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ed corn flakes than low…priced auto insurance。
以早餐麦片为例，它的资产报酬率是汽车保险业的一倍（这也是为什么家乐氏与通用磨坊的股价净值比是五倍，而保险业者的股价净值比仅为一倍），麦片公司常常在调整产品售价，即便其生产成本没什么变，但消费者却连一个屁都不吭一声，但要是换做是保险业者，就算只是反映成本稍微调整一下价格，保户马上就会生气地跳起来，所以若你识相，最好是选择去卖高价的玉米片，而不是低价的汽车保险。
The antagonism that the public feels toward the industry can have serious consequences： Proposition 103； a California initiative passed last fall； threatens to push auto insurance prices down sharply； even though costs have been soaring。 The price cut has been suspended while the courts review the initiative； but the resentment that brought on the vote has not been suspended： Even if the initiative is overturned； insurers are likely to find it tough to operate profitably in California。 （Thank heavens the citizenry isn mad at bonbons： If Proposition 103 applied to candy as well as insurance； See would be forced to sell its product for 5。76 per pound。 rather than the 7。60 we charge … and would be losing money by the bucketful。）
一般大众对于保险业的敌视会造成严重的后果，去年秋天加州通过的一项103提案，虽然成本一再上涨，却还威胁要将汽车保费价格大幅压低，所幸法院后来检视这项提案予以搁置，但这次投票所带来的冲击未曾稍减，保险业者在加州已很难再有营运获利的空间，（感谢老天还好加州人没有对巧克力糖果感到反感，若是103提案也如保险般适用于糖果的话，喜斯可能被迫以每磅5。76元而不是现在的每磅7。6元，果真如此，喜斯可能就要亏大钱了）
The immediate direct effects on Berkshire from the initiative are minor； since we saw few opportunities for profit in the rate structure that existed in California prior to the vote。 However； the forcing down of prices would seriously affect GEICO； our 44％…owned investee； which gets about 10％ of its premium volume from California。 Even more threatening to GEICO is the possibility that similar pricing actions will be taken in other states； through either initiatives or legislation。
对Berkshire来说，这项法案的短期影响不大，因为即使在这法案之前，加州现行的费率结构也很难让我找到有获利的商机，然而这项压低保费的做法却会直接影响到我们持有44％股权的GEICO，约有10％2的保费收入系来自加州，更具威胁的是若其它州，不管是透过提案或是立法的方式，也跟进采取类似的行动，
If voters insist that auto insurance be priced below cost； it eventually must be sold by government。 Stockholders can subsidize policyholders for a short period； but only taxpayers can subsidize them over the long term。 At most property…casualty panies； socialized auto insurance would be no disaster for shareholders。 Because of the modity characteristics of the industry； most insurers earn mediocre returns and therefore have little or no economic goodwill to lose if they are forced by government to leave the auto insurance business。 But GEICO； because it is a low…cost producer able to earn high returns on equity； has a huge amount of economic goodwill at risk。 In turn； so do we。
若民众坚持汽车保险费的价格一定要低于成本，则最后可能要由政府直接来负责，股东或可暂时支应保户，但只有纳税人可以长久地给予支助，对大部分的产物意外险业者来说，社会化的汽车保险对于其股东不会有太大影响，因为由于这个产业是属于大众产品，保险业者所赚的投资报酬平平，所以若因此被政府强迫退出市场，也不会有太大的商誉损失，但GEICO就不一样了，由于它的成本低，相对地可以获得高报酬，所以可能会有很大的潜在商誉损失，而这当然会连带影响到我们。
At Berkshire； in 1988； our premium volume continued to fall； and in 1989 we will experience a large decrease for a special reason： The contract through which we receive 7％ of the business of Fireman Fund expires on August 31。 At that time； we will return to Fireman Fund the unearned premiums we hold that relate to the contract。 This transfer of funds will show up in our remiums written？account as a negative 85 million or so and will make our third…quarter figures look rather peculiar。 However； the termination of this contract will not have a significant effect on profits。
在1988年Berkshire的保费收入持续减少，到了1989年我们预期保费收入还会大幅下滑，一方面是因为消防人员退休基金即将于八月底到期，届时依合约我们必须将未到期的保费退还，估计总共退回的金额8；500万美元，这将使得我们第三季的数字看起来有点奇怪，当然这对于我们公司本身的获利不会造成太大的影响。
Berkshire underwriting results continued to be excellent in 1988。 Our bined ratio （on a statutory basis and excluding structured settlements and financial reinsurance） was 104。 Reserve development was favorable for the second year in a row； after a string of years in which it was very unsatisfactory。 Details on both underwriting and reserve development appear on pages 36…38。
Berkshire 1988年的承保表现依旧相当不错，我们的综合比率（依照法定基础扣除和解与财务再保）大约在104，损失准备提列在前几年不佳后，连续两年情况还算良好）
Our insurance volume over the next few years is likely to run very low； since business with a reasonable potential for profit will almost certainly be scarce。 So be it。 At Berkshire； we simply will not write policies at rates that carry the expectation of economic loss。 We encounter enough troubles when we expect a gain。
我们的保费收入规模预计在未来几年内都会维持在相当低的水平，因为有利可图的生意实在是少之又少，随它去，在Berkshire我们不可能在知道明明会亏钱的情况下，还去硬接生意，光是接看起来有赚头的生意，就让我们的麻烦够多了。
Despite … or perhaps because of … low volume； our profit picture during the next few years is apt to be considerably brighter than the industry。 We are sure to have an exceptional amount of float pared to premium volume； and that augurs well for profits。 In 1989 and 1990 we expect our float/premiums ratio to be at least three times that of the typical property/casualty pany。 Mike Goldberg； with special help from Ajit Jain； Dinos Iordanou； and the National Indemnity managerial team； has positioned us well in that respect。
尽管（也或许正因为如此）我们的保单量少，可以预期的我们的获利情况在未来几年内也会比同业来的出色，相较于保单量我们有高比例的浮存金，通常这代表着获利，在1989与1990这两年内，我们的浮存金/保费收入比例至少会是同业水准的三倍以上，Mike Goldberg在Ajit Jain等人的协助下，加上国家产险的经营团队使我们站在相当有利的位置。
At some point … we don know when … we will be deluged with insurance business。 The cause will probably be some major physical or financial catastrophe。 But we could also experience an explosion in business； as we did in 1985； because large and increasing underwriting losses at other panies coincide with their recognition that they are far underreserved。 in the meantime； we will retain our talented professionals； protect our capital； and try not to make major mistakes。
有一点我们不知道什么时候，我们会被保险事业拖垮，有可能会是一些重大的天然或是经济上的意外，但我们也有可能会遇到像1985年一样爆炸性的成长，因为当其它同业因长期杀价抢单，一夕之间损失突然爆发，才发现损失提列准备远远不足，在那种情况下，我们一定会稳固好我们的专业人员与资本并尽量避免犯下重大的错误。
Marketable Securities
有价证券投资
In selecting marketable securities for our insurance panies； we can choose among five major categories： （1） long…term mon stock investments； （2） medium…term fixed…ine securities； （3） long…term fixed…ine securities； （4） short…term cash equivalents； and （5） short…term arbitrage mitments。
在为我们的保险事业选择有价证券投资之时，我们主要有五种选择（1）长期股票投资（2）长期固定收益债券（3）中期固定收益债券（4）短期约当现金（5）短期套利交易
We have no particular bias when it es to choosing from these categories。 We just continuously search among them for the highest after…tax returns as measured by mathematical expectation；？limiting ourselves always to investment alternatives we think we understand。 Our criteria have nothing to do with maximizing immediately reportable earnings； our goal； rather； is to maximize eventual net worth。
对于这五种类型的交易，我们没有特别的偏好，我们只是持续不断地寻找最高的税后报酬预计的数学期望值，且仅限于我们认为了解熟悉的投资，我们无意让与短期的帐面盈余好看，我们的目标是让长期的净值极大化。
Below we list our mon stock holdings having a value over 100 million； not including arbitrage mitments； which will be discussed later。 A small portion of these investments belongs to subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns less than 100％。
下表是我们超过一亿美元以上的普通股投资，（不包含套利交易，这部份我们后面会再谈），一部份的投资系属于Berkshire关系企业所持有
Shares pany Cost Market
…
（000s omitted）
3；000；000 Capital Cities/ABC； Inc。 。。。。。。。。。。。。。。 517；500 1；086；750
14；172；500 The Coca…Cola pany 。。。。。。。。。。。 592；540 632；448
2；400；000 Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation Preferred* 。。。。。。。。。。。。 71；729 121；200
6；850；000 GEICO Corporation 。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。 45；713 849；400
1；727；765 The Washington Post pany 。。。 9；731 364；126
*Although nominally a preferred stock； this security is financially equivalent to a mon stock。
Our permanent holdings … Capital Cities/ABC； Inc。； GEICO Corporation； and The Washington Post pany … remain unchanged。 Also unchanged is our unqualified admiration of their managements： Tom Murphy and Dan Burke at Cap Cities； Bill Snyder and Lou Simpson at GEICO； and Kay Graham and Dick Simmons at The Washington Post。 Charlie and I appreciate enormously the talent and integrity these managers bring to their businesses。
我们永久的持股…资本