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e it；〃 so also can investors … in an inexact but useful way … 〃see〃 the risks inherent in certain investments without reference to plex equations or price histories。
这些因素对于许多分析师来说，可能是丈二金刚摸不着头脑，因为他们根本无法从现有的数据库中找到这些信息，但是取得这些精确数字的难度高并不代表他们就不重要或是无法克服，就像是司法正义一样，Stewart法官发现他根本无法找到何谓猥亵的标准，不过他还是坚称，只要我一看到就知道是不是，同样地对于投资人来说，不需靠精确的公式或是股价历史，而只要运用不太精确但却有用的方式，就可以看到潜藏在某些投资里的风险。
Is it really so difficult to conclude that Coca…Cola and Gillette possess far less business risk over the long term than； say； any puter pany or retailer？ Worldwide； Coke sells about 44％ of all soft drinks； and Gillette has more than a 60％ share （in value） of the blade market。 Leaving aside chewing gum； in which Wrigley is dominant； I know of no other significant businesses in which the leading pany has long enjoyed such global power。
就长期而言，可口可乐与吉列所面临的产业风险，要比任何计算机公司或是通路商或小得多，可口可乐占全世界饮料销售量的44％，吉列则拥有60％的刮胡刀市场占有率（以销售额计），除了称霸口香糖的箭牌公司之外，我看不出还有那家公司可以像他们一样长期以来享有傲视全球的竞争力。
Moreover； both Coke and Gillette have actually increased their worldwide shares of market in recent years。 The might of their brand names； the attributes of their products； and the strength of their distribution systems give them an enormous petitive advantage； setting up a protective moat around their economic castles。 The average pany； in contrast； does battle daily without any such means of protection。 As Peter Lynch says； stocks of panies selling modity…like products should e with a warning label： 〃petition may prove hazardous to human wealth。〃
更重要的，可口可乐与吉列近年来也确实一点一滴地在增加他们全球市场的占有率，品牌的力量、产品的特质与配销通路的优势，使得他们拥有超强的竞争力，就像是树立起高耸的护城河来保卫其经济城堡，相对的，一般公司却要每天耗尽心思去打没有意义的游击战，就像是彼得．林区所说的，对于那些只会销售量贩式产品的公司来说，大家应该在其股票上加印这句警语…「竞争可能有害于人类的利益」。
The petitive strengths of a Coke or Gillette are obvious to
even the casual observer of business。 Yet the beta of their stocks is similar to that of a great many run…of…the…mill panies who possess little or no petitive advantage。 Should we conclude from this similarity that the petitive strength of Coke and Gillette gains them nothing when business risk is being measured？ Or should we conclude that the risk in owning a piece of a pany … its stock … is somehow divorced from the long…term risk inherent in its business operations？ We believe neither conclusion makes sense and that equating beta with investment risk also makes no sense。
可口可乐与吉列的竞争力在一般产业观察家眼中实在是显而易见的，然而其股票的Beta值却与一般平庸、完全没有竞争优势的公司相似，难道只因为这样我们就该认为在衡量公司所面临的产业风险时，完全不须考虑他们所享有的竞争优势吗？ 或者就可以说持有一家公司部份所有权…也就是股票的风险，与公司长期所面临的营运风险一点关系都没有，我们认为这些说法，包含衡量投资风险的Beta公式在内，一点道理都没有。
The theoretician bred on beta has no mechanism for differentiating the risk inherent in； say； a single…product toy pany selling pet rocks or hula hoops from that of another toy pany whose sole product is Monopoly or Barbie。 But it's quite possible for ordinary investors to make such distinctions if they have a reasonable understanding of consumer behavior and the factors that create long…term petitive strength or weakness。 Obviously； every investor will make mistakes。 But by confining himself to a relatively few； easy…to…understand cases； a reasonably intelligent； informed and diligent person can judge investment risks with a useful degree of accuracy。
Beta学者所架构的理论根本就没有能力去分辨，销售宠物玩具或呼拉圈的玩具公司与销售大富翁或芭比娃娃的玩具公司，所隐藏的风险有何不同？ 但对一般普通的投资人来说，只要他略懂得消费者行为以及形成企业长期竞争优势或弱势的原因的话，就可以很明确的看出两者的差别，当然每个投资人都会犯错，但只要将自己集中在相对少数，容易了解的投资个案上，一个理性、知性与耐性兼具的投资人一定能够将投资风险限定在可接受的范围之内。
In many industries； of course； Charlie and I can't determine whether we are dealing with a 〃pet rock〃 or a 〃Barbie。〃 We couldn't solve this problem； moreover； even if we were to spend years intensely studying those industries。 Sometimes our own intellectual shortings would stand in the way of understanding； and in other cases the nature of the industry would be the roadblock。 For example； a business that must deal with fast…moving technology is not going to lend itself to reliable evaluations of its long…term economics。 Did we foresee thirty years ago what would transpire in the television…manufacturing or puter industries？ Of course not。 （Nor did most of the investors and corporate managers who enthusiastically entered those industries。） Why； then； should Charlie and I now think we can predict the future of other rapidly…evolving businesses？ We'll stick instead with the easy cases。 Why search for a needle buried in a haystack when one is sitting in plain sight？
当然有许多产业，连查理或是我可能都无法判断到底我们在玩的是宠物玩具或芭比娃娃，甚至在花了许多年时间努力的研究这些产业之后，我们还是无法解决这个问题，有时是因为我们本身智识上的缺陷，阻碍了我们对事情的了解，有时则是因为产业特性的关系，例如对于一家随时都比须面临快速变迁技术的公司来说，我们根本就无法对其长期的竞争力做出任何的评断，人类在三十年前，是否就能预知现在电视制造或计算机产业的演进，当然不能，就算是大部分钻研于这方面领域的投资人与企业经理人也没有办法，那么为什么查理跟我要觉得应该要有去预测其它产业快速变迁前景的能力呢？ 我们宁愿挑些简单一点的，一个人坐的舒舒服服就好了，为什么还要费事去挨稻草里的针呢？
Of course； some investment strategies … for instance； our efforts in arbitrage over the years … require wide diversification。 If significant risk exists in a single transaction； overall risk should be reduced by making that purchase one of many mutually…independent mitments。 Thus； you may consciously purchase a risky investment … one that indeed has a significant possibility of causing loss or injury … if you believe that your gain； weighted for probabilities； considerably exceeds your loss； parably weighted； and if you can mit to a number of similar； but unrelated opportunities。 Most venture capitalists employ this strategy。 Should you choose to pursue this course； you should adopt the outlook of the casino that owns a roulette wheel； which will want to see lots of action because it is favored by probabilities； but will refuse to accept a single； huge bet。
当然，有些投资策略，例如我们从事多年的套利活动，就必须将风险分散，若是单一交易的风险过高，就比须将资源分散到几个各自独立的个案之上，如此一来，虽然每个个案都有可能导致损失或伤害，但只要你确信每个独立的个案经过机率的加权平均能够让你获致满意的报酬就行了，许多创业投资者用的就是这种方法，若是你也打算这样做的话，记得采取与赌场老板搞轮盘游戏同样的心态，那就是鼓励大家持续不断的下注，因为长期而言，机率对庄家有利，但千万要拒绝单一一次的大赌注。
Another situation requiring wide diversification occurs when an investor who does not understand the economics of specific businesses nevertheless believes it in his interest to be a long…term owner of American industry。 That investor should both own a large number of equities and space out his purchases。 By periodically investing in an index fund； for example； the know…nothing investor can actually out…perform most investment professionals。 Paradoxically； when 〃dumb〃 money acknowledges its limitations； it ceases to be dumb。
另外一种需要分散风险的特殊情况是，当投资人并没有对任何单一产业有特别的熟悉，不过他却对美国整体产业前景有信心，则这类的投资人应该分散持有许多公司的股份，同时将投入的时点拉长，例如，透过定期投资指数基金，一个什么都不懂的投资人通常都能打败大部分的专业经理人，很奇怪的是，当愚昧的金钱了解到自己的极限之后，它就不再愚昧了。
On the other hand； if you are a know…something investor； able to understand business economics and to find five to ten sensibly…priced panies that possess important long…term petitive advantages； conventional diversification makes no sense for you。 It is apt simply to hurt your results and increase your risk。 I cannot understand why an investor of that sort elects to put money into a business that is his 20th favorite rather than simply adding that money to his top choices … the businesses he understands best and that present the least risk； along with the greatest profit potential。 In the words of the prophet Mae West： 〃Too much of a good thing can be wonderful。〃
另一方面，若是你是稍具常识的投资人，能够了解产业经济的话，应该就能够找出五到十家股价合理并享有长期竞争优势的公司，此时一般分散风险的理论对你来说就一点意义也没有，要是那样做反而会伤害到你的投资成果并增加你的风险，我实在不了解那些投资人为什么要把钱摆在他排名第20的股票上，而不是把钱集中在排名最前面，最熟悉了解同时风险最小，获利可能最大的投资之上，或许这就是先知梅西卫斯特所说的，「好事物越多，就越完美」。
Corporate Governance企业治理
At our annual meetings； someone usually asks 〃What happens to this place if you get hit by a truck？〃 I'm glad they are still asking the question in this form。 It won't be too long before the query bees： 〃Wh