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he industry； are vulnerable to catastrophe losses that could exceed their reinsurance protection and take their cost of float right off the chart。 Unless these panies can materially improve their underwriting performance … and history indicates that is an almost impossible task … their shareholders will experience results similar to those borne by the owners of a bank that pays a higher rate of interest on deposits than it receives on loans。
在另外一方面，许多知名的保险公司，在考量承保损失/浮存金成本，再加上租税惩罚之后，事实上让股东产生负的报酬，此外这些公司像其它业者一样，相当容易受到大型灾害的伤害，在扣除再保部份所得到的保护之后，资金成本率还是有可能升高到无以复加的地步，而除非这些公司能够大幅改善其承保的成绩，历史的经验显示这是项不可能的任务，这些股东很可能会和吸收较高的存款利息支出，却只能收到较低的借款利息收入的银行股东一样的下场。
All in all； the insurance business has treated us very well。 We have expanded our float at a cost that on the average is reasonable； and we have further prospered because we have earned good returns on these low…cost funds。 Our shareholders； true； have incurred extra taxes； but they have been more than pensated for this cost （so far） by the benefits produced by the float。
总的来说，保险营运给我们的回报算是相当不错的了，我们的保险浮存金以合理的资金成本率持续增加，而靠着这些低成本的资金赚取更高的投资报酬使我们的事业蒸蒸日上，确实我们的股东必须负担额外的税负，但大家从这样低的资金成本所获得的利益却补回更多（至少到目前为止是如此）。
A particularly encouraging point about our record is that it was achieved despite some colossal mistakes made by your Chairman prior to Mike Goldberg's arrival。 Insurance offers a host of opportunities for error； and when opportunity knocked； too often I answered。 Many years later； the bills keep arriving for these mistakes： In the insurance business； there is no statute of limitations on stupidity。
尤其有更令人振奋的一点，这些记录还包含本人之前所犯下一些重大的错误，在Mike Goldberg接手后，应该会有更好的成绩，保险往往会有一大堆让你发生错误的机会，而通常在这些机会敲门时，我都会响应，以致于经过那么多年之后，到现在我们还必须为我以前所犯的那些错误付出代价，在保险业愚蠢的程度是没有上限的。
The intrinsic value of our insurance business will always be far more difficult to calculate than the value of； say； our candy or newspaper panies。 By any measure； however； the business is worth far more than its carrying value。 Furthermore； despite the problems this operation periodically hands us； it is the one … among all the fine businesses we own … that has the greatest potential。
我们保险事业的实际价值永远比其它事业如糖果或是报纸事业难以估计，但是不管用任何计算方法，保险事业的价值一定远高于其帐面价值，更重要的是虽然保险业让我们三不五时会出状况，但这行业却是我们现在所有不错的事业当中，最有成长潜力的。
Marketable Securities有价证券投资
Below we list our mon stock holdings having a value of over 100 million。 A small portion of these investments belongs to subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns less than 100％。
下表是我们超过一亿美元以上的普通股投资，一部份的投资系属于Berkshire关系企业所持有）。
Shares pany Cost Market （000s omitted） 12/31/90
3；000；000 Capital Cities/ABC； Inc。 。。。。。。。。。。。。 517；500 1；377；375
46；700；000 The Coca…Cola Co。 。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。 1；023；920 2；171；550
2；400；000 Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp。 。。。 71；729 117；000
6；850；000 GEICO Corp。 。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。 45；713 1；110；556
1；727；765 The Washington Post pany 。。。。。。。。。 9；731 342；097
5；000；000 Wells Fargo & pany 。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。 289；431 289；375
Lethargy bordering on sloth remains the cornerstone of our investment style： This year we neither bought nor sold a share of five of our six major holdings。 The exception was Wells Fargo； a superbly…managed； high…return banking operation in which we increased our ownership to just under 10％； the most we can own without the approval of the Federal Reserve Board。 About one…sixth of our position was bought in 1989； the rest in 1990。
树濑天生特有的懒散正代表着我们的投资模式，今年我们没有增加也没有处分任何持股，除了Wells Fargo这家拥有良好的经营团队，并享有相当高的股东权益报酬率的银行，所以我们将持股比率增加到10％左右，这是我们可以不必向联准会申报的最高上限，其中六分之一是在1989年买进，剩下的部份则是在1990年增加。
The banking business is no favorite of ours。 When assets are twenty times equity … a mon ratio in this industry … mistakes that involve only a small portion of assets can destroy a major portion of equity。 And mistakes have been the rule rather than the exception at many major banks。 Most have resulted from a managerial failing that we described last year when discussing the 〃institutional imperative：〃 the tendency of executives to mindlessly imitate the behavior of their peers； no matter how foolish it may be to do so。 In their lending； many bankers played follow…the…leader with lemming…like zeal； now they are experiencing a lemming…like fate。
银行业并不是我们的最爱，因为这个行业的特性是资产约为股权的20倍，这代表只要资产发生一点问题就有可能把股东权益亏光光，而偏偏大银行出问题早已变成是常态而非特例，许多情况是管理当局的疏失，就像是去年度我们曾提到的系统规范…也就是经营主管会不自主的模仿其它同业的做法，不管这些行为有多愚蠢，在从事放款业务时，许多银行业者也都有旅鼠那种追随领导者的行为倾向，所以现在他们也必须承担像旅鼠一样的命运。
Because leverage of 20：1 magnifies the effects of managerial strengths and weaknesses； we have no interest in purchasing shares of a poorly…managed bank at a 〃cheap〃 price。 Instead； our only interest is in buying into well…managed banks at fair prices。
因为20比1的比率，使得所有的优势与缺点所造成的影响对会被放大，我们对于用便宜的价格买下经营不善的银行一点兴趣都没有，相反地我们希望能够以合理的价格买进一些经营良好的银行。
With Wells Fargo； we think we have obtained the best managers in the business； Carl Reichardt and Paul Hazen。 In many ways the bination of Carl and Paul reminds me of another … Tom Murphy and Dan Burke at Capital Cities/ABC。 First； each pair is stronger than the sum of its parts because each partner understands； trusts and admires the other。 Second； both managerial teams pay able people well； but abhor having a bigger head count than is needed。 Third； both attack costs as vigorously when profits are at record levels as when they are under pressure。 Finally； both stick with what they understand and let their abilities； not their egos； determine what they attempt。 （Thomas J。 Watson Sr。 of IBM followed the same rule： 〃I'm no genius；〃 he said。 〃I'm smart in spots … but I stay around those spots。〃）
在Wells Fargo，我想我们找到银行界最好的经理人Carl Reichardt与Paul Hazen，在许多方面这两个人的组合使我联想到另外一对搭档，那就是资本城/ABC的Tom Murphy与Dan Burke，首先两个人加起来的力量都大于个别单打独斗，因为每个人都了解、信任并尊敬对方，其次他们对于有才能的人从不吝啬，但也同时厌恶冗员过多，第三尽管公司获利再好，他们控制成本的努力不曾稍减，最后两者都坚持自己所熟悉的，让他们的能力而非自尊来决定成败，就像IBM的Thomas Watson曾说：「我不是天才，我只是有点小聪明，不过我却充分运用这些小聪明。」
Our purchases of Wells Fargo in 1990 were helped by a chaotic market in bank stocks。 The disarray was appropriate： Month by month the foolish loan decisions of once well…regarded banks were put on public display。 As one huge loss after another was unveiled … often on the heels of managerial assurances that all was well … investors understandably concluded that no bank's numbers were to be trusted。 Aided by their flight from bank stocks； we purchased our 10％ interest in Wells Fargo for 290 million； less than five times after…tax earnings； and less than three times pre…tax earnings。
我们是在1990年银行股一片混乱之间买进Wells Fargo的股份的，这种失序的现象是很合理的，几个月来有些原本经营名声不错的银行，其错误的贷款决定却一一被媒体揭露，随着一次又一次庞大的损失数字被公布，银行业的诚信与保证也一次又一次地被践踏，渐渐地投资人越来越不敢相信银行的财务报表数字，趁着大家出脱银行股之际，我们却逆势以2。9亿美元，五倍不到的本益比（若是以税前获利计算，则本益比甚至不到三倍），买进Wells Fargo 10％的股份。
Wells Fargo is big … it has 56 billion in assets … and has been earning more than 20％ on equity and 1。25％ on assets。 Our purchase of one…tenth of the bank may be thought of as roughly equivalent to our buying 100％ of a 5 billion bank with identical financial characteristics。 But were we to make such a purchase； we would have to pay about twice the 290 million we paid for Wells Fargo。 Moreover； that 5 billion bank； manding a premium price； would present us with another problem： We would not be able to find a Carl Reichardt to run it。 In recent years； Wells Fargo executives have been more avidly recruited than any others in the banking business； no one； however； has been able to hire the dean。
Wells Fargo实在是相当的大，帐面资产高达560亿美元，股东权益报酬率高达20％，资产报酬率则为1。25％，买下他10％的股权相当于以买下一家50亿美元资产100％股权，但是真要有这样条件的银行，其价码可能会是2。9亿美元的一倍以上，此外就算真的可以买得到，我们同样也要面临另外一个问题，那就是找不到像Carl Reichardt这样的人才来经营，近几年来，从Wells Fargo出身的经理人一直广受各家银行同业所欢迎，但想要请到这家银行的老宗师可就不是一件容易的事了。
Of course； ownership of a bank … or about any other business … is far from riskless。 California banks face the specific risk of a major earthquake； w