按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
蔷醯檬に闫拇笫保呕峥悸墙 �
o Leaving aside the three convertible preferreds discussed in the next section； we substantially reduced our holdings in both medium… and long…term fixed…ine securities。 In the long…terms； just about our only holdings have been Washington Public Power Supply Systems （WPPSS） bonds carrying coupons ranging from low to high。 During the year we sold a number of the low…coupon issues； which we originally bought at very large discounts。 Many of these issues had approximately doubled in price since we purchased them and in addition had paid us 15％…17％ annually； tax…free。 Our prices upon sale were only slightly cheaper than typical high…grade tax…exempts then manded。 We have kept all of our high…coupon WPPSS issues。 Some have been called for redemption in 1991 and 1992； and we expect the rest to be called in the early to mid…1990s。
除了后面会提到的三项可转换特别股投资之外，我们大幅减少在中长期的固定收益债券部位，尤其是长期部份，大概就只剩下华盛顿公用电力系统债券，去年我们处分了部份当初以相当低折价买进的低收益债券，处分价格与一般信用评等佳的债券差不多，是原始投资成本的一倍，外加每年15％到17％的免税利息，至于高收益的债券则予以保留，有些即将在1991年或1992年到期，剩下的则会在1990年中期到期赎回。
We also sold many of our medium…term tax…exempt bonds during the year。 When we bought these bonds we said we would be happy to sell them … regardless of whether they were higher or lower than at our time of purchase … if something we liked better came along。 Something did … and concurrently we unloaded most of these issues at modest gains。 Overall； our 1989 profit from the sale of tax…exempt bonds was about 51 million pre…tax。
同时我们也卖了不少中期的免税债券，当初买下这些债券时就曾说过，只要时机成熟找到更好的投资标的，我们会很高兴地把他们给处分掉，不管届时的价格是高或是低于我们的投资成本，如今时机确实成熟了，所以我们便将大部分的债券出清，所得的报酬还算不错，总结下来我们1989年从出售免税债券所获得的税前收益大概在5；100万左右。
The proceeds from our bond sales； along with our excess cash at the beginning of the year and that generated later through earnings； went into the purchase of three convertible preferred stocks。 In the first transaction； which took place in July； we purchased 600 million of The Gillette Co。 preferred with an 8 3/4％ dividend； a mandatory redemption in ten years； and the right to convert into mon at 50 per share。 We next purchased 358 million of USAir Group； Inc。 preferred stock with mandatory redemption in ten years； a dividend of 9 1/4％； and the right to convert into mon at 60 per share。 Finally； late in the year we purchased 300 million of Champion International Corp。 preferred with mandatory redemption in ten years； a 9 1/4％ dividend； and the right to convert into mon at 38 per share。
我们将出售债券所得的收入连同期初帐上的现金与年中所赚取的盈余，通通买进三种可转换特别股，第一种是在7月我们投资6亿美金在吉列刮胡刀年利率8又3/4％十年强制赎回的可转换特别股，转换价格订为50美元；之后我们又花了3。58亿美金投资美国航空年利率9又1/4％十年强制赎回的可转换特别股，转换价格订为60美元；最后我们在年底又以3亿美金投资冠军企业年利率9又1/4％十年强制赎回的可转换特别股，转换价格订为38美元。
Unlike standard convertible preferred stocks； the issues we own are either non…salable or non…convertible for considerable periods of time and there is consequently no way we can gain from short…term price blips in the mon stock。 I have gone on the board of Gillette； but I am not on the board of USAir or Champion。 （I thoroughly enjoy the boards I am on； but can't handle any more。）
不像一般的可转换特别股，这次我们所拥有的在限定时间内不得出售或转换的，所以短期间我们要靠普通股反转而获利的机会不大，我并且已经加入吉列的董事会，至于美国航空或是Champion公司则没有，（我很喜欢现有加入的董事会，但可是由于分身乏术可能无法再加入其它公司的董事会）。
Gillette's business is very much the kind we like。 Charlie and I think we understand the pany's economics and therefore believe we can make a reasonably intelligent guess about its future。 （If you haven't tried Gillette's new Sensor razor； go right out and get one。） However； we have no ability to forecast the economics of the investment banking business （in which we have a position through our 1987 purchase of Salomon convertible preferred）； the airline industry； or the paper industry。 This does not mean that we predict a negative future for these industries： we're agnostics； not atheists。 Our lack of strong convictions about these businesses； however； means that we must structure our investments in them differently from what we do when we invest in a business appearing to have splendid economic characteristics。
吉列这家公司与我们喜爱的类型非常相近，查理跟我都熟悉这个产业的环境，因此我们相信可以对这家公司的未来做一个合理的预估，（若是没有试过吉列新的感应式刮胡刀，赶紧去买一个来试试！），但是我们就没法子来预测投资银行业、航空业或是造纸业的未来前景，（我们在1987年买下所罗门公司的可转换债券） ，当然这并不表示他们的未来就是个负数，基本上我们是不可知论者，而不是无神论者。所以由于我们在这些产业上缺乏强而有力的论点支持我们，因此我们在这些产业上所采的投资方式就必须与那些显而易见的好公司好产业有所不同。
In one major respect； however； these purchases are not different： We only want to link up with people whom we like； admire； and trust。 John Gutfreund at Salomon； Colman Mockler； Jr。 at Gillette； Ed Colodny at USAir； and Andy Sigler at Champion meet this test in spades。
不过在另一方面，有一点还是很重要，我们只跟我们喜欢、欣赏且信任的人打交道，像是所罗门的John Gutfreund、吉列的Colman Mockler二世、美国航空的Ed Colodny与Champion企业的Andy Sigler都算是符合我们的标准。
They in turn have demonstrated some confidence in us； insisting in each case that our preferreds have unrestricted voting rights on a fully…converted basis； an arrangement that is far from standard in corporate finance。 In effect they are trusting us to be intelligent owners； thinking about tomorrow instead of today； just as we are trusting them to be intelligent managers； thinking about tomorrow as well as today。
同时他们对我们也相当的信任，坚持给我们无限制的转换权利，这在一般美国大企业融资案里头并不多见，事实上他们相信我们是聪明的老板，看的是未来而不是现在，就像我们相信他们是聪明的经理人一样，不但会看未来同时也会顾及现在。
The preferred…stock structures we have negotiated will provide a mediocre return for us if industry economics hinder the performance of our investees； but will produce reasonably attractive results for us if they can earn a return parable to that of American industry in general。 We believe that Gillette； under Colman's management； will far exceed that return and believe that John； Ed； and Andy will reach it unless industry conditions are harsh。
这种可转换特别股的投资方式可以确保即便是我们的被投资公司面临产业前景不佳的环境时，仍能确保我们可以得到稳定的收益，同时若被投资公司表现不错时，我们又可以获得比投资一般美国企业更好的报酬，我们相信吉列在Colman的领导之下，一定会有不错的表现，另外John与Andy即使是面临产业不佳的前景，应该也不会让我们失望。
Under almost any conditions； we expect these preferreds to return us our money plus dividends。 If that is all we get； though； the result will be disappointing； because we will have given up flexibility and consequently will have missed some significant opportunities that are bound to present themselves during the decade。 Under that scenario； we will have obtained only a preferred…stock yield during a period when the typical preferred stock will have held no appeal for us whatsoever。 The only way Berkshire can achieve satisfactory results from its four preferred issues is to have the mon stocks of the investee panies do well。
不管在任何情况之下，我们预期这些可转换特别股都可以让我们收回本金加上股利无虞，然而若是我们真的只能收回这些，那么这样的结果毋宁是相当令我们失望的，因为我们必须被迫牺牲流动性，这友可能让我们在往后的十年内错失更好的投资机会，在这种情况下，我们就只能获得一般特别股所能获得的利益，而后者却是我们根本就不会想要去投资的，所以唯一对Berkshire最有益处的是我们的被投资公司本身的普通股也能有优异的表现。
Good management and at least tolerable industry conditions will be needed if that is to happen。 But we believe Berkshire's investment will also help and that the other shareholders of each investee will profit over the years ahead from our preferred…stock purchase。 The help will e from the fact that each pany now has a major； stable； and interested shareholder whose Chairman and Vice Chairman have； through Berkshire's investments； indirectly mitted a very large amount of their own money to these undertakings。 In dealing with our investees； Charlie and I will be supportive； analytical； and objective。 We recognize that we are working with experienced CEOs who are very much in mand of their own businesses but who nevertheless； at certain moments； appreciate the chance to test their thinking on someone without ties to their industry or to decisions of the past。
这需要靠好的经营团队再加上可以忍受的产业环境，不过我们相信Berkshire本身对这四家公司的资金挹注，也能够对这些公司与其股东的长远利益有所帮助，这是由于他们可以确信现在这些公司的背后有一个稳定又关心公司的大股东在默默地支持他们，再与我们被投资公司相处时，我们通常会采取支持、客观并给予分析建议的态度，我们了解这些公司的CEO对于其所处的产业都相当的清楚，但我想他们应该有会很珍惜我们这些与产业背景完全不相关的客观人士所给他们的经验交流。
As a