工退休保险以及由Kizer家族经营的信用卡保险业务，以及由Don所领导的国家产险所从事的传统汽车保险与一般责任险方面，总的来说，这四类业务都表现的相当不错，不但有承保获利，还贡献了相当大金额的保险浮存金。
All in all； we have a first…class insurance business。 Though its results will be highly volatile； this operation possesses an intrinsic value that exceeds its book value by a large amount … larger； in fact； than is the case at any other Berkshire business。
总而言之，我们拥有第一流的保险事业，虽然他们的经营成果变化相当的大，但是其实质价值却远超过其帐面的价值，而事实上，在Berkshire其它事业的身上也有类似的情况。
mon Stock Investments股票投资
Below we list our mon stockholdings having a value of over 250 million。 A small portion of these investments belongs to subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns less than 100％。
下表是我们超过二亿五千万美元以上的普通股投资，一部份的投资系属于Berkshire关系企业所持有）。
12/31/93 Shares pany Cost Market （000s omitted）
2；000；000 93；400；000 13；654；600 34；250；000 4；350；000 24；000；000 38；335；000 1；727；765 6；791；218
Capital Cities/ABC； Inc。 The Coca…Cola pany Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp。 （〃Freddie Mac〃） GEICO Corp。 General Dynamics Corp。 The Gillette pany Guinness PLC The Washington Post pany。 Wells Fargo & pany
345；000 1；023；920 307；505 45；713 94；938 600；000 333；019 9；731 423；680
1；239；000 4；167；975 681；023 1；759；594 401；287 1；431；000 270；822 440；148 878；614
Considering the similarity of this year's list and the last； you may decide your management is hopelessly atose。 But we continue to think that it is usually foolish to part with an interest in a business that is both understandable and durably wonderful。 Business interests of that kind are simply too hard to replace。
看到今年所列的投资与去年竟如此的相似，你可能会认为本公司的管理阶层实在是昏庸到无可救药的地步，不过我们还是坚持相信离开原本就熟悉且表现优异稳定的公司，实在是非常不智之举，这类的公司实在是还难找到更好的替代。
Interestingly； corporate managers have no trouble understanding that point when they are focusing on a business they operate： A parent pany that owns a subsidiary with superb long…term economics is not likely to sell that entity regardless of price。 〃Why；〃 the CEO would ask； 〃should I part with my crown jewel？〃 Yet that same CEO； when it es to running his personal investment portfolio； will offhandedly … and even impetuously … move from business to business when presented with no more than superficial arguments by his broker for doing so。 The worst of these is perhaps； 〃You can't go broke taking a profit。〃 Can you imagine a CEO using this line to urge his board to sell a star subsidiary？ In our view； what makes sense in business also makes sense in stocks： An investor should ordinarily hold a small piece of an outstanding business with the same tenacity that an owner would exhibit if he owned all of that business。
有趣的是企业经理人在认定何者才是自己本业时，从来就不会搞不清楚情况，母公司是不会单纯因为价格因素就将自己旗下最优秀的子公司给卖掉，公司总裁一定会问，为什么要把我皇冠上的珠宝给变卖掉，不过当场景转换到其个人的投资组合时，他却又会毫不犹豫地，甚至是情急地从这家公司换到另一家公司，靠的不过是股票经纪人肤浅的几句话语，其中最烂的一句当属，你不会因为获利而破产，你能想象要是一家公司的总裁用类似的方式建议董事会将最有潜力的子公司给卖掉时，就我个人的观点，适用于企业经营的原则也同样适用于股票投资，投资人在持有一家公司的股票所展现的韧性应当与一家公司的老板持有公司全部的股权一样。
Earlier I mentioned the financial results that could have been achieved by investing 40 in The Coca…Cola Co。 in 1919。 In 1938； more than 50 years after the introduction of Coke； and long after the drink was firmly established as an American icon； Fortune did an excellent story on the pany。 In the second paragraph the writer reported： 〃Several times every year a weighty and serious investor looks long and with profound respect at Coca…Cola'srecord； but es regretfully to the conclusion that he is looking too late。 The specters of saturation and petition rise before him。〃
先前我曾经提到若是在1919年以40美元投资可口可乐会获得怎样的成果， 1938年在可乐问世达50年且早已成为代表美国的产品之后，财富杂志对该公司做了一次详尽的专访，在文章的第二段作者写到：每年都会有许多重量型的投资人看好可口可乐，并对于其过去的辉煌记录表示敬意，但也都做下自己太晚发现的结论，认为该公司已达巅峰，前方的道路充满了竞争与挑战。
Yes； petition there was in 1938 and in 1993 as well。 But it's worth noting that in 1938 The Coca…Cola Co。 sold 207 million cases of soft drinks （if its gallonage then is converted into the 192…ounce cases used for measurement today） and in 1993 it sold about 10。7 billion cases； a 50…fold increase in physical volume from a pany that in 1938 was already dominant in its very major industry。 Nor was the party over in 1938 for an investor： Though the 40 invested in 1919 in one share had （with dividends reinvested） turned into 3；277 by the end of 1938； a fresh 40