按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
most of their time monitoring both the progress of deals and the market movements of the related stocks。 This is not how Charlie nor I wish to spend our lives。 （What the sense in getting rich just to stare at a ticker tape all day？）
Berkshire的套利活动与其它套利客有些不同，首先相较于一般套利客一年从事好几十个案子，每年我们只参与少数通常是大型的交易案，有这么多锅子同时在煮，他们必须花很多时间在监控交易的进度与相关股票的股价变动，这并不是查理跟我想要过的生活方式，（为了致富，整天盯着计算机屏幕到底有何意义？）
Because we diversify so little； one particularly profitable or unprofitable transaction will affect our yearly result from arbitrage far more than it will the typical arbitrage operation。 So far； Berkshire has not had a really bad experience。 But we will … and when it happens we will report the gory details to you。
也因为我们只专注在少数几个案子，所以一个特别好或是特别差的案子，可能会大大地影响到我们一整年的套利成绩，所幸到目前为止，Berkshire还没有遇到什么惨痛的经验，一旦发生我一定会一五一十的向各位报告。
The other way we differ from some arbitrage operations is that we participate only in transactions that have been publicly announced。 We do not trade on rumors or try to guess takeover candidates。 We just read the newspapers； think about a few of the big propositions； and go by our own sense of probabilities。
另有一点不同的是我们只参与已经公开对外宣布的案子，我们不会仅靠着谣言或是去预测可能被购并的对象，我们只看报纸，思考几项关键因素，并依照我们判断的可能性做决定。
At yearend； our only major arbitrage position was 3；342；000 shares of RJR Nabisco with a cost of 281。8 million and a market value of 304。5 million。 In January we increased our holdings to roughly four million shares and in February we eliminated our position。 About three million shares were accepted when we tendered our holdings to KKR； which acquired RJR； and the returned shares were promptly sold in the market。 Our pre…tax profit was a better…than…expected 64 million。
到了年底，我们剩下唯一的套利投资是334。2万股的RJR Nabisco，投资成本2。82亿美元，目前市价3。04亿美元，今年一月我们增加持股到400万股，接着在二月全部出清。有300万股是KKR决定购并RJR后，我们卖给KKR的，获利6；400万美元略高于预期。
Earlier； another familiar face turned up in the RJR bidding contest： Jay Pritzker； who was part of a First Boston group that made a tax…oriented offer。 To quote Yogi Berra； it was deja vu all over again。？
稍早之前，另外一个竞争对手Jay Pritzker…第一波士顿集团浮现加入对RJR的竞争行列，提出以租税规划为导向的提案，套句Yogi Berra的说法：这感觉识曾相识！
During most of the time when we normally would have been purchasers of RJR； our activities in the stock were restricted because of Salomon participation in a bidding group。 Customarily； Charlie and I； though we are directors of Salomon； are walled off from information about its merger and acquisition work。 We have asked that it be that way： The information would do us no good and could； in fact； occasionally inhibit Berkshirearbitrage operations。
大部分的时间我们买进RJR相当大的限制，由于我们在也是竞争者的所罗兄公司有投资，虽然查理跟我都是所罗门的董事，但我们却与整个购并案的所有信息隔绝，而我们认为这样也好，额外的信息对我们不见得就有好处，事实上，有时还会妨碍到Berkshire进行套利的投资。
However； the unusually large mitment that Salomon proposed to make in the RJR deal required that all directors be fully informed and involved。 Therefore； Berkshire purchases of RJR were made at only two times： first； in the few days immediately following management announcement of buyout plans； before Salomon became involved； and considerably later； after the RJR board made its decision in favor of KKR。 Because we could not buy at other times； our directorships cost Berkshire significant money。
然而由于所罗门的提案规模相当的大，以致于所有的董事都必须完全被知会并参与，因此Berkshire总共只有两个时点可以进行买进RJR的动作，第一次是当RJR经营阶层宣布整个购并计画的几天内，当时所罗门还未宣布加入竞标，另外是后来RJR董事会决定优先考虑KKR的提案，也因为所罗门的董事职务，使得Berkshire的投资成本大大提高。
Considering Berkshire good results in 1988； you might expect us to pile into arbitrage during 1989。 Instead； we expect to be on the sidelines。
看到1988年如此丰硕的套利成果，你可能会觉得我们应该继续朝这方面加强，但事实上，我们决定采取观望的态度。
One pleasant reason is that our cash holdings are down … because our position in equities that we expect to hold for a very long time is substantially up。 As regular readers of this report know； our new mitments are not based on a judgment about short…term prospects for the stock market。 Rather； they reflect an opinion about long…term business prospects for specific panies。 We do not have； never have had； and never will have an opinion about where the stock market； interest rates； or business activity will be a year from now。
一个好的理由是因为我们决定大幅提高在长期股权方面的投资，所以目前的现金水位已经下降，常常读我们年报的人可能都知道，我们的决定不是基于短期股市的表现，反而我们注重的是个别企业的长期经济展望，我们从来没有、以后也不会对短期股市、利率或企业活动做任何的评论。
Even if we had a lot of cash we probably would do little in arbitrage in 1989。 Some extraordinary excesses have developed in the takeover field。 As Dorothy says： oto； I have a feeling wee not in Kansas any more。？
然而就算是我们现金满满，我们在1989年可能也不会从事太多的套利交易，购并市场的发展已经有点过头了，就像桃乐斯所说的：「奥图，我觉得我们好象已经不是在堪萨斯市了！」
We have no idea how long the excesses will last； nor do we know what will change the attitudes of government； lender and buyer that fuel them。 But we do know that the less the prudence with which others conduct their affairs； the greater the prudence with which we should conduct our own affairs。 We have no desireto arbitrage transactions that reflect the unbridled … and； in our view； often unwarranted … optimism of both buyers and lenders。 In our activities； we will heed the wisdom of Herb Stein： if something can go on forever； it will end。？
我们不太确定这种过热的现象会持续多久，包含参与热潮的政府、金主与买家的态度会如何转变，不过我们可以确定的是，当别人越没有信心参与这些活动时，我们的信心也就越高，我们不愿意参与那些反应买方与金主无可救药的乐观，通常我们认为那是无保障的，在此我们宁愿注重Herb Stein的智能，若一件事不能持久不衰，那么它终将结束。
Efficient Market Theory
效率市场理论
The preceding discussion about arbitrage makes a small discussion of fficient market theory？（EMT） also seem relevant。 This doctrine became highly fashionable … indeed； almost holy scripture in academic circles during the 1970s。 Essentially； it said that analyzing stocks was useless because all public information about them was appropriately reflected in their prices。 In other words； the market always knew everything。 As a corollary； the professors who taught EMT said that someone throwing darts at the stock tables could select a stock portfolio having prospects just as good as one selected by the brightest； most hard…working security analyst。 Amazingly； EMT was embraced not only by academics； but by many investment professionals and corporate managers as well。 Observing correctly that the market was frequently efficient； they went on to conclude incorrectly that it was always efficient。 The difference between these propositions is night and day。
前面提到的套利活动使得我们有必要讨论一下市场效率理论，这理论在近年来变得非常热门，尤其在1970年代的学术圈被奉为圣旨，基本上它认为分析股票是没有用的，因为所有公开的信息皆已反应在其股价之上，换句话说，市场永远知道所有的事，学校教市场效率理论的教授因此做了一个推论，比喻说任何一个人射飞镖随机所选出来的股票组合可以媲美，华尔街最聪明、最努力的证券分析师所选出来的投资组合，令人惊讶的是市场效率理论不但为学术界所拥抱，更被许多投资专家与企业经理人所接受，正确地观察到市场往往是具有效率的，他们却继续下了错误的结论，市场永远都具有效率，这中间的假设差异，简直有天壤之别。
In my opinion； the continuous 63…year arbitrage experience of Graham…Newman Corp。 Buffett Partnership； and Berkshire illustrates just how foolish EMT is。 （There plenty of other evidence； also。） While at Graham…Newman； I made a study of its earnings from arbitrage during the entire 1926…1956 lifespan of the pany。 Unleveraged returns averaged 20％ per year。 Starting in 1956； I applied Ben Graham arbitrage principles； first at Buffett Partnership and then Berkshire。 Though Ie not made an exact calculation； I have done enough work to know that the 1956…1988 returns averaged well over 20％。 （Of course； I operated in an environment far more favorable than Ben； he had 1929…1932 to contend with。）
就我个人的看法，就我个人过去在葛拉罕…纽曼公司、巴菲特合伙企业与Berkshire公司连续63年的套利经验，说明了效率市场理论有多么的愚蠢（当然还有其它一堆证据），当初在葛拉罕…纽曼公司上班时，我将该公司1926年到1956年的套利成果做了一番研究，每年平均20％的投资报酬率，之后从1956年开始我在巴菲特合伙企业与之后的Berkshire公司，运用葛拉罕的套利原则，虽然我并没有仔细地去算，但1956年到1988年间的投资报酬率应该也有超过20％，（当然之后的投资环境比起葛拉罕当时要好的许多，因为当时他遇到过1929…1932年的景气大萧条）。
All of the conditions are present that are required for a fair test of portfolio performance： （1） the three organizations traded hundreds of different securities while building this 63…year record； （2） the results are not