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inst a single catastrophe； such as a tornado or hurricane； that produces losses from a large number of policies。 In these contracts； the primary insurer might retain the loss from a single event up to a maximum of； say； 10 million； buying various layers of reinsurance above that level。 When losses exceed the retained amount； the reinsurer typically pays 95％ of the excess up to its contractual limit； with the primary insurer paying the remainder。 （By requiring the primary insurer to keep 5％ of each layer； the reinsurer leaves him with a financial stake in each loss settlement and guards against his throwing away the reinsurer's money。）
然而我们对于价格合理的生意胃口却很足够，1989年有一件事可以说明，那就是CAT防护，也就是一般保险公司（也包含再保公司本身）都会向再保公司签约买下再保合约，来免于承担像是龙卷风或是飓风等单一意外事件所可能引发钜额损失的风险，在这些再保合约中，原始的保险公司可能会保留一个单一的损失上限，例如1；000万美金，然后在此之上买进好几层的再保险，当损失超过自留的部份时，再保公司依规定就要支付超过的部份，最高比例可达95％，（之所以要求保险公司本身每层保留5％，是为了让保险公司与再保公司站在同一阵线，避免保险公司慷再保公司之凯）。
CAT covers are usually one…year policies that also provide for one automatic reinstatement； which requires a primary insurer whose coverage has been exhausted by a catastrophe to buy a second cover for the balance of the year in question by paying another premium。 This provision protects the primary pany from being 〃bare〃 for even a brief period after a first catastrophic event。 The duration of 〃an event〃 is usually limited by contract to any span of 72 hours designated by the primary pany。 Under this definition； a wide…spread storm； causing damage for three days； will be classified as a single event if it arises from a single climatic cause。 If the storm lasts four days； however； the primary pany will file a claim carving out the 72 consecutive hours during which it suffered the greatest damage。 Losses that occurred outside that period will be treated as arising from a separate event。
CAT防护的保单通常是一年期，一般可以自动延长一年，这样的条款主要是保护保险公司避免因为重大灾害发生后，投保的空窗期，事件发生的持续期间通常由合约限定在72小时以内，在这种定义之下，一场持续三天的大风暴所造成的损害，可被归类为单一事件。要是大风暴持续四天以上，则保险公司可以切割出其受害最惨重的72小时，超过的部份则必须视为另一个独立的事件。
In 1989； two unusual things happened。 First； Hurricane Hugo generated 4 billion or more of insured loss； at a pace； however； that caused the vast damage in the Carolinas to occur slightly more than 72 hours after the equally severe damage in the Caribbean。 Second； the California earthquake hit within weeks； causing insured damage that was difficult to estimate； even well after the event。 Slammed by these two … or possibly three … major catastrophes； some primary insurers； and also many reinsurers that had themselves bought CAT protection； either used up their automatic second cover or became uncertain as to whether they had done so。
1989年有两件特殊的事件发生，第一Hugo飓风造成40亿美元的损失，不过之后不久72小时，又在加勒比海发生相同规模的灾害；第二加州大地震在几个礼拜内又接连发生，造成难以估计的损失，受到这两个事件严重的打击，或者应该说是三个，许多有买CAT防身的保险公司及再保公司，立刻使用第二次投保权。
At that point sellers of CAT policies had lost a huge amount of money … perhaps twice because of the reinstatements … and not taken in much in premiums。 Depending upon many variables； a CAT premium might generally have run 3％ to 15％ of the amount of protection purchased。 For some years； we've thought premiums of that kind inadequate and have stayed away from the business。
在当时许多卖CAT保单的业者亏了一屁股，尤其是第二次投保部份，根本收不到足够的保费，由于有许多变量，保费通常会是在保额的3％到15％不等，有好几年，我们认为这种保费收入并不合理，所以没有介入这个市场。
But because the 1989 disasters left many insurers either actually or possibly bare； and also left most CAT writers licking their wounds； there was an immediate shortage after the earthquake of much…needed catastrophe coverage。 Prices instantly became attractive； particularly for the reinsurance that CAT writers themselves buy。 Just as instantly； Berkshire Hathaway offered to write up to 250 million of catastrophe coverage； advertising that proposition in trade publications。 Though we did not write all the business we sought； we did in a busy ten days book a substantial amount。
但是1989年的大灾害使得许多CAT业者穷于填补保险客户的伤口，使得地震灾后保单供给发生短缺，保费价格很快地就回到相当吸引人的水准，尤其是再保公司本身自己所买的保单，若有需要，Berkshire可以马上就签下2。5亿美元以上的保单，虽然并不是所有上门的生意都接，但忙个十天下来所签的保单金额也是相当可观。
Our willingness to put such a huge sum on the line for a loss that could occur tomorrow sets us apart from any reinsurer in the world。 There are； of course； panies that sometimes write 250 million or even far more of catastrophe coverage。 But they do so only when they can； in turn； reinsure a large percentage of the business with other panies。 When they can't 〃lay off〃 in size； they disappear from the market。
世界上再没有其它再保公司会像我们一样，愿意一口气接受如此大金额的投保，当然也有保险公司偶尔会愿意接下二亿五美金的灾害理赔保险，但是其提通常是他们可以再向其它保险公司分保出去，当他们找不到分散风险的再保公司时，他们会马上退出市场。
Berkshire's policy； conversely； is to retain the business we write rather than lay it off。 When rates carry an expectation of profit； we want to assume as much risk as is prudent。 And in our case； that's a lot。
相反地Berkshire的政策则是保留大部分的保额而不是把他们给分配掉，当保险费率看起来有利可图，我们很愿意承担更多的风险，以外界的标准而言，那应该是个大数字。
We will accept more reinsurance risk for our own account than any other pany because of two factors： （1） by the standards of regulatory accounting； we have a net worth in our insurance panies of about 6 billion … the second highest amount in the United States； and （2） we simply don't care what earnings we report quarterly； or even annually； just as long as the decisions leading to those earnings （or losses） were reached intelligently。
我们之所以愿意承担比一般保险公司更多的风险，主要有两个原因： （1）以会计原则的规范标准，我们的保险公司净值高达60亿美金，位居全美第二（2）我们并不在乎每季的短期盈余数字，就算是每年也无所谓，只要长期而言，这些决策是基于稳健获利的立场所作的明智决定。
Obviously； if we write 250 million of catastrophe coverage and retain it all ourselves； there is some probability that we will lose the full 250 million in a single quarter。 That probability is low； but it is not zero。 If we had a loss of that magnitude； our after…tax cost would be about 165 million。 Though that is far more than Berkshire normally earns in a quarter； the damage would be a blow only to our pride； not to our well…being。
很明显地如此我们接下二亿五的灾害保险，并自留大部分的保额，很有可能我们会在一夕之间损失这二亿五，这种机率虽然很低，却并不表示没有可能，若真的发生那样的损失，我们的税后损失大概会是1。65亿，相较于Berkshire每季所赚的盈余来说，只能算是个小数字，虽然会我们会丢了面子，但还不至于失了里子。
This posture is one few insurance managements will assume。 Typically； they are willing to write scads of business on terms that almost guarantee them mediocre returns on equity。 But they do not want to expose themselves to an embarrassing single…quarter loss； even if the managerial strategy that causes the loss promises； over time； to produce superior results。 I can understand their thinking： What is best for their owners is not necessarily best for the managers。 Fortunately Charlie and I have both total job security and financial interests that are identical with those of our shareholders。 We are willing to look foolish as long as we don't feel we have acted foolishly。
这种态度在保险业界来说实在是少之又少，通常一般的保险公司会愿意接下很多的保单以确定公司每年可以获得一定的利益，但他们却不愿意公司在某一个单季发生大额的损失，虽然这种短期损失可以获致更长远的利益；我想我能够体谅他们的立场，对股东最有利的事并一定对经理人最好，很幸运的查理跟我的工作保障与身家利益与所有的股东皆一致，我们愿意被人当作是傻子，只要我们自己知道我们不是个傻子。
Our method of operation； incidentally； makes us a stabilizing force in the industry。 We add huge capacity when capacity is short and we bee less petitive only when capacity is abundant。 Of course； we don't follow this policy in the interest of stabilization … we follow it because we believe it to be the most sensible and profitable course of action。 Nevertheless； our behavior steadies the market。 In this case； Adam Smith's invisible hand works as advertised。
事实上我们这样的经营策略让我们成为市场上的稳定力量，当供给短缺时，我们可以马上进场满足大家的需求，而当市场过于饱和时，我们又会立即退出市场观望，当然我们这样的做法并不只是为了达到市场的稳定而已，我们之所以会这样做是因为我们认为这样才是最合理、对大家最有利的做法，当然这样的做法间接达到稳定市场的效果，也符合亚当．史密斯所提市场有一只看不见的手的说法。
Currently； we hold an exceptional amount of float pared to premium volume。 This circumstance should produce quite favorable insurance results for us during the next few years as it did in 1989。 Our underwriting losses should be tolerable and our investment ine from policyhold