按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
e enormously the talent and integrity these managers bring to their businesses。
我们永久的持股…资本城/ABC、GEICO汽车保险与华盛顿邮报依旧不变，同样不变的是我们对于这些管理阶层无条件的敬仰，不管是资本城/ABC的Tom Murphy 与 Dan Burke、GEICO汽车保险的Bill Snyder 与Lou Simpson，还有华盛顿邮报的Kay Graham与 Dick Simmons，查理跟我对于他们所展现的才能与品格同感敬佩。
Their performance； which we have observed at close range； contrasts vividly with that of many CEOs； which we have fortunately observed from a safe distance。 Sometimes these CEOs clearly do not belong in their jobs； their positions； nevertheless； are usually secure。 The supreme irony of business management is that it is far easier for an inadequate CEO to keep his job than it is for an inadequate subordinate。
他们的表现，就我们最近距离的观察，与许多公司的CEO截然不同，所幸我们能与后者保持适当的距离，因为有时这些CEO实在是不适任，但却总是能够坐稳其宝座，企业管理最讽刺的就是不适任的老板要比不适任的部属更容易保住其位置。
If a secretary； say； is hired for a job that requires typing ability of at least 80 words a minute and turns out to be capable of only 50 words a minute； she will lose her job in no time。 There is a logical standard for this job； performance is easily measured； and if you can make the grade； youe out。 Similarly； if new sales people fail to generate sufficient business quickly enough； they will be let go。 Excuses will not be accepted as a substitute for orders。
假设一位秘书在应征时被要求一分钟要能够打80个字，但录取之后被发现一分钟只能打50个字，很快地她就可能会被炒鱿鱼，因为有一个相当客观的标准在那里，其表现如何很容易可以衡量的出来；同样的，一个新进的业务，若是不能马上创造足够业绩，可能立刻就要走路，为了维持纪律，很难允许有例外情形发生。
However； a CEO who doesn perform is frequently carried indefinitely。 One reason is that performance standards for his job seldom exist。 When they do； they are often fuzzy or they may be waived or explained away； even when the performance shortfalls are major and repeated。 At too many panies； the boss shoots the arrow of managerial performance and then hastily paints the bullseye around the spot where it lands。
但是一个CEO表现不好，却可以无限期的撑下去，一个原因就是根本没有一套可以衡量其表现的标准存在，就算真的有，也是写的很模糊，或是含混解释过去，即便是错误与过失一再发生也是如此，有太多的公司是等老板射箭出去后，再到墙上把准心描上去。
Another important； but seldom recognized； distinctionbetween the boss and the foot soldier is that the CEO has no immediate superior whose performance is itself getting measured。 The sales manager who retains a bunch of lemons in his sales force will soon be in hot water himself。 It is in his immediate self…interest to promptly weed out his hiring mistakes。 Otherwise； he himself may be weeded out。 An office manager who has hired inept secretaries faces the same imperative。
另外一个很重要但却很少被提起老板与员工之间的差别是老板本身没有一个直接可以衡量判断其表现的上司，业务经理不可能让一颗老鼠屎一直留在他那一锅粥之内，他一定会很快地把它给挑出来，否则可能连他自己都会有问题，同样的一个老板要是请到一位无能的秘书，也会有相同的动作。
But the CEOboss is a Board of Directors that seldom measures itself and is infrequently held to account for substandard corporate performance。 If the Board makes a mistake in hiring； and perpetuates that mistake； so what？ Even if the pany is taken over because of the mistake； the deal will probably bestow substantial benefits on the outgoing Board members。 （The bigger they are； the softer they fall。）
但CEO的上司也就是董事会却很少检视其绩效，并为企业表现不佳负责，就算董事会选错了人，而且这个错误还持续存在又怎样？即使因为这样使得公司被接收，通常交易也会确保被逐出的董事会成员有丰厚的利益（且通常公司越大，甜头越多）
Finally； relations between the Board and the CEO are expected to be congenial。 At board meetings； criticism of the CEO performance is often viewed as the social equivalent of belching。 No such inhibitions restrain the office manager from critically evaluating the substandard typist。
最后董事会与CEO之间的关系应该是要能够意气相投，在董事会议当中，对于CEO表现的批评就好象是在社交场合中打嗝一样不自然，但却没有一位经理人会被禁止不准严格地审核打字员的绩效。
These points should not be interpreted as a blanket condemnation of CEOs or Boards of Directors： Most are able and hard…working； and a number are truly outstanding。 But the management failings that Charlie and I have seen make us thankful that we are linked with the managers of our three permanent holdings。 They love their businesses； they think like owners； and they exude integrity and ability。
以上几点不是要一杆子打翻一条船，大部分的CEO或是董事会都相当努力、能干，有一小部份更是特别的杰出，但查理跟我在看过很多失败的例子之后，更加对于我们能够与前面三家公司优秀的经理人共事感到非常幸运，他们热爱他们的事业，想法跟老板一致，且散发出才气与品格。
In 1988 we made major purchases of Federal Home Loan Mortgage Pfd。 （reddie Mac？ and Coca Cola。 We expect to hold these securities for a long time。 In fact； when we own portions of outstanding businesses with outstanding managements； our favorite holding period is forever。 We are just the opposite of those who hurry to sell and book profits when panies perform well but who tenaciously hang on to businesses that disappoint。 Peter Lynch aptly likens such behavior to cutting the flowers and watering the weeds。 Our holdings of Freddie Mac are the maximum allowed by law； and are extensively described by Charlie in his letter。 In our consolidated balance sheet these shares are carried at cost rather than market； since they are owned by Mutual Savings and Loan； a non…insurance subsidiary。
1988年我们做出两项重大的决定，大笔买进联邦家庭贷款抵押公司（Freddie Mac）与可口可乐，我们打算要持有这些股票很长的一段期间，事实上当我们发现我们持有兼具杰出企业与杰出经理人的股权时，我们最长的投资期间是永久，我们跟那些急着想要卖出表现不错的股票以实现获利却顽固地不肯出脱那些绩效差的股份的那群人完全相反。彼得林区生动地将这种行为解释成砍除花朵来当作野草的肥料，我们持有Freddie Mac的股份比例是法令规定的上限，这部份查理在后面会详加为各位说明，因为他们是属于共同储贷…我们一家非保险的子公司所投资，所以在我们的合并资产负债表当中，这些持股将以成本而非市价列示。
We continue to concentrate our investments in a very few panies that we try to understand well。 There are only a handful of businesses about which we have strong long…term convictions。 Therefore； when we find such a business； we want to participate in a meaningful way。 We agree with Mae West： too much of a good thing can be wonderful。？
我们持续将投资集中在少数我们能够了解的公司之上，只有少部份是我们想要长期投入的，因为当我们好不容易找到这样的公司时，我们会想要达到一定的参与程度，我们同意Mae West的看法，好东西当然是多多益善。
We reduced our holdings of medium…term tax…exempt bonds by about 100 million last year。 All of the bonds sold were acquired after August 7； 1986。 When such bonds are held by property…casualty insurance panies； 15％ of the ax…exempt？ interest earned is subject to tax。
去年我们减少在中期免税债券约一亿美元的投资，所有卖出的债券都是在1986年之后才取得的，当这些债券由产险公司所持有的时候，其中15％的利息收入是要课税的。
The 800 million position we still hold consists almost entirely of bonds randfathered？under the Tax Reform Act of 1986； which means they are entirely tax…exempt。 Our sales produced a small profit and our remaining bonds； which have an average maturity of about six years； are worth modestly more than carrying value。
剩下我们仍持有约8亿美元的债券，都是属于适用1986年租税改革法案完全免税的祖父级债券，出售的债券将有些许的获利，而继续持有的债券平均到期日大概是六年，其市价大概略高于帐面价值。
Last year we described our holdings of short…term and intermediate…term bonds of Texaco； which was then in bankruptcy。 During 1988； we sold practically all of these bonds at a pre…tax profit of about 22 million。 This sale explains close to 100 million of the reduction in fixed…ine securities on our balance sheet。
去年我们曾提及我们所持有的已破产的Texaco短期与中期公司债券，1988年我们已经将所有的部位处分，获利约2；200万美元，此举将使得我们在固定收益债券的投资部位减少1亿美元。
We also told you last year about our holdings of another security whose predominant characteristics are those of an intermediate fixed…ine issue： our 700 million position in Salomon Inc 9％ convertible preferred。 This preferred has a sinking fund that will retire it in equal annual installments from 1995 to 1999。 Berkshire carries this holding at cost。 For reasons discussed by Charlie on page 69； the estimated market value of our holding has improved from moderately under cost at the end of last year to moderately over cost at 1988 year end。
去年我们还提到了另外一个深具固定收益特色的投资：亦即所罗门公司9％可转换特别股，这种特别股特别要求公司提拨偿债基金，自1995年到1999年间分批赎回，Berkshire将这些投资以成本列示在帐上，基于查理所提的原因，现在的估计市价以从前一年度略低于成本，转变为1988年的略高于成本。
The close association we have had with John Gutfreund； CEO of Salomon； during the past year has reinforced our admiration for him。 But we continue to have no great insights about the near； intermediate or long…term economics of the investment banking business： This is not an industry in which it is easy to forecast future levels of profitability。 We continue to