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et's take a quick look at the last 25 years。
套用Robert Benchley的名言：「要一只狗教小孩子忠诚、忍耐，并此能够滚三圈再在地上躺好」，这就是经验传承的难处，不过不论如何，再犯下一错误之前，最好能够先反省一下以前的那些错误，所以让我们花点时间回顾一下过去25年的经验。
My first mistake； of course； was in buying control of Berkshire。 Though I knew its business … textile manufacturing … to be unpromising； I was enticed to buy because the price looked cheap。 Stock purchases of that kind had proved reasonably rewarding in my early years； though by the time Berkshire came along in 1965 I was being aware that the strategy was not ideal。
首先我所犯的第一个错误，当然就是买下Berkshire纺织的控制权，虽然我很清楚纺织这个产业没什么前景，却因为它的价格实在很便宜而受其所引诱，虽然在早期投资这样的股票确实让我获利颇丰，但在1965年投资Berkshire后，我就开始发现这终究不是个理想的投资模式。
If you buy a stock at a sufficiently low price； there will usually be some hiccup in the fortunes of the business that gives you a chance to unload at a decent profit； even though the long…term performance of the business may be terrible。 I call this the 〃cigar butt〃 approach to investing。 A cigar butt found on the street that has only one puff left in it may not offer much of a smoke； but the 〃bargain purchase〃 will make that puff all profit。
如果你以很低的价格买进一家公司的股票，应该很容易有机会以不错的获利出脱了结，虽然长期而言这家公司的经营结果可能很糟糕，我将这种投资方法称之为「烟屁股」投资法，在路边随地可见的香烟头捡起来可能让你吸一口，解一解烟瘾，但对于隐君子来说，也不过是举手之劳而已。
Unless you are a liquidator； that kind of approach to buying businesses is foolish。 First； the original 〃bargain〃 price probably will not turn out to be such a steal after all。 In a difficult business； no sooner is one problem solved than another surfaces … never is there just one cockroach in the kitchen。 Second； any initial advantage you secure will be quickly eroded by the low return that the business earns。 For example； if you buy a business for 8 million that can be sold or liquidated for 10 million and promptly take either course； you can realize a high return。 But the investment will disappoint if the business is sold for 10 million in ten years and in the interim has annually earned and distributed only a few percent on cost。 Time is the friend of the wonderful business； the enemy of the mediocre。
不过除非你是清算专家，否则买下这类公司实在是属于傻瓜行径，第一长期而言，原来看起来划算的价格到最后可能一点都不值得，在经营艰困的企业中，通常一个问题才刚解决不久，另外一个问题就又接踵而来，厨房里的蟑螂绝对不会只有你看到的那一只而已，第二先前的价差优势很快地就会被企业不佳的绩效所侵蚀，例如你用800万美元买下一家清算价值达1；000万美元的公司，若你能马上把这家公司给处理掉，不管是出售或是清算都好，换算下来你的报酬可能会很可观，但是若这家公司要花上你十年的时间才有办法把它给处理掉，而在这之前你只能拿回一点点可怜的股利的话，相信我时间虽然是好公司的朋友，但却是烂公司最大的敌人。
You might think this principle is obvious； but I had to learn it the hard way … in fact； I had to learn it several times over。 Shortly after purchasing Berkshire； I acquired a Baltimore department store； Hochschild Kohn； buying through a pany called Diversified Retailing that later merged with Berkshire。 I bought at a substantial discount from book value； the people were first…class； and the deal included some extras … unrecorded real estate values and a significant LIFO inventory cushion。 How could I miss？ So…o…o … three years later I was lucky to sell the business for about what I had paid。 After ending our corporate marriage to Hochschild Kohn； I had memories like those of the husband in the country song； 〃My Wife Ran Away With My Best Friend and I Still Miss Him a Lot。〃
或许你会认为这道理再简单不过了，不过我却必须经历惨痛的教训才真正的搞懂，在买下Berkshire不久之后，我又买了巴尔的摩百货公司、Hochschild Kohn与一家叫多元零售公司（后来与Berkshire合并），我以相当的折价幅度买下这些公司，经营的人也属一流，整个交易甚至还有额外的利益，包含未实现的房地产增值利益与后进先出法的存货会计原则，我到底还漏掉了什么？ 还好三年之后，算我走狗运，能够以成本价左右的价格脱身，在跟Hochschild Kohn公司结束关系之后，我只有一个感想，就像一首乡村歌曲的歌词所述的，「我的老婆跟我最要好的朋友跑了，我是多么地怀念他！」
I could give you other personal examples of 〃bargain…purchase〃 folly but I'm sure you get the picture： It's far better to buy a wonderful pany at a fair price than a fair pany at a wonderful price。 Charlie understood this early； I was a slow learner。 But now； when buying panies or mon stocks； we look for first…class businesses acpanied by first…class managements。
我可以给各位另外一个个人经验，以合理的价格买下一家好公司要比用便宜的价格买下一家普通的公司来的好的多，像查理老早就明白这个道理，我的反应则比较慢，不过现在当我们投资公司或股票时，我们不但选择最好的公司，同时这些公司还要有好的经理人。
That leads right into a related lesson： Good jockeys will do well on good horses； but not on broken…down nags。 Both Berkshire's textile business and Hochschild； Kohn had able and honest people running them。 The same managers employed in a business with good economic characteristics would have achieved fine records。 But they were never going to make any progress while running in quicksand。
从这里我们又学到了一课，好的马还要搭配好骑师才能有好成绩，像Berkshire纺织与Hochschild； Kohn也都有才能兼具的人在管理，很不幸的他们所面临的是流沙般的困境，若能将这些人摆在体质更好的公司相信他们应该会有更好的成绩。
I've said many times that when a management with a reputation for brilliance tackles a business with a reputation for bad economics； it is the reputation of the business that remains intact。 I just wish I hadn't been so energetic in creating examples。 My behavior has matched that admitted by Mae West： 〃I was Snow White； but I drifted。〃
我曾说过好几次，当一个绩效卓著的经理人遇到一家恶名昭彰的企业，通常会是后者占上风，但愿我再也没有那么多精力来创造新的例子，我以前的行为就像是Mae West曾说的︰「曾经我是个白雪公主，不过如今我已不再清白。」
A further related lesson： Easy does it。 After 25 years of buying and supervising a great variety of businesses； Charlie and I have not learned how to solve difficult business problems。 What we have learned is to avoid them。 To the extent we have been successful； it is because we concentrated on identifying one…foot hurdles that we could step over rather than because we acquired any ability to clear seven…footers。
另外还学到一个教训，在经历25年企业管理与经营各种不同事业的岁月之后，查理跟我还是没能学会如此去解决难题，不过我们倒学会如何去避免他们，在这点我们倒做的相当成功，我们专挑那种一呎的低栏，而避免碰到七呎的跳高。
The finding may seem unfair； but in both business and investments it is usually far more profitable to simply stick with the easy and obvious than it is to resolve the difficult。 On occasion； tough problems must be tackled as was the case when we started our Sunday paper in Buffalo。 In other instances； a great investment opportunity occurs when a marvelous business encounters a one…time huge； but solvable； problem as was the case many years back at both American Express and GEICO。 Overall； however； we've done better by avoiding dragons than by slaying them。
这项发现看起来似乎是不太公平，不管是在经营企业或是投资通长坚持在容易又明显的好公司会比死守在有问题的公司要来的好，当然有时困难的问题也有被解决的机会，像是我们刚开始在经营水牛城报纸一样，或是有时一家好公司也会有暂时的难关，像是以前美国运通与GEICO都曾经一度发生状况，不过总的来说，我们尽量做到回避妖龙，而不是冒险去屠龙。
My most surprising discovery： the overwhelming importance in business of an unseen force that we might call 〃the institutional imperative。〃 In business school； I was given no hint of the imperative's existence and I did not intuitively understand it when I entered the business world。 I thought then that decent； intelligent； and experienced managers would automatically make rational business decisions。 But I learned over time that isn't so。 Instead； rationality frequently wilts when the institutional imperative es into play。
我最意外的发现是企业一种看不到的巨大影响力，我们称之为〃系统规范〃，在学校时没有人告诉我这种规范的存在，而我也不是一开始进入商业世界就知道有这回事，我以为任何正当、聪明有经验的经理人都会很自动的做这样的决策，但慢慢地我发现完全就不是这么一回事，相反的理性的态度在系统规范的影响下都会慢慢地变质。
For example： （1） As if governed by Newton's First Law of Motion； an institution will resist any change in its current direction； （2） Just as work expands to fill available time； corporate projects or acquisitions will materialize to soak up available funds； （3） Any business craving of the leader； however foolish； will be quickly supported by detailed rate…of…return and strategic studies prepared by his troops； and （4） The behavior of peer panies； whether they are expanding； acquiring； setting executive pensation or whatever； will be mindlessly imitated。
举例来说（1）就好象是受牛顿第一运动定律所规范，任何一个组织机构都会抵抗对现有方向做任何的改变（2）就像拥有会有工作来填满所有的时间，企业的计画或购并案永远有足够的理由将资金耗尽（3）任何一个崇拜领导者的组织，不管有多离谱，他的追随者永远可以找到可以支持其理论的投资评估分析报告（4）同业的举动，不管是做扩张、购并或是订定经理人待遇等都会在无意间彼此模仿。
Institutional dynamics； not vena