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我们选择以可转换特别股的方式投资。
We； of course； have no special insights regarding the direction or future profitability of investment banking。 By their nature； the economics of this industry are far less predictable than those of most other industries in which we have major mitments。 This unpredictability is one of the reasons why our participation is in the form of a convertible preferred。
当然我们对于所罗门公司的CEO …John Gutfreund的能力与品格有不错的印象，查理与我都很尊崇且信赖他，我们是在1976年开始认识他，当时他在协助GEICO汽车保险免于破产的命运时出了不少力，之后我们看到他好几次引导客户免于愚蠢的交易，虽然这使得所罗门因此损失许多顾问费收入，这种以客户服务至上的表现在华尔街并不多见。
What we do have a strong feeling about is the ability and integrity of John Gutfreund； CEO of Salomon Inc。 Charlie and I like； admire and trust John。 We first got to know him in 1976 when he played a key role in GEICO's escape from near…bankruptcy。 Several times since； we have seen John steer clients away from transactions that would have been unwise； but that the client clearly wanted to make … even though his advice provided no fee to Salomon and acquiescence would have delivered a large fee。 Such service…above…self behavior is far from automatic in Wall Street。
如同查理在50页上所陈述的理由，截至年底我们将在所罗门公司的投资价值定在面额的98％，大约比我们的投资成本少1；400万，不过我们仍然相信这家公司在高品质资本筹募与市场创造营运，将可为我们的投资创造不错的盈余，若果真如此，我们可转换为股权的权利将会非常有价值。
For the reasons Charlie outlines on page 50； at yearend we valued our Salomon investment at 98％ of par； 14 million less than our cost。 However； we believe there is a reasonable likelihood that a leading； high…quality capital…raising and market…making operation can average good returns on equity。 If so； our conversion right will eventually prove to be valuable。
最后关于我们有价证券的投资再补充两点，第一照例我还是给诸位一个提醒，相较于去年底的持股内容，我们现在的投资组合又有变动，而且在没有知会大家的情况下，还会继续变动。
Two further ments about our investments in marketable securities are appropriate。 First； we give you our usual warning： Our holdings have changed since yearend and will continue to do so without notice。
这二点跟前面也有相关，跟前几年一样，在1987年媒体不时在猜测我们进出的投资标的，这些报导有时是真的，有时是半真半假，有时根本就不是事实，有趣的是，我发现媒体的规模与声誉和报导的真实性一点相关都没有，曾经有一家全美举足轻重的媒体杂志刊登一项完全错误的谣言，另外一家出版业者则将一桩短期的套利投资误当做是一项长期的投资， （之所以没有公布名字，是因为古有名训，遇到整桶整桶买墨水的人，最好不要跟他发生争吵）
The second ment is related： During 1987； as in some earlier years； there was speculation in the press from time to time about our purchase or sale of various securities。 These stories were sometimes true； sometimes partially true； and other times pletely untrue。 Interestingly； there has been no correlation between the size and prestige of the publication and the accuracy of the report。 One dead…wrong rumor was given considerable prominence by a major national magazine； and another leading publication misled its readers by writing about an arbitrage position as if it were a long…term investment mitment。 （In not naming names； I am observing the old warning that it's not wise to pick fights with people who buy ink by the barrel。） You should understand that we simply don't ment in any way on rumors； whether they are true or false。 If we were to deny the incorrect reports and refuse ment on the correct ones； we would in effect be menting on all。
大家应该知道我们从来不会对任何的谣言加以评论，不管是真或是假，因为若是我们否认不实的报导，或是拒绝对真实的事件发表评论，都等于间接表达了我们的立场。
In a world in which big investment ideas are both limited and valuable； we have no interest in telling potential petitors what we are doing except to the extent required by law。 We certainly don't expect others to tell us of their investment ideas。 Nor would we expect a media pany to disclose news of acquisitions it was privately pursuing or a journalist to tell his petitors about stories on which he is working or sources he is using。
在现在这个社会，大型的投资机会相当的稀少且弥足珍贵，除非法令特别要求，我们不可能向潜在的竞争对手透露我们的动向，就像我们也不可能期待对手告诉我们他的想法，同样地我们也不期待媒体能够揭露他们独家采访得到的购并消息，就像是一个记者不可能向他的同业透露他正在努力追踪的独家新闻。
I find it unfortable when friends or acquaintances mention that they are buying X because it has been reported … incorrectly … that Berkshire is a buyer。 However； I do not set them straight。 If they want to participate in whatever Berkshire actually is buying； they can always purchase Berkshire stock。 But perhaps that is too simple。 Usually； I suspect； they find it more exciting to buy what is being talked about。 Whether that strategy is more profitable is another question。
我特别觉得很不高兴，当我的朋友或是旧识告诉我说他们买进X公司的股票，因为报纸错误地报导说Berkshire已经买进这家公司的股票，不过后来我发现事情没有那么单纯，他们会买的原因主要是因为这些股票实在太热门，至于是否能够真正获利则是另外一回事。
Financing
财务方面
Shortly after yearend； Berkshire sold two issues of debentures； totaling 250 million。 Both issues mature in 2018 and will be retired at an even pace through sinking fund operations that begin in 1999。 Our overall interest cost； after allowing for expenses of issuance； is slightly over 10％。 Salomon was our investment banker； and its service was excellent。
在年度结束后不久，Berkshire发行了两期的债券，总共的金额是2。5亿美元，到期日皆为2018年并且会从1999年开始慢慢分期由偿债基金赎回，包含发行成本在内，平均的资金成本约在10％上下，负责这次发行债券的投资银行就是所罗门，他们提供了绝佳的服务。
Despite our pessimistic views about inflation； our taste for debt is quite limited。 To be sure； it is likely that Berkshire could improve its return on equity by moving to a much higher； though still conventional； debt…to…business…value ratio。 It's even more likely that we could handle such a ratio； without problems； under economic conditions far worse than any that have prevailed since the early 1930s。
尽管我们对于通货膨胀抱持悲观的看法，我们对于举债的兴趣还是相当有限，虽然可以肯定的是Berkshire可以靠提高举债来增加投资报酬，即使这样做我们的负债比例还是相当的保守，且就算如此我们很有信心应该可以应付比1930经济大萧条更坏的经济环境。
But we do not wish it to be only likely that we can meet our obligations； we wish that to be certain。 Thus we adhere to policies … both in regard to debt and all other matters … that will allow us to achieve acceptable long…term results under extraordinarily adverse conditions； rather than optimal results under a normal range of conditions。
但我们还是不愿意这种大概没有问题的做法，我们要的是百分之百的确定，因此我们坚持一项政策，那就是不管是举债或是其它任何方面，我们希望是能够在最坏的情况下得到合理的结果，而不是预期在乐观的情况下，得到很好的利益。
Good business or investment decisions will eventually produce quite satisfactory economic results； with no aid from leverage。 Therefore； it seems to us to be both foolish and improper to risk what is important （including； necessarily； the welfare of innocent bystanders such as policyholders and employees） for some extra returns that are relatively unimportant。 This view is not the product of either our advancing age or prosperity： Our opinions about debt have remained constant。
只要是好公司或是好的投资决策，不靠投资杠杆，最后还是能够得到令人满意的结果，因此我们认为为了一点额外的报酬，将重要的东西（也包含政策制定者与员工福祉）暴露在不必要的风险之下是相当愚蠢且不适当的。
However； we are not phobic about borrowing。 （We're far from believing that there is no fate worse than debt。） We are willing to borrow an amount that we believe … on a worst…case basis … will pose no threat to Berkshire's well…being。 Analyzing what that amount might be； we can look to some important strengths that would serve us well if major problems should engulf our economy： Berkshire's earnings e from many diverse and well…entrenched businesses； these businesses seldom require much capital investment； what debt we have is structured well； and we maintain major holdings of liquid assets。 Clearly； we could be fortable with a higher debt…to…business…value ratio than we now have。
当然我们不会畏惧借贷（我们还不至于认为借钱是万恶不赦的），我们还是愿意在估计不会损及Berkshire利益的最坏情况下，进行举债，至于这个限度在哪里，我们就必须评估自己本身的实力， Berkshire的获利来自于许多不同且扎实的产业，这些产业通常不需要额外大量的投资，负债的部份也相当健全，同时我们还保有大量的流动资产，很明显的，我们大可以承担比现在更高的负债比例。
One further aspect of our debt policy deserves ment： Unlike many in the business world； we prefer to finance in anticipation of need rather than in reaction to it。 A business obtains the best financial results possible by managing both sides of its balance sheet well。 This means obtaining the highest…possible return on assets and the lowest…possible cost on liabilities。 It would be convenient if opportunities for intelligent action on both fronts coincided。 However； reason tells us that just the opposite is likely to be the case： Tight money conditions； which translate into high costs f