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above 100 indicates a loss。 When the investment ine that an insurer earns from holding policyholders' funds （〃the float〃） is taken into account； a bined ratio in the 107…111 range typically produces an overall breakeven result； exclusive of earnings on the funds provided by shareholders。
综合比率代表保险的总成本（理赔损失加上费用）占保费收入的比例，比率在100以下代表有承保的损失，在100以上则代表有承保的获利综合比率代表的是保险的总成本（损失加上费用）占保费收入的比率，100以下代表会有承销利益，100以上代表会有承销损失，若把持有保费收入浮存金（扣除股东权益部份所产生的盈余）所产生的投资收益列入考量，损益两平的范围大概是在107…111之间。
For the reasons laid out in previous reports； we expect the industry's incurred losses to grow by about 10％ annually； even in years when general inflation runs considerably lower。 （Actually； over the last 25 years； incurred losses have grown at a still faster rate； 11％。） If premium growth meanwhile materially lags that 10％ rate； underwriting losses will mount； though the industry's tendency to underreserve when business turns bad may obscure their size for a time。
基于前几次年报所说明的理由，即使是通货膨胀在这几年来相对温和，我们预期保险业每年损失增加的比率约在10％左右，若是保费收入成长没有到达10％以上，损失一定会增加，（事实上过去25年以来，理赔损失系以11％的速度在成长），虽然保险公司在景气不好时，会习惯性地将损失暂时隐藏起来。
Last year we said the climb in the bined ratio was 〃almost certain to continue … and probably will accelerate … for at least two more years。〃 This year we will not predict acceleration； but otherwise must repeat last year's forecast。 Premium growth is running far below the 10％ required annually。 Remember also that a 10％ rate would only stabilize the bined ratio； not bring it down。
去年我们曾说若综合比率八成会继续上升，甚至在未来两年内还会加速，今年我们不再做加速的预期，不然的话还会再重复去年的预测，保费收入成长的幅度远低于每年最低10％成长的要求，而且大家要记住，10％只表示能抑止综合比率上升的情况，却不能使它下降。
The increase in the bined ratio in 1989 was a little more than we had expected because catastrophes （led by Hurricane Hugo） were unusually severe。 These abnormalities probably accounted for about two points of the increase。 If 1990 is more of a 〃normal〃 year； the bined ratio should rise only minimally from the catastrophe…swollen base of 1989。 In 1991； though； the ratio is apt to climb by a greater degree。
1989年的综合比率增加的幅度略高于我们的预期，原因在于意外灾害（主要是Hugo飓风）特别严重，这部份造成的影响大约占了2个百分点，假若1990年能够回到正常情况，相较于1989年略微膨胀的基础，综合比率可能只会增加一点点，然后到了1991年可能又会提高增加的幅度。
mentators frequently discuss the 〃underwriting cycle〃 and speculate about its next turn。 If that term is used to connote rhythmic qualities； it is in our view a misnomer that leads to faulty thinking about the industry's fundamental economics。
产业评论家常常会讨论到承保循环并预测它下一次反转的时点，若那个名词是用来暗示有节奏性的本质，则我们认为那他们就有点张冠李戴的把这个产业情况搞错了。
The term was appropriate some decades ago when the industry and regulators cooperated to conduct the business in cartel fashion。 At that time； the bined ratio fluctuated rhythmically for two reasons； both related to lags。 First； data from the past were analyzed and then used to set new 〃corrected〃 rates； which were subsequently put into effect by virtually all insurers。 Second； the fact that almost all policies were then issued for a one…to three…year term … which meant that it took a considerable time for mispriced policies to expire … delayed the impact of new rates on revenues。 These two lagged responses made bined ratios behave much like alternating current。 Meanwhile； the absence of significant price petition guaranteed that industry profits； averaged out over the cycle； would be satisfactory。
这个名词在几十年前当产业界与政府单位通力合作维持一个类似卡特尔组织时或许还适用，在那个年代，综合比率只因两个原因上下变动，两者都具有递延性，第一是过去的信息会被分析然而据以订定新的费率，一体适用于所有的保险业者之上；第二所有的保单通常是一次以三年为期，这代表着一张有问题的保单通常要花三年才能解决，所以新费率的实施影响有其递延性，这两个因素使得综合比率的变化有脉络可循，同时没有价格的竞争通常就保证可以有稳定的获利，意味着整个循环下来可以获致满意的报酬。
The cartel period is long gone。 Now the industry has hundreds of participants selling a modity…like product at independently…established prices。 Such a configuration … whether the product being sold is steel or insurance policies … is certain to cause subnormal profitability in all circumstances but one： a shortage of usable capacity。 Just how often these periods occur and how long they last determines the average profitability of the industry in question。
不过卡特尔的年代早已过去，现在的产业有几百家公司在销售同一种商品，价格各自独立，在这种情况下，不管所卖的商品是钢铁或是保单，除了产能短缺的情况之外，整体同业的获利一定很可怜，不过却须视所处产业的获利情况来决定短缺情况的发生时点与期间长短。
In most industries； capacity is described in physical terms。 In the insurance world； however； capacity is customarily described in financial terms； that is； it's considered appropriate for a pany to write no more than X dollars of business if it has Y dollars of net worth。 In practice； however； constraints of this sort have proven ineffective。 Regulators； insurance brokers； and customers are all slow to discipline panies that strain their resources。 They also acquiesce when panies grossly overstate their true capital。 Hence； a pany can write a great deal of business with very little capital if it is so inclined。 At bottom； therefore； the amount of industry capacity at any particular moment primarily depends on the mental state of insurance managers。
在大部分的产业，产能是以具体的事物来呈现，不过在保险的世界里，产能所代表的却是指财务数字，亦即假设一家公司的净值有Y，那么他可以承接的保单大概就只能有X，就实务而言，做这样的限制其实效果相当有限，主管机关、保险掮客与客户对于其节制背后的保险公司的反应都很慢，而且就算真正的资本有被夸大的情况，他们也给予姑息，因此一家资本额不大的保险公司若他们愿意，照样可以接下一大堆保单，因此整个保险业的供给能量，主要还是视保险公司经理人本身的心态而定。
All this understood； it is not very difficult to prognosticate the industry's profits。 Good profits will be realized only when there is a shortage of capacity。 Shortages will occur only when insurers are frightened。 That happens rarely … and most assuredly is not happening now。
在了解内情之后，大家不难预知这个产业未来的获利情况，获利要好只有当供给短缺时才有可能发生，而供给短缺只有当保险业者感到害怕时才有可能发生，而偏偏这种情况又很少见，且可以确定短期之内不会出现。
Some analysts have argued that the more onerous taxes recently imposed on the insurance industry and 1989's catastrophes … Hurricane Hugo and the California earthquake … will cause prices to strengthen significantly。 We disagree。 These adversities have not destroyed the eagerness of insurers to write business at present prices。 Therefore； premium volume won't grow by 10％ in 1990； which means the negative underwriting trend will not reverse。
有些分析师认为最近刚实施的保险业新税法过于繁重，同时加上Hugo飓风与加州的地震，将会是保险费率大幅提高，我们并不认同这样的看法，因为这些负面的因素并不会迫使同业不以现在的价格接受保单，因此1990年的保费收入应该无法成长10％以上，也就是说整体的承保绩效可能还会继续恶化。
The industry will meantime say it needs higher prices to achieve profitability matching that of the average American business。 Of course it does。 So does the steel business。 But needs and desires have nothing to do with the long…term profitability of industries。 Instead； economic fundamentals determine the oute。 Insurance profitability will improve only when virtually all insurers are turning away business despite higher prices。 And we're a long way from that point。
业者同时也会宣称保险业需要调高价格才能维持一般美国企业的获利水平，当然事实确是如此，钢铁业也一样，但需要与想要与产业长期的获利并无绝对相关，反而是经济实质现况才是决定结果的关键因素，保险业的获利要改进，只有靠所有业者通力合作，除非价格合理否则就不接生意，但现在离那样的情况还很远。
Berkshire's premium volume may drop to 150 million or so in 1990 （from a high of 1 billion in 1986）； partly because our traditional business continues to shrink and partly because the contract under which we received 7％ of the business of Fireman's Fund expired last August。 Whatever the size of the drop； it will not disturb us。 We have no interest in writing insurance that carries a mathematical expectation of loss； we experience enough disappointments doing transactions we believe to carry an expectation of profit。
Berkshire 1990年的保费收入可能会降至1。5亿美元左右，（相较于1986年的10亿美元高点），一方面是因为我们传统的业务持续在萎缩，一方面是消防人员退休基金这项业务在去年八月已到期，但不管业务量减少多少，一点都不影响我们，我们完全没有兴趣去接那种一看就会赔钱的保单，光是那些看起来有赚头的生意就够我们受的了。
However； our appetite for appropriately…priced business is ample； as one tale from 1989 will tell。 It concerns 〃CAT covers；〃 which are reinsurance contracts that primary insurance panies （and also reinsurers themselves） buy to protect themselves against a single catastrophe； such as a tornado or hurricane； that produces losses from a large number