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traded hundreds of different securities while building this 63…year record； （2） the results are not skewed by a few fortunate experiences； （3） we did not have to dig for obscure facts or develop keen insights about products or managements … we simply acted on highly…publicized events； and （4） our arbitrage positions were a clearly identified universe … they have not been selected by hindsight。
所有的条件皆以具备来公平测试投资组合的表现（1）三个公司63年来买卖了上百种不同的股票证券（2）结果应该不会因为某个特别好的个案所扭曲（3）我们不需要故意隐瞒事实或是宣扬我们的产品优秀或是经营者眼光独到，我们只是从事高度公开的个案（4）我们的套利部份可以很容易就被追查到，他们并不是事后才特别挑选出来的
Over the 63 years； the general market delivered just under a 10％ annual return； including dividends。 That means 1；000 would have grown to 405；000 if all ine had been reinvested。 A 20％ rate of return； however； would have produced 97 million。 That strikes us as a statistically…significant differential that might； conceivably； arouse one curiosity。
过去63年来，大盘整体的投资报酬（加计股利）大概只有10％，意思是说若当初投入1；000美元的话，现在可以获得405；000美元，但是若投资报酬率改为20％的话，现在却会变成9；700万美元，统计上如此大的差异使得我们不禁好奇的想要怀疑，然而理论支持者从来就不会去注意理论与现实如此地不相符，确实现在他们讲话已不如过去那么大声，但据我所知却没有任何一个人愿意承认错误，不管他们已经误导了多少个学生，市场效率理论还是继续在各个企管名校间列为投资课程的重要教材之一，很显然的，死不悔改、甚而曲解神意，不是只有神学家才做的出来。
Yet proponents of the theory have never seemed interested in discordant evidence of this type。 True； they don talk quite as much about their theory today as they used to。 But no one； to my knowledge； has ever said he was wrong； no matter how many thousands of students he has sent forth misinstructed。 EMT； moreover； continues to be an integral part of the investment curriculum at major business schools。 Apparently； a reluctance to recant； and thereby to demystify the priesthood； is not limited to theologians。 Naturally the disservice done students and gullible investment professionals who have swallowed EMT has been an extraordinary service to us and other followers of Graham。 In any sort of a contest … financial； mental； or physical … it an enormous advantage to have opponents who have been taught that it useless to even try。 From a selfish point of view； Grahamites should probably endow chairs to ensure the perpetual teaching of EMT。
自然而然，这些遇人不淑的学生与被骗的投资专家在接受市场效率理论后，对于我们与其它葛拉罕的追随者实在有莫大的帮助，在任何的竞赛中，不管是投资、心智或是体能方面，要是遇到对手被告知思考与尝试是没有用的，对我们来说等于是占尽了优势，从一个自私的观点来看，葛拉罕学派应该祈祷市场效率理论能够在校园中永为流传。
All this said； a warning is appropriate。 Arbitrage has looked easy recently。 But this is not a form of investing that guarantees profits of 20％ a year or； for that matter； profits of any kind。 As noted； the market is reasonably efficient much of the time： For every arbitrage opportunity we seized in that 63…year period； many more were foregone because they seemed properly…priced。
说了那么多，最后还是要提出一个警告，最近套利看起来相当容易，但它却不是永远都保证有20％报酬的投资活动，现在的市场比起过去来的有效率许多，除了我们过去63年所真正掌握的套利活动之外，还有更多是因为价格合理而因此被舍弃掉的。
An investor cannot obtain superior profits from stocks by simply mitting to a specific investment category or style。 He can earn them only by carefully evaluating facts and continuously exercising discipline。 Investing in arbitrage situations； per se； is no better a strategy than selecting a portfolio by throwing darts。
一个投资者很难只靠单一一种投资类别或投资风格而创造超人的利益，他只能靠着仔细评估事实并持续地遵照原则才能赚取超额利润，就套利投资本身而言，并没有比选择利用飞镖选股的策略好到哪里去。
New York Stock Exchange Listing
纽约证券交易所挂牌
Berkshire shares were listed on the New York Stock Exchange on November 29； 1988。 On pages 50…51 we reproduce the letter we sent to shareholders concerning the listing。
Berkshire的股份于1988年11月29日正式在纽约证券交易所挂牌，后面附有我们写给股东有关挂牌的正式声明。
Let me clarify one point not dealt with in the letter： Though our round lot for trading on the NYSE is ten shares； any number of shares from one on up can be bought or sold。
除了那封信之外，我个人还有一点要说明，虽然我们在交易所的基本交易单位是10股，但只要是1股以上还是一样可以进行买卖。
As the letter explains； our primary goal in listing was to reduce transaction costs； and we believe this goal is being achieved。 Generally； the spread between the bid and asked price on the NYSE has been well below the spread that prevailed in the over…the…counter market。
另外如同信中所提到的，我们之所以决定挂牌的主要目的是要降低交易成本，而我相信这目的也已经达到，一般来说，在NYSE买卖之间的价差会比在柜台买卖要来得小的多。
Henderson Brothers； Inc。； the specialist in our shares； is the oldest continuing specialist firm on the Exchange； its progenitor； William Thomas Henderson； bought his seat for 500 on September 8； 1861。 （Recently； seats were selling for about 625；000。） Among the 54 firms acting as specialists； HBI ranks second in number of stocks assigned； with 83。 We were pleased when Berkshire was allocated to HBI； and have been delighted with the firm performance。 Jim Maguire； Chairman of HBI； personally manages the trading in Berkshire； and we could not be in better hands。
负责买卖Berkshire股份的是Henderson兄弟公司…交易所中一家老牌专家，它的前身William Thomas Henderson，是在1861年以500块美金买下一个交易所的席位（最近一个席位的成交价大约是62。5万美金），在所有54家交易公司当中，HBI共被分配到第二多的83种股票，我们很高兴Berkshire能够被分配给HBI负责交易，到目前为止对于他们的服务感到相当满意，该公司负责人Jim Maguire亲自负责Berkshire的交易，他是我们可以找到的最佳人选。
In two respects our goals probably differ somewhat from those of most listed panies。 First； we do not want to maximize the price at which Berkshire shares trade。 We wish instead for them to trade in a narrow range centered at intrinsic business value （which we hope increases at a reasonable … or； better yet； unreasonable … rate）。 Charlie and I are bothered as much by significant overvaluation as significant undervaluation。 Both extremes will inevitably produce results for many shareholders that will differ sharply from Berkshire business results。 If our stock price instead consistently mirrors business value； each of our shareholders will receive an investment result that roughly parallels the business results of Berkshire during his holding period。
有两点是我们与其它挂牌公司最大不同的地方，第一我们不希望Berkshire的股价过高，主要是希望它能够反应的实质价值范围内交易（当然我们希望实质价值能够以合理的速度增加，当然能够不合理的增加更好），查理跟我都不希望，股价被过分高估或是被过分低估，两者都会使Berkshire的股东的获利与公司本身经营获利状况不相当，所以如果Berkshire的股价持续地反应企业实质的价值，则我们可以确定每个股东在他持有公司股份的期间所获得的利益，都能与公司本身营运的获利成等比。
Second； we wish for very little trading activity。 If we ran a private business with a few passive partners； we would be disappointed if those partners； and their replacements； frequently wanted to leave the partnership。 Running a public pany； we feel the same way。
第二我们希望交易量越少越好，如果我们经营的是一家只有几位合伙人的私人企业，我们也不希望合伙人时常进进出出合伙事业，经营一家公开上市公司也是同样的道理。
Our goal is to attract long…term owners who； at the time of purchase； have no timetable or price target for sale but plan instead to stay with us indefinitely。 We don understand the CEO who wants lots of stock activity； for that can be achievedonly if many of his owners are constantly exiting。 At what other organization … school； club； church； etc。 … do leaders cheer when members leave？ （However； if there were a broker whose livelihood depended upon the membership turnover in such organizations； you could be sure that there would be at least one proponent of activity； as in： here has not been much going on in Christianity for a while； maybe we should switch to Buddhism next week。？
我们希望能够吸引具有远见的投资人，在买进股份时，抱着打算与我们永远同在而不是订有卖出价格的时间表，我们实在不能理解为何有公司的CEO希望自己公司的股份交易量越多越好，这代表公司的股东组合会变来变去，在其它如学校、俱乐部、教堂等社会机构当中，没有主持人希望自己的组织成员离开的，（然而偏偏就有营业员就是要靠着说服成员离开组织来维生，你有没有听过有人劝你反正最近基督教也没有什么搞头，不如下礼拜大家改信佛教试一试）。
Of course； some Berkshire owners will need or want to sell from time to time； and we wish for good replacements who will pay them a fair price。 Therefore we try； through our policies； performance； and munications； to attract new shareholders who understand our operations； share our time horizons； and measure us as we measure ourselves。 If we can continue to attract this sort of shareholder … and； just as important； can continue to be uninteresting to those with short…term or unrealistic expectations … Berkshire shares should consistently sell at prices reasonably related to business value。
当然还是有些Berkshire股东需要或是想要偶尔把他持有的股份卖掉，而我们希望能够找到合适的人以