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e float will exceed the 15％ by which claims and expenses overrun premiums。 The catch； though； is that 〃long…tail〃 means exactly that： Liability business written in a given year and presumed at first to have produced a bined ratio of 115 may eventually smack the insurer with 200； 300 or worse when the years have rolled by and all claims have finally been settled。
像这种长尾巴业务，通常即使综合比率高达115（或更高）都还可能有获利，因为在索赔与费用发生之前的那一段时间利用浮存金所赚的利润甚至会超过15％，但重点是所谓的长尾巴顾名思义，就是在某一年度承接的责任保险保单之时，假设会有115的综合比率，但结果到最后尾大不掉，经过多年的纠缠，终于和解的结果，有可能让保险业者承担200、300或是更糟的综合比率。
The pitfalls of this business mandate an operating principle that too often is ignored： Though certain long…tail lines may prove profitable at bined ratios of 110 or 115； insurers will invariably find it unprofitable to price using those ratios as targets。 Instead； prices must provide a healthy margin of safety against the societal trends that are forever springing expensive surprises on the insurance industry。 Setting a target of 100 can itself result in heavy losses； aiming for 110 … 115 is business suicide。
这项业务一定要特别注意一项时常令人忽略的经营原则的陷阱，虽然部份长尾巴业务在110到115的综合比率之间仍可以获利，但若是保险业者依此比率来订定保费价格的话很可能会亏大钱，所以保费价格必须要有一个安全的边际空间以防止当今总是会让保险业有昂贵的意外蹦出来的社会趋势，将综合比率设在100一定会产生重大的损失，将目标锁定在110…115之间则无异是自杀的行为。
All of that said； what should the measure of an insurer's profitability be？ Analysts and managers customarily look to the bined ratio … and it's true that this yardstick usually is a good indicator of where a pany ranks in profitability。 We believe a better measure； however； to be a parison of underwriting loss to float developed。
说了那么多，到底该如何衡量一家保险公司的获利能力呢？ 分析师与经理人通常习惯性的会去看综合比率，当然在我们要看一家保险公司是否赚钱时，这项比率是一个很好的正确指针，但我们认为还有一项数字是更好的衡量标准，那就是承保损失与浮存金的比率。
This loss/float ratio； like any statistic used in evaluating insurance results； is meaningless over short time periods： Quarterly underwriting figures and even annual ones are too heavily based on estimates to be much good。 But when the ratio takes in a period of years； it gives a rough indication of the cost of funds generated by insurance operations。 A low cost of funds signifies a good business； a high cost translates into a poor business。
这种损失/浮存金比率跟其它保险业常用的绩效衡量统计数字一样，必须要有一段相当长的时间才有意义，单季或甚至是单一年度的数字，会因为估计的成份太浓而无参考价值，但是只要时间一拉长，这个比率就可以告诉我们保险营运所产生浮存金的资金成本，若资金成本低就代表这是一家好公司，相反地就是一家烂公司。
On the next page we show the underwriting loss； if any； of our insurance group in each year since we entered the business and relate that bottom line to the average float we have held during the year。 From this data we have puted a 〃cost of funds developed from insurance。〃
下一页是我们进入保险业后，每年的承保损失统计（若有的话），以及每年平均持有的浮存金数量，从这个表我们可以很轻易地算出保险事业所产生的浮存金其资金成本是多少。
（1） （2） Yearend Yield Underwriting Approximate on Long…Term Loss Average Float Cost of Funds Govt。 Bonds （In Millions） （Ratio of 1 to 2）
1967 profit 17。3 less than zero 5。50％ 1979 profit 227。3 less than zero 10。08％
1968 。 profit 19。9 less than zero 5。90％ 1980 profit 237。0 less than zero 11。94％
1969 profit 23。4 less than zero 6。79％ 1981 profit 228。4 less than zero 13。61％
1970 0。37 32。4 1。14％ 6。25％ 1982 21。56 220。6 9。77％ 10。64％
1971 profit 52。5 less than zero 5。81％ 1983 33。87 231。3 14。64％ 11。84％
1972 profit 69。5 less than zero 5。82％ 1984 48。06 253。2 18。98％ 11。58％
1973 profit 73。3 less than zero 7。27％ 1985 44。23 390。2 11。34％ 9。34％
1974 7。36 79。1 9。30％ 8。13％ 1986 55。84 797。5 7。00％ 7。60％
1975 11。35 87。6 12。96％ 8。03％ 1987 55。43 1；266。7 4。38％ 8。95％
1976 。 profit 102。6 less than zero 7。30％ 1988 11。08 1；497。7 0。74％ 9。00％
1977 profit 139。0 less than zero 7。97％ 1989 24。40 1；541。3 1。58％ 7。97％
1978 profit 190。4 less than zero 8。93％ 1990 26。65 1；637。3 1。63％ 8。24％
The float figures are derived from the total of loss reserves； loss adjustment expense reserves and unearned premium reserves minus agents' balances； prepaid acquisition costs and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance。 At some insurers other items should enter into the calculation； but in our case these are unimportant and have been ignored。
浮存金的数字是将所有的损失准备、损失费用调整准备与未赚取保费加总后，再扣除应付佣金、预付购并成本及相关再保递延费用，若是别的保险业者可能还有其它项目需要列入做计算，但因为这些科目在Berkshire并不重要，所以予以省略。
During 1990 we held about 1。6 billion of float slated eventually to find its way into the hands of others。 The underwriting loss we sustained during the year was 27 million and thus our insurance operation produced funds for us at a cost of about 1。6％。 As the table shows； we managed in some years to underwrite at a profit and in those instances our cost of funds was less than zero。 In other years； such as 1984； we paid a very high price for float。 In 19 years out of the 24 we have been in insurance； though； we have developed funds at a cost below that paid by the government。
在1990年我们大概持有16亿美元的浮存金，这些钱会慢慢地流到其它人的手中，当年度的承保损失约为2；600万美元，因此我们从保险营运所获得的资金，其成本约为1。6％，而就如同这张表所显示的，有些年度我们有承保获利，所以我们的资金成本甚至低于零，但是也有些年度，像1984年我们必须为浮存金支付相当高的成本，但是总计至今24个年度当中有19个年度，我们负担的资金成本甚至比美国政府发行债券的成本还低。
There are two important qualifications to this calculation。 First； the fat lady has yet to gargle； let alone sing； and we won't know our true 1967 … 1990 cost of funds until all losses from this period have been settled many decades from now。 Second； the value of the float to shareholders is somewhat undercut by the fact that they must put up their own funds to support the insurance operation and are subject to double taxation on the investment ine these funds earn。 Direct investments would be more tax…efficient。
这项计算式有两个重要的要求，首先胖女人漱口都很难听了，更何况还要她唱歌，除非等到这时间所发生的损失都已确定解决，否则我们不能确定1967年…1990年的资金成本到底是多少，第二浮存金对于股东的价值有点打折，因为股东们还必须投入相对的资金来支持保险事业的营运，同时这些资金所赚取的投资收益又必须面临双重的课税，相较之下直接投资的税负就少多了。
The tax penalty that indirect investments impose on shareholders is in fact substantial。 Though the calculation is necessarily imprecise； I would estimate that the owners of the average insurance pany would find the tax penalty adds about one percentage point to their cost of float。 I also think that approximates the correct figure for Berkshire。
间接投资加诸在股东身上的租税惩罚事实上是相当重的，虽然计算公式铁定没办法做的很精确，但我估计对于这些保险事业的所有者来说，租税惩罚至少让他们增加一个百分点以上的资金成本，我想这个数字也适用于Berkshire之上。
Figuring a cost of funds for an insurance business allows anyone analyzing it to determine whether the operation has a positive or negative value for shareholders。 If this cost （including the tax penalty） is higher than that applying to alternative sources of funds； the value is negative。 If the cost is lower； the value is positive … and if the cost is significantly lower； the insurance business qualifies as a very valuable asset。
分析保险事业的资金成本使得任何人都可以据此判断这家公司的营运对于股东到底是正面的还是负面的，若是这项成本（包含租税惩罚）高于其它替代性的资金来源，其价值就是负的，若是成本更低，那么对股东便能产生正面的价值，而若是成本远低于一般水准，那么这个事业就是一项相当有价值的资产。
So far Berkshire has fallen into the significantly…lower camp。 Even more dramatic are the numbers at GEICO； in which our ownership interest is now 48％ and which customarily operates at an underwriting profit。 GEICO's growth has generated an ever…larger amount of funds for investment that have an effective cost of considerably less than zero。 Essentially； GEICO's policyholders； in aggregate； pay the pany interest on the float rather than the other way around。 （But handsome is as handsome does： GEICO's unusual profitability results from its extraordinary operating efficiency and its careful classification of risks； a package that in turn allows rock…bottom prices for policyholders。）
到目前为止，Berkshire算是资金成本相当低的那类，虽然我们拥有48％股权的GEICO的比率更好，且通常每年都享有承保获利，GEICO藉由不断地成长提供越来越多的资金以供投资，而且它的资金成本还远低于零成本以下，意思是说GEICO的保单持有人不但要先付保费给公司而且还要支付利息，（但就像有人又帅又有才干，GEICO非凡的获利能力导因于公司经营的效率与对风险的严格分类，如此使得保户也可享受超低价格的保单）。
Many well…known insurance panies； on the other hand； incur an underwriting loss/float cost that； bined with the tax penalty； produces negative results for owners。 In addition； these panies； like all others in the industry； are vulnerable to catastrophe losses that could exceed their reinsurance protection and