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1989 33；165 34；235 13；008 25；583 （3；387）
1990 18；458 23；892 9；676 20；420 （3；461）
1989 19；996 20；626 9；810 16；372 （3；372）
Other Purchase…Price
Accounting Charges Interest Expense*
1990 （5；951） （76；374）
1989 （5；740） （42；389）
1990 （6；856） （49；726）
1989 （6；668） （27；098）
Shareholder…Designated
Contributions Other Operating Earnings Sales of Securities
1990 （5；824） 58；309 482；477 33；989
1989 （5；867） 23；755 393；414 223；810
1990 （3；801） 35；782 370；745 23；348
1989 （3；814） 12；863 299；902 147；575
Total Earnings … All Entities
1990 1989 1990 1989
516；466 617；224 394；093 447；477
*Excludes interest expense of Scott Fetzer Financial Group and Mutual Savings & Loan。
*不包含史考特飞兹与联合储贷的利息费用
We refer you also to pages 47…53； where we have rearranged Berkshire's financial data into four segments。 These correspond to the way Charlie and I think about the business and should help you more in estimating Berkshire's intrinsic value than consolidated figures would do。 Shown on these pages are balance sheets and earnings statements for： （1） our insurance operations； with their majorinvestment positions itemized； （2） our manufacturing； publishing and retailing businesses； leaving aside certain non… operating assets and purchase…price accounting adjustments； （3） our subsidiaries engaged in finance…type operations； which are Mutual Savings and Scott Fetzer Financial； and （4） an all…other category that includes the non…operating assets （primarily marketable securities） held by the panies in segment （2）； all purchase… price accounting adjustments； and various assets and debts of the Wesco and Berkshire parent panies。
目前我们已将Berkshire的财务信息重新分类为四大部门，这是查理跟我认为最可以帮助大家计算本公司实质价值的最好方式，以下的资产负债表与盈余表就是依此分类表示（1）保险事业，另将主要投资部位归类（2）制造、出版与零售事业，扣除非本业资产与购买法的会计调整（3）金融业的子公司…诸如联合储贷与史考特飞兹财务公司（4）其它项目，包含前述非营业资产（主要是有价证券投资）与购买法调整，还有Wesco与Berkshire母公司一些其它的资产与负债。
If you bine the earnings and net worths of these four segments； you will derive totals matching those shown on our GAAP statements。 However； I want to emphasize that this four…category presentation does not fall within the purview of our auditors； who in no way bless it。
如果你将这四个部门的盈余与净值加总，会得到与经会计师依一般公认会计原则查核一致的数字，然而我还是必须强调这种表达方式并未经过会计师的检视，我想他宁可选择不要看的好。
〃Look…Through〃 Earnings透视盈余
The term 〃earnings〃 has a precise ring to it。 And when an earnings figure is acpanied by an unqualified auditor's certificate； a naive reader might think it parable in certitude to pi； calculated to dozens of decimal places。
盈余这个名词有一个明确的定义，而当盈余数字再加上会计师无保留意见的背书后，单纯的投资人可能就会以为它是像圆周率一样经过计算，可以到好几个小数点般精确。
In reality； however； earnings can be as pliable as putty when a charlatan heads the pany reporting them。 Eventually truth will surface； but in the meantime a lot of money can change hands。 Indeed； some important American fortunes have been created by the monetization of accounting mirages。
然而事实上，当公司盈余数字是由骗徒所主导时，盈余可能像油灰一样地脆弱，当然到最后真相一定会大白，但在此同时一大笔财富可能已经换手，确实许多美国财富传奇就是靠着这种会计数字假象所创造出来的。
Funny business in accounting is not new。 For connoisseurs of chicanery； I have attached as Appendix A on page 22 a previously unpublished satire on accounting practices written by Ben Graham in 1936。 Alas； excesses similar to those he then lampooned have many times since found their way into the financial statements of major American corporations and been duly certified by big…name auditors。 Clearly； investors must always keep their guard up and use accounting numbers as a beginning； not an end； in their attempts to calculate true 〃economic earnings〃 accruing to them。
有趣的企业会计并不是件新鲜事，对于企业诈骗的专家，我特别附上班哲明葛拉罕在1936年所写未经出版有关会计做帐的讽刺性文章，自此之后，我们可以发现这种葛拉罕所描写的方法散见于各大美国企业财务报表中，而且全部都经过各大会计师事务所签证背书，所以对此投资人必须特别提高警戒，要了解在计算一家公司的实质的经济盈余时，会计数字只不过是个出发点，而绝非是最后的结果。
Berkshire's own reported earnings are misleading in a different； but important； way： We have huge investments in panies （〃investees〃） whose earnings far exceed their dividends and in which we record our share of earnings only to the extent of the dividends we receive。 The extreme case is Capital Cities/ABC； Inc。 Our 17％ share of the pany's earnings amounted to more than 83 million last year。 Yet only about 530；000 （600；000 of dividends it paid us less some 70；000 of tax） is counted in Berkshire's GAAP earnings。 The residual 82 million…plus stayed with Cap Cities as retained earnings； which work for our benefit but go unrecorded on our books。
Berkshire本身的盈余在某些重要的方面也有所误导，首先我们主要的被投资公司其实际盈余远高于后来发放的股利，而Berkshire帐列的盈余也仅限于这些已发放的股利收入，最明显的例子就是资本城/ABC公司，若依照我们持股17％的比例，去年可分得的利润是8；300万美元，但Berkshire依照一般公认会计原则所认列的投资利益却只有53万美元（亦即60万股利收入扣除7万美元的税负），剩下8；200多万的盈余则保留在该公司的帐上，虽然实际上对我们大有益处，但在我们公司的帐上却一点踪迹都没有。
Our perspective on such 〃forgotten…but…not…gone〃 earnings is simple： The way they are accounted for is of no importance； but their ownership and subsequent utilization is all…important。 We care not whether the auditors hear a tree fall in the forest； we do care who owns the tree and what's next done with it。
我们对于这种被遗忘但却存在的盈余的态度很简单，到底认不认列数字一点都不重要，最重要的是我们可以确定这些盈余可以为我们所有且会被充分加以运用，我们不在乎听到会计师说森林中有一棵树被砍倒了，我们在乎的是这棵树是不是属于我们的，以及之后要如何来处理它。
When Coca…Cola uses retained earnings to repurchase its shares； the pany increases our percentage ownership in what I regard to be the most valuable franchise in the world。 （Coke also； of course； uses retained earnings in many other value…enhancing ways。） Instead of repurchasing stock； Coca…Cola could pay those funds to us in dividends； which we could then use to purchase more Coke shares。 That would be a less efficient scenario： Because of taxes we would pay on dividend ine； we would not be able to increase our proportionate ownership to the degree that Coke can； acting for us。 If this less efficient procedure were followed； however； Berkshire would report far greater 〃earnings。〃
当可口可乐利用保留盈余来买回自家股份，该公司等于间接增加我们的持股比例，也就是此举让我认定这家公司是全世界最好的企业（当然可口可乐还将资金运用在很多加强公司利益的地方上），除了买回股份，可口可乐也可以将这些资金以股利的方式退还给股东，然后我们同样可以利用这笔钱买进更多可口可乐的股票，只是后面这种做法比较没有效率，因为如此还要支付额外的所得税，使得最后所得到的持股比例比前面的方式少一点，而讽刺的是要是利用后面的那种做法，Berkshire的帐面盈余可能还会更好看。
I believe the best way to think about our earnings is in terms of 〃look…through〃 results； calculated as follows： Take 250 million； which is roughly our share of the 1990 operating earnings retained by our investees； subtract 30 million； for the incremental taxes we would have owed had that 250 million been paid to us in dividends； and add the remainder； 220 million； to our reported operating earnings of 371 million。 Thus our 1990 〃look…through earnings〃 were about 590 million。
我个人相信最好的方式是利用透视的方法来衡量Berkshire的盈余，2亿5；000万美元大概是我们在1990年可以从被投资公司那边未分配到的营业利润，扣除3；000万的额外股利所得税，再将剩下的2亿2；000万美元加到本来的帐列盈余3亿7；100万，所得的5亿9；000万大概就是我们经过透视的真正盈余。
As I mentioned last year； we hope to have look…through earnings grow about 15％ annually。 In 1990 we substantially exceeded that rate but in 1991 we will fall far short of it。 Our Gillette preferred has been called and we will convert it into mon stock on April 1。 This will reduce reported earnings by about 35 million annually and look…through earnings by a much smaller； but still significant； amount。 Additionally； our media earnings … both direct and look…through … appear sure to decline。 Whatever the results； we will post you annually on how we are doing on a look…through basis。
就像我去年曾经提到的，我希望我们的透视盈余每年都能够成长15％，在1990年我们确实大幅超越这个比率，但1991年结果却差很多，我们在吉列的可转换特别股投资已经被赎回，我们将在4月1日把它们转为普通股投资，虽然这将会使得我们每年的帐面盈余减少3；500万，透视盈余也会跟着减少，另外我们在媒体事业的直接与透视盈余也可能下滑，但不论如何，我们每年还是会向大家报告透视盈余的计算结果。
Non…Insurance Operations非保险营运
Take another look at the figures on page 51； which aggregate the earnings and balance sheets of our non…insurance operations。 After…tax earnings on average equity in 1990 were 51％； a result that would have placed the group about 20th on the 1989 Fortune 500。
看看52页的那些数字，亦即我们非保险事业的盈余与资产负债加总，1990年的平均股东权益报酬率是51％，这个获利能力在1989年的财星五百大可以排在前20名。
Two factors make this re