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6；850；000 GEICO Corporation 。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。 45；713 756；925
1；727；765 The Washington Post pany 。。。。。。。。9；731 323；092
在这些公司上，我们实在看不出买下并控制一家企业或是购买部份股权
有什么基本上的差异，每次我们都试着买进一些长期看好的公司，我们的目标是以合理的价格买到绩优的企业，而不是以便宜的价格买进平庸的公司，查理跟我发现买到货真价实的东西才是我们真正应该做的。
We really don't see many fundamental differences between the purchase of a controlled business and the purchase of marketable holdings such as these。 In each case we try to buy into businesses with favorable long…term economics。 Our goal is to find an outstanding business at a sensible price； not a mediocre business at a bargain price。 Charlie and I have found that making silk purses out of silk is the best that we can do； with sow's ears； we fail。 （It must be noted that your Chairman； always a quick study； required only 20 years to recognize how important it was to buy good businesses。 In the interim； I searched for 〃bargains〃 … and had the misfortune to find some。 My punishment was an education in the economics of short…line farm implement manufacturers； third…place department stores； and New England textile manufacturers。）
必须特别注意的是，本人虽然以反应快速著称，不过却花了二十年才明白要买下好企业的重要性，刚开始我努力寻找便宜的货色，不幸的是真的让我找到了一些，所得到的教训是在农具机械、三流百货公司与新英格兰纺织工厂等经济形态上上了一课。
Of course； Charlie and I may misread the fundamental economics of a business。 When that happens； we will encounter problems whether that business is a wholly…owned subsidiary or a marketable security； although it is usually far easier to exit from the latter。 （Indeed； businesses can be misread： Witness the European reporter who； after being sent to this country to profile Andrew Carnegie； cabled his editor； 〃My God； you'll never believe the sort of money there is in running libraries。〃）
当然查理跟我确实会误判一家企业的基础竞争力，结果是我们面临了一大堆问题与挑战，不管是买下全部或是部份的股权，当然后者要脱身相对容易一点， （确实企业很可能会被误判，一位欧洲记者被派驻到美国采访卡内基，发了一封电报给他的编辑主管说到，老天你一定不敢相信经营博物馆竟然可以赚那么多钱）
In making both control purchases and stock purchases； we try to buy not only good businesses； but ones run by high…grade； talented and likeable managers。 If we make a mistake about the managers we link up with； the controlled pany offers a certain advantage because we have the power to effect change。 In practice； however； this advantage is somewhat illusory： Management changes； like marital changes； are painful； time…consuming and chancy。 In any event； at our three marketable…but permanent holdings； this point is moot： With Tom Murphy and Dan Burke at Cap Cities； Bill Snyder and Lou Simpson at GEICO； and Kay Graham and Dick Simmons at The Washington Post； we simply couldn't be in better hands。
在进行取得控制权或是部份股权投资时，我们不但试着去找一家好公司，同时最好是能够由品格才能兼具且为我们喜爱的管理者经营，如果是看错了人，在具控制权的情况下，我们还有机会发挥影响力来改变，事实上这种优势有点不太实际，因为更换管理阶层，就像是结束婚姻关系一样，过程是相当地费时痛苦且要看运气，不论如何，我们三家永恒的股权投资在这点是不太可能发生的，有Tom Murphy 和Dan Burke 在资本城； Bill Snyder 和 Lou Simpson 在盖可保险 Kay Graham 和Dick Simmons 在华盛顿邮报，我们实在想不出有更有的接替人选。我必须说明控制一家公司有二个主要的优点，首先当我们控制一家公司我们便有分配资金与资源的权力，相较之下，若是部份股权投资则完全没有说话的余地，这点非常重要，因为大部分的公司经营者，并不擅长于做资金分配，之所以如此并不让人讶异，因为大部分的老板之所以能够成功是靠着他们在行销、生产、工程、行政管理方面的专长。
I would say that the controlled pany offers two main advantages。 First； when we control a pany we get to allocate capital； whereas we are likely to have little or nothing to say about this process with marketable holdings。 This point can be important because the heads of many panies are not skilled in capital allocation。 Their inadequacy is not surprising。 Most bosses rise to the top because they have excelled in an area such as marketing； production； engineering； administration or； sometimes； institutional politics。
而一旦成为CEO之后，他们马上必须面临许多新的责任与挑战，包括要做资金分配的决策，这是一项他们以前从未面对艰巨且重要的任务，打个比方，这就好象是一位深具天分的音乐家，没有安排让他到卡内基音乐厅演奏，却反而任命他为联邦准备理事会主席一般。
Once they bee CEOs； they face new responsibilities。 They now must make capital allocation decisions； a critical job that they may have never tackled and that is not easily mastered。 To stretch the point； it's as if the final step for a highly…talented musician was not to perform at Carnegie Hall but； instead； to be named Chairman of the Federal Reserve。
CEO缺乏资金分配的能力可不是一件小事，一家公司若是每年保留10％的盈余在公司的话，经过十年后，他所要掌管的资金等于增加了60％。
The lack of skill that many CEOs have at capital allocation is no small matter： After ten years on the job； a CEO whose pany annually retains earnings equal to 10％ of net worth will have been responsible for the deployment of more than 60％ of all the capital at work in the business。
某些体认到自己缺乏这方面能力的CEO（当然也有很多不这样认为），会转向部属、管理顾问或是投资银行家寻求建议，查理跟我时常观察这种帮忙最后的结果，总的来说，我们认为大多数的情况并不能解决问题，反而是让问题变得更严重。
CEOs who recognize their lack of capital…allocation skills （which not all do） will often try to pensate by turning to their staffs； management consultants； or investment bankers。 Charlie and I have frequently observed the consequences of such 〃help。〃 On balance； we feel it is more likely to accentuate the capital…allocation problem than to solve it。
结果你就会发现在美国企业一大堆不明智的资本分配决策一再重复的发生 （这也是为什么你常常听到组织重整再造的原因），然而在Berkshire我们算是比较幸运，在一家我们不具控制权的股权投资方面，大部分的公司资金运用还算得当，有的甚至还相当的杰出。
In the end； plenty of unintelligent capital allocation takes place in corporate America。 （That's why you hear so much about 〃restructuring。〃） Berkshire； however； has been fortunate。 At the panies that are our major non…controlled holdings； capital has generally been well…deployed and； in some cases； brilliantly so。
第二项优点是相较于部份投资，取得控制权的投资享有租税上的优惠， Berkshire身为一家控股公司，在投资部份股权时，必须吸收相当大的租税成本，相较之下，持有控制股权的投资则没有这种情况，这种租税弱势发生在我们身上由来已久，但过去几年的税法修订，使得这种情形更雪上加霜，同样的获利，若发生在我们持有80％以上股权的公司，要比其它部份股权投资的效益要高出50％以上。
The second advantage of a controlled pany over a marketable security has to do with taxes。 Berkshire； as a corporate holder； absorbs some significant tax costs through the ownership of partial positions that we do not when our ownership is 80％； or greater。 Such tax disadvantages have long been with us； but changes in the tax code caused them to increase significantly during the past year。 As a consequence； a given business result can now deliver Berkshire financial results that are as much as 50％ better if they e from an 80％…or…greater holding rather than from a lesser holding。
不过这种劣势有时可以由另一项优势所抵消掉，有时候股票市场让我们可以以不可思议的价格买到绩优公司部份的股权，远低于协议买下整家公司取得控制权的平均价格，举例来说，我们在1973年以每股5。63元买下华盛顿邮报的股票，该公司在1987年的每股盈余是10。3元，同样地，我们分别在1976、1979与1980年以每股6。67元的平均价格买下盖可保险的部份股权，到了去年其每股税后的营业利益是9。01元，从这些情况看来，市场先生实在是一位非常大方的好朋友。
The disadvantages of owning marketable securities are sometimes offset by a huge advantage： Occasionally the stock market offers us the chance to buy non…controlling pieces of extraordinary businesses at truly ridiculous prices … dramatically below those manded in negotiated transactions that transfer control。 For example； we purchased our Washington Post stock in 1973 at 5。63 per share； and per…share operating earnings in 1987 after taxes were 10。30。 Similarly； Our GEICO stock was purchased in 1976； 1979 and 1980 at an average of 6。67 per share； and after…tax operating earnings per share last year were 9。01。 In cases such as these； Mr。 Market has proven to be a mighty good friend。
一个矛盾又有趣的会计现象，从上面的表你可以看到，我们在这三家公司的股权投资市值超过20亿，但是他们在1987年总共贡献给Berkshire帐面税后盈余却只有一千一百万美元。
An interesting accounting irony overlays a parison of the reported financial results of our controlled panies with those of the permanent minority holdings listed above。 As you can see； those three stocks have a market value of over 2 billion。 Yet they produced only 11 million in reported after…tax earnings for Berkshire in 1987。
会计原则规定我们必须在这些公司分配股利的时候才能认列利益，这通常要比公司实际所赚的数字要少的多，以这三家公司合计， 1987年可以分配到的盈余数字高达一亿美元，另一方面，会计原则规定这三家公司的股份若是有保险公司所持有，则其帐面价值应该要以其市场价格列示，结果是一般公认会计原则要求我们在资产负债表上秀出这些被投资事业的实际价值，却不准让我们在损益表是反应他们实质的获利能力。
Accounting rules dictate that we take into ine only