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ust the opposite is likely to be the case： Tight money conditions； which translate into high costs for liabilities； will create the best opportunities for acquisitions； and cheap money will cause assets to be bid to the sky。 Our conclusion： Action on the liability side should sometimes be taken independent of any action on the asset side。
我们举债政策还有一向特点值得说明，不像其它公司，我们比较希望能够预先准备而不是事后补救，一家公司若能够同时管好资产负债表的两侧，就会有不错的成绩，这代表一方面要能够将资产的报酬率提高，一方面要能够将负债的资金成本降低，若是两边都能碰巧的兼顾那就太好了，不过事实告诉我们，通常情况正好相反，当资金吃紧时，代表负债的成本上升，这正是对外购并的最好时机，因为便宜的资金有时会将竞标的资产飙到天价，我们的结论是，在举债方面的动作，有时应该要跟购置资产方面的动作分开做。
Alas； what is 〃tight〃 and 〃cheap〃 money is far from clear at any particular time。 We have no ability to forecast interest rates and … maintaining our usual open…minded spirit … believe that no one else can。 Therefore； we simply borrow when conditions seem non…oppressive and hope that we will later find intelligent expansion or acquisition opportunities； which … as we have said … are most likely to pop up when conditions in the debt market are clearly oppressive。 Our basic principle is that if you want to shoot rare； fast…moving elephants； you should always carry a loaded gun。
当然何谓吃紧﹖何谓便宜的资金﹖很难有一个清楚的分野，我们无法去预测利率的走向，所以我们随时保持开放的心态，随机地在市场还没有那么悲观时借钱，期望之后可以找到合适的购并或投资标的，而通常如同我们先前所提到的，大概是会在债市情况悲观时出现，我们一个基本的原则就是，如果你想要猎捕那种罕见且移动迅速的大象，那么你的枪枝就要随时上膛准备。
Our fund…first； buy…or…expand…later policy almost always penalizes near…term earnings。 For example； we are now earning about 6 1/2％ on the 250 million we recently raised at 10％； a disparity that is currently costing us about 160；000 per week。 This negative spread is unimportant to us and will not cause us to stretch for either acquisitions or higher…yielding short…term instruments。 If we find the right sort of business elephant within the next five years or so； the wait will have been worthwhile。
我们这种先准备资金，之后再买进扩张的政策，虽然会对我们短期间的盈余造成影响，例如我们之前取得10％成本的2。5亿美元，现在大概只能赚得6。5％的收益，中间的利差损失每个礼拜大概是16万美元，这对我们来说，只是个小数目，也不会迫使我们去从事一些短期高风险的投资，只要我们能在未来五年内找到理想的目标猎物，这一切等待都是值得的。
Miscellaneous
其它事项
We hope to buy more businesses that are similar to the ones we have； and we can use some help。 If you have a business that fits the following criteria； call me or； preferably； write。
我们希望能够找到更多像我们现在拥有的企业，当然这需要一些帮助，如同你知道有公司符合以下的条件，打电话或者最好是写信给我。
（1）巨额交易（每年税后盈余至少有一千万美元）
（2）持续稳定获利（我们对有远景或具转机的公司没兴趣）
（3）高股东报酬率（并且甚少举债）
（4）具备管理阶层（我们无法提供）
（5）简单的企业（若牵涉到太多高科技，我们弄不懂）
（6）合理的价格（在价格不确定前，我们不希望浪费自己与对方太多时间）我们不会进行敌意的购并，并承诺完全保密并尽快答复是否感兴趣 （通常不超过五分钟） ，我们倾向采现金交易，除非我们所换得的内含价值跟我们付出的一样多，否则不考虑发行股份。我们欢迎可能的卖方与那些过去与我们合作过的对象打听，对于那些好的公司与好的经营阶层，我们可以提供一个好的归属。另一方面我们也持续接到一些不符合我们条件的询问，包括新事业、转机股、拍卖案以及最常见的中介案 （那些说你们要是能过碰一下面，一定会感兴趣之类的） 。在此重申我们对这些一点兴趣都没有。
Here's what we're looking for：
（1） large purchases （at least 10 million of after…tax earnings）； （2） demonstrated consistent earning power （future projections are of little interest to us； nor are 〃turnaround〃 situations）； （3） businesses earning good returns on equity while employing little or no debt； （4） management in place （we can't supply it）； （5） simple businesses （if there's lots of technology； we won't understand it）； （6） an offering price （we don't want to waste our time or that of the seller by talking； even preliminarily； about a transaction when price is unknown）。 We will not engage in unfriendly takeovers。 We can promise plete confidentiality and a very fast answer … customarily within five minutes … as to whether we're interested。 We prefer to buy for cash； but will consider issuing stock when we receive as much in intrinsic business value as we give。 We invite potential sellers to check us out by contacting people with whom we have done business in the past。 For the right business … and the right people … we can provide a good home。 On the other hand； we frequently get approached about acquisitions that don't e close to meeting our tests： new ventures； turnarounds； auction…like sales； and the ever…popular （among brokers） 〃I'm…sure…something…will…work…out…if…you…people…get…to…know…each…other。〃 None of these attracts us in the least。 Besides being interested in the purchases of entire businesses as described above； we are also interested in the negotiated purchase of large； but not controlling； blocks of stock parable to those we hold in Cap Cities and Salomon。 We have a special interest in purchasing convertible preferreds as a long…term investment； as we did at Salomon。
除了以上买下整家公司的购并案外，我们也会考虑买进一大部份不具控制权的股份，就像我们在资本城与所罗门这两个Case一样，尤其是我们对于像这次购买所罗门一样的可转换特别股当作长期投资特别有兴趣。
接下来是一点记忆回顾，大部分Berkshire的大股东是在1969年
清算巴菲特合伙事业时取得本公司股份的，这些合伙的伙伴可能还记得当初在1962年，我曾经在巴菲特合伙事业所投资控制的Dempster…一家帮浦与农用机具制造公司，面临经营上重大的难题。
And now a bit of deja vu。 Most of Berkshire's major stockholders received their shares at yearend 1969 in a liquidating distribution from Buffett Partnership； Ltd。 Some of these former partners will remember that in 1962 I encountered severe managerial problems at Dempster Mill Manufacturing Co。； a pump and farm implement manufacturing pany that BPL controlled。
在当时我带着我无法解决的问题去找查理，就像是现在一样，查理建议我在加州他有一位朋友叫Harry Bottle非常脚踏实地，或许可以帮得上忙，我在当年四月去洛杉矶拜访他，一个礼拜后，他就被请到内布拉斯加州来管理Dempster，此后问题立刻获得解决，记得在1962年的年报中，我还特地将Harry封为年度风云人物。
At that time； like now； I went to Charlie with problems that were too tough for me to solve。 Charlie suggested the solution might lie in a California friend of his； Harry Bottle； whose special knack was never forgetting the fundamental。 I met Harry in Los Angeles on April 17； 1962； and on April 23 he was in Beatrice； Nebraska； running Dempster。 Our problems disappeared almost immediately。 In my 1962 annual letter to partners； I named Harry 〃Man of the Year。〃
24年后，场景搬到Berkshire 另外一家子公司K & W公司，一家专门生产自动机具的小公司，过去这家公司做得还不错，不过到了1985…1986年却突然发生状况，盲目追求达不到的东西，却放弃现有可以做的产品，负责管理监督K & W的查理，知道可以不必知会我，直接找到现年68岁的Harry，任命他为CEO，然后就静待结果出来，事实上他没有等多久，到了1987年隔年， K & W的获利就创下新高，比1986年成长三倍，由于获利提升，该公司所需的资金也就跟着减少，该公司的应收及存货水准减少了20％。
Fade to 24 years later： The scene is K & W Products； a small Berkshire subsidiary that produces automotive pounds。 For years K & W did well； but in 1985…86 it stumbled badly； as it pursued the unattainable to the neglect of the achievable。 Charlie； who oversees K & W； knew there was no need to consult me。 Instead； he called Harry； now 68 years old； made him CEO； and sat back to await the inevitable。 He didn't wait long。 In 1987 K & W's profits set a record； up more than 300％ from 1986。 And； as profits went up； capital employed went down： K & W's investment in accounts receivable and inventories has decreased 20％。
所以要是在往后的十年、二十年，我们的被投资事业又发生问题时，你就知道谁的电话又会响了。
If we run into another managerial problem ten or twenty years down the road； you know whose phone will ring。 About 97。2％ of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire's 1987 shareholder…designated contributions program。 Contributions made through the program were 4。9 million； and 2；050 charities were recipients。
大约有97。2％的有效股权参与1987年的股东指定捐赠计划，总计约490万美元捐出的款项分配给2；050家慈善机构最近一项研究显示约有50％的美国大公司的捐赠计画是由董事会所决定，这等于是由代表公司所有股东的一小群人来决定公司资金捐给他们所偏爱的慈善机构，却从来不会去管股东们的意见，（我很怀疑若情况刚好相反，由股东们来决定这些董事口袋里的钱要捐给谁时，他们会有什么样的反应），当甲从乙的身上拿钱给丙时，若甲是立法者，则这个过程叫做课税，若甲是企业的主管或是经理人时，这就叫做是慈善，我们仍然坚信除非是捐给那些很明显对于公司有助益的单位时，应该要先征询股东们而非仅仅是经理人或是董事的意见。
A recent survey reported that about 50％ of major American panies match charitable contributions made by directors （sometimes by a factor of three to one）。 In effect； these representatives of the owners direct funds to their favorite charities； and never consult the owners as to their charitable preferences。 （I wonder how they would feel if the process were reversed and shareholders could invade the directors' pockets for