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ng of government bonds has occurred on a large scale in recent years； as long…term investors； ranging from pension funds to individual IRA accounts； recognized these high…grade； zero…coupon issues to be well suited to their needs。
这时创意十足的银行家就适时出现了，（我很高兴的向各位报告那就是所罗门兄弟公司），它们从标准的政府债券中，分拆出大家所想要的零息债券，每一张债券都跟储蓄债券一样，在未来的某一天到期后可以拿回完整的一笔钱，举例来说如果你可以将20年期每半年付息的债券，分拆成40张到期日分别为半年到20年不等的零息债券，之后再将到期日相同的债券并起来对外出售，假设现行的殖利率为10％，半年期的价格大概是95。24％，20年期的则只有14。20％，如此一来所有购买这种债券的投资者就可以明确的确保它可以获得的报酬率，分拆债券这几年因符合长期的退休基金与个人的IRA帐户投资者需求，广受欢迎而大量流行。
But as happens in Wall Street all too often； what the wise do in the beginning； fools do in the end。 In the last few years zero…coupon bonds （and their functional equivalent； pay…in…kind bonds； which distribute additional PIK bonds semi…annually as interest instead of paying cash） have been issued in enormous quantities by ever…junkier credits。 To these issuers； zero （or PIK） bonds offer one overwhelming advantage： It is impossible to default on a promise to pay nothing。 Indeed； if LDC governments had issued no debt in the 1970's other than long…term zero…coupon obligations； they would now have a spotless record as debtors。
但就像是华尔街经常会发生的，不管什么好东西到最后都会变质，最近几年来零息债券（以及功能类似的pay…in…kind债券，只发放PIK债券取代现金），有一大部份是垃圾债券等级，对这些发行公司来说，零息债券有一个很大的好处，因为在发行后直到到期日前根本就不必付出任何资金所以根本就不有无法偿付的情况，事实上，LDC政府在1970年后除了长期零息债券之外就没有发行过其它债券，所以就一个债务人来说，它们到现在还拥有完美无暇的记录。
This principle at work … that you need not default for a long time if you solemnly promise to pay nothing for a long time … has not been lost on promoters and investment bankers seeking to finance ever…shakier deals。 But its acceptance by lenders took a while： When the leveraged buy…out craze began some years back； purchasers could borrow only on a reasonably sound basis； in which conservatively…estimated free cash flow … that is； operating earnings plus depreciation and amortization less normalized capital expenditures … was adequate to cover both interest and modest reductions in debt。
这原则实在是管用，你大可以正经八百的说你一定不会还不出钱，原因是因为你有好长一段时间可以不必支付一毛钱，直到支持者与投资银行家再发明出更刺激的融资方式之前，不过债权人也要花好长一段时间才能支持这种做法，当融资购并热开始风行的几年之前，投资者只能借到一点钱，因为债权人会保守地估计其未来的现金流量，亦即营业收益加计折旧与摊销再扣除资本支出，必须要能够确保未来的利息支出与本金的支付。
Later； as the adrenalin of deal…makers surged； businesses began to be purchased at prices so high that all free cash flow necessarily had to be allocated to the payment of interest。 That left nothing for the paydown of debt。 In effect； a Scarlett O'Hara 〃I'll think about it tomorrow〃 position in respect to principal payments was taken by borrowers and accepted by a new breed of lender； the buyer of original…issue junk bonds。 Debt now became something to be refinanced rather than repaid。 The change brings to mind a New Yorker cartoon in which the grateful borrower rises to shake the hand of the bank's lending officer and gushes： 〃I don't know how I'll ever repay you。〃
之后随着肾上腺素升高，买价持续飙高使得所有的预估现金流量都必须被分配用来支付利息，至于本金的部份根本就不在预计偿付范围之内，接着贷款者对于本金偿还的态度就变得像乱世佳人中的郝思佳一样，「管他的，明天再说吧！」，而更离谱的是偏偏就有借钱者愿意吃这一套，那就是专门买垃圾债券的投资者，债务从此以后只要再融资即可，根本就不用考虑要偿还，这种心态的转变在纽约客卡通中描写的罪贴切，一个贷款人痛哭零涕地握着银行员的手说到，「我实在不知道该如何”偿还”你对我的恩情。」
Soon borrowers found even the new； lax standards intolerably binding。 To induce lenders to finance even sillier transactions； they introduced an abomination； EBDIT … Earnings Before Depreciation； Interest and Taxes … as the test of a pany's ability to pay interest。 Using this sawed…off yardstick； the borrower ignored depreciation as an expense on the theory that it did not require a current cash outlay。
很快的其它借款人又找到更新、更宽松的约束方式，为了拐骗金主借钱来从事更离谱的交易，这群人又引进了一个新名词叫做扣除折旧、利息与税负前的盈余EBDIT，来衡量一家公司偿债的能力，利用这种较低的标准，借款人故意忽略了折旧也是一种费用，虽然它不会马上有现金的支出。
Such an attitude is clearly delusional。 At 95％ of American businesses； capital expenditures that over time roughly approximate depreciation are a necessity and are every bit as real an expense as labor or utility costs。 Even a high school dropout knows that to finance a car he must have ine that covers not only interest and operating expenses； but also realistically…calculated depreciation。 He would be laughed out of the bank if he started talking about EBDIT。
这样的态度摆明了就是掩耳盗铃，95％的美国企业，长期而言其资本支出大概与平时提列的累积折旧费用相当，所花的每一分钱都与日常的劳工薪资或水电成本一样实在，即使是中学的中辍生也知道养一台车子不只是要负担利息与日常油钱保养费用而已，还必须精确地考量到每月实际摊销的折旧，若是他跑到银行摆出EBDIT这一套说法，保证一下子就会被轰出来。
Capital outlays at a business can be skipped； of course； in any given month； just as a human can skip a day or even a week of eating。 But if the skipping bees routine and is not made up； the body weakens and eventually dies。 Furthermore； a start…and…stop feeding policy will over time produce a less healthy organism； human or corporate； than that produced by a steady diet。 As businessmen； Charlie and I relish having petitors who are unable to fund capital expenditures。
在企业资本支出当然可以暂时不去考虑，就像是一个人可以一天或甚至一个礼拜不吃东西，但若是这种情况便做是一种坏习惯的话，身体很快就会发生不适的状况，甚至有死亡的危险，更甚者，有一餐没一餐的做法比起稳定的进食习惯，更可能使得一个健康的人身体机能变差，不管是人体或是企业都是如此，身为一个生意人，查理跟我对于竞争对手可能没有资金进行资本支出来感到欣喜。
You might think that waving away a major expense such as depreciation in an attempt to make a terrible deal look like a good one hits the limits of Wall Street's ingenuity。 If so； you haven't been paying attention during the past few years。 Promoters needed to find a way to justify even pricier acquisitions。 Otherwise； they risked … heaven forbid！ … losing deals to other promoters with more 〃imagination。〃
或许你会认为排除一项主要的费用诸如折旧等使得原本一桩很烂的交易变成不错的交易，是华尔街聪明才智极致的表现，，那你可能是完全没有注意到华尔街过去几年的发展，支持者必须再找到一个更有看头的做法，来合理解释价格更离谱的购并案，不然的话，他们就必须冒犯最严重的天条…被其它更有”创意”的支持者把生意抢走。
So； stepping through the Looking Glass； promoters and their investment bankers proclaimed that EBDIT should now be measured against cash interest only； which meant that interest accruing on zero…coupon or PIK bonds could be ignored when the financial feasibility of a transaction was being assessed。 This approach not only relegated depreciation expense to the let's…ignore…it corner； but gave similar treatment to what was usually a significant portion of interest expense。 To their shame； many professional investment managers went along with this nonsense； though they usually were careful to do so only with clients' money； not their own。 （Calling these managers 〃professionals〃 is actually too kind； they should be designated 〃promotees。〃）
所以穿过外面的那道玻璃，支持者与其投资银行宣称EBDIT应该可以只跟要付的利息做比较就好，意思是说在评估一项投资案的时候，那些记帐不须马上支付的利息根本就可以不必纳入考量，这样的方式不但是把折旧丢到没人注意的角落边，还将大部分的利息费用用同样的方式对待，可耻的是，许多专业投资银行家竟然昧着良心附和，反正只要确定这是客户而不是他们自己的钱就好，（称呼这群人为专业人士实在是太恭维他们了，他们应该被归类为抬轿者）。
Under this new standard； a business earning； say； 100 million pre…tax and having debt on which 90 million of interest must be paid currently； might use a zero…coupon or PIK issue to incur another 60 million of annual interest that would accrue and pound but not e due for some years。 The rate on these issues would typically be very high； which means that the situation in year 2 might be 90 million cash interest plus 69 million accrued interest； and so on as the pounding proceeds。 Such high…rate reborrowing schemes； which a few years ago were appropriately confined to the waterfront； soon became models of modern finance at virtually all major investment banking houses。
在这种新的标准之下，一家公司假设税前有1亿美元的获利，同时最近一年有9千万的利息支出，大可以运用零息债券或是PIK债券来额外负担6千万只要记帐却不须马上支付利息与本金，而这种债券的利率通常非常高，到了第二年，公司可能要承担9千万的付现息与6；900万的记帐息，之后随着复利记帐息持续增加，而这种高利率的融资计画，在刚开始几年还能获得有效控制，但不久之后就变成所有大型投资银行必备推荐给客户的标准融资工具。
When they make these offerings； investment bankers display their humorous side： They dispense ine and balance sheet projections extending five or more years into the futu