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e8东的信 _作者: 美 沃伦·巴菲特-第79章

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Berkshire is another kind of buyer  a rather unusual one。 We buy to keep; but we don't have; and don't expect to have; operating people in our parent organization。 All of the businesses we own are run autonomously to an extraordinary degree。 In most cases; the managers of important businesses we have owned for many years have not been to Omaha or even met each other。 When we buy a business; the sellers go on running it just as they did before the sale; we adapt to their methods rather than vice versa。 
至于Berkshire则属于另外一类型的买主,而且绝对是与众不同的,我们买进是为了拥有,但我们不要,也不希望公司的营运主管由母公司指派,我们旗下所有的事业都能够相当独立自主地营运,大部分的情况下,我们所拥有的重要事业管理人从来就没有来过奥玛哈,甚至于双方连面都没碰过,当我们买下一间公司之后,卖方依旧还是照原来的样子经营公司,是我们要去适应他们,不是他们要来适应我们。
We have no one  family; recently recruited MBAs; etc。  to whom we have promised a chance to run businesses we have bought from owner…managers。 And we won't have。 
我们没有任何家族成员或是新进聘用的企管硕士,准备要来经营我们买下的任何企业,我想以后也不会有这种情况。 
You know of some of our past purchases。 I'm enclosing a list of everyone from whom we have ever bought a business; and I invite you to check with them as to our performance versus our promises。 You should be particularly interested in checking with the few whose businesses did not do well in order to ascertain how we behaved under difficult conditions。 
如果你知道我们过去的购并案,我会附上过去我们购买企业的名单,我建议你可以打个电话check看看,我们是不是说到做到,特别是你可以问问少数几家经营不甚理想的公司,看看在艰难的状况下,我们又会采取怎样的做法。 
Any buyer will tell you that he needs you personally  and if he has any brains; he most certainly does need you。 But a great many buyers; for the reasons mentioned above; don't match their subsequent actions to their earlier words。 We will behave exactly as promised; both because we have so promised; and because we need to in order to achieve the best business results。 
任何买主都会告诉你,私底下他很需要你的协助,当然若他真的有大脑,他就会知道他真的是需要你,但大多数的买主,基于先前所提的几个理由,大都不会遵守先前所作的承诺,但我们不一样,绝对是说到做到,因为一方面我们已做出承诺,另一方面我们也是为了有更有的经营成果。
This need explains why we would want the operating members of your family to retain a 20% interest in the business。 We need 80% to consolidate earnings for tax purposes; which is a step important to us。 It is equally important to us that the family members who run the business remain as owners。 Very simply; we would not want to buy unless we felt key members of present management would stay on as our partners。 Contracts cannot guarantee your continued interest; we would simply rely on your word。 
这样的需求可以说明为何我们希望原有的经营团队最好能够保留20%的股份,基于租税规划我们需要80%以上的股权,这点很重要,但同时我们也希望继续留下来管理的家族成员也能够自己当老板,所以很简单,除非我们确定原有的主要经理人还会继续留下来成为我们的合伙人,否则我们不会考虑买下公司,合约并不能保证你会继续投入,我们相信的是你承诺的每一个字。
The areas I get involved in are capital allocation and selection and pensation of the top man。 Other personnel decisions; operating strategies; etc。 are his bailiwick。 Some Berkshire managers talk over some of their decisions with me; some don't。 It depends upon their personalities and; to an extent; upon their own personal relationship with me。 
我们会介入的领域是资金的规划与配置,以及高阶人员的任命与报酬,其余的人事、营运策略等那就是你自己的事,有些Berkshire旗下事业的经理人会把他们所作的一些商业决定向我报告,有些则不会,这主要是视他们本身的个性,以及与我个人的私人关系而定。
If you should decide to do business with Berkshire; we would pay in cash。 Your business would not be used as collateral for any loan by Berkshire。 There would be no brokers involved。 
如果你决定要跟Berkshire一起做生意,我们会以现金的方式给予报酬,你的企业资产也不会被Berkshire拿来当作借款的抵押品,也不会有掮客牵涉其中。
Furthermore; there would be no chance that a deal would be announced and that the buyer would then back off or start suggesting adjustments (with apologies; of course; and with an explanation that banks; lawyers; boards of directors; etc。 were to be blamed)。 And finally; you would know exactly with whom you are dealing。 You would not have one executive negotiate the deal only to have someone else in charge a few years later; or have the president regretfully tell you that his board of directors required this change or that (or possibly required sale of your business to finance some new interest of the parent's)。 
另外在交易成交后,我们也不会临时宣布退出不玩,或是提出要做调整的要求, (当然要是银行、律师、董事会等方面的出状况,我们也会做出道歉与合理的解释),你不会碰到几年前与你谈判的主管突然走人,之后新上任的主管一概不认帐,或是公司总裁很遗憾地跟你说,他背后的董事会要求你这样或要求你那样, (或甚至想要再把你的公司卖掉以支应母公司新的资金需求)。
It's only fair to tell you that you would be no richer after the sale than now。 The ownership of your business already makes you wealthy and soundly invested。 A sale would change the form of your wealth; but it wouldn't change its amount。 If you sell; you will have exchanged a 100%…owned valuable asset that you understand for another valuable asset  cash  that will probably be invested in small pieces (stocks) of other businesses that you understand less well。 There is often a sound reason to sell but; if the transaction is a fair one; the reason is not so that the seller can bee wealthier。 
另外也必须要提醒你在交易完成后,你并不会比原来还富有,因为拥有原来的事业已经让你用最有利的投资方式赚了很多钱,整个交易只会让你的财富形式有所改变,但基本上金额数量并不会改变,若你要卖,你可以确定将能够把原有100%持有且熟悉的资产,换得另外一种资产…现金,或再加上一小部份你比较不熟悉的企业股份,要做出出售的决定总有许多理由,但若整个交易是公平合理的话,这个理由绝对不是卖方因此可以变得更富有。
I will not pester you; if you have any possible interest in selling; I would appreciate your call。 I would be extraordinarily proud to have Berkshire; along with the key members of your family; own ___I believe we would do very well financially; and I believe you would have just as much fun running the business over the next 20 years as you have had during the past 20。我不会刻意纠缠你,但若你有任何的意愿想要出售的话,我会很乐意接到你的电话,我很荣幸能够让Berkshire与你的家族成员一起拥有这份事业;我相信公司在财务上一定会变得更好,而我也相信在未来的20年内,你也会像过去20年来一样,愉快地继续经营这份事业。
一九九一
Our gain in net worth during 1991 was 2。1 billion; or 39。6%。 Over the last 27 years (that is; since present management took over) our per…share book value has grown from 19 to 6;437; or at a rate of 23。7% pounded annually。
1991年本公司的净值成长了21亿美元,较去年增加了39。6%,而总计过去27年以来,也就是自从现有经营阶层接手之后,每股净值从19元成长到现在的6;437美元,年复合成长率约为23。7%。
The size of our equity capital … which now totals 7。4 billion … makes it certain that we cannot maintain our past rate of gain or; for that matter; e close to doing so。 As Berkshire grows; the universe of opportunities that can significantly influence the pany's performance constantly shrinks。 When we were working with capital of 20 million; an idea or business producing 1 million of profit added five percentage points to our return for the year。 Now we need a 370 million idea (i。e。; one contributing over 550 million of pre…tax profit) to achieve the same result。 And there are many more ways to make 1 million than to make 370 million。
现在我们股东权益的资金规模已高达74亿美元,所以可以确定的是,我们可能再也无法像过去那样继续维持高成长,而随着Berkshire不断地成长,世上所存可以大幅影响本公司表现的机会也就越来越少。当我们操作的资金只有2;000万美元的时候,一项获利100万美元的案子就可以使得我们的年报酬率增加5%,但时至今日,我们却要有3。7亿美元的获利(要是以税前计算的话,更要5。5亿美元),才能达到相同的效果,而要一口气赚3。7亿美元比起一次赚100万美元的难度可是高的多了。
Charlie Munger; Berkshire's Vice Chairman; and I have set a goal of attaining a 15% average annual increase in Berkshire's intrinsic value。 If our growth in book value is to keep up with a 15% pace; we must earn 22 billion during the next decade。 Wish us luck … we'll need it。
查理孟格…Berkshire的副主席与我一起设定,以15%做为每年公司实质价值成长的目标,也就是说如果在未来十年内,公司要能达到这个目标,则帐面净值至少要增加22亿美元,请大家祝我们好运吧! 我们真的很需要祝福。
Our outsized gain in book value in 1991 resulted from a phenomenon not apt to be repeated: a dramatic rise in the price…earnings ratios of Coca…Cola and Gillette。 These two stocks accounted for nearly 1。6 billion of our 2。1 billion growth in net worth last year。 When we loaded up on Coke three years ago; Berkshire's net worth was 3。4 billion; now our Coke stock alone is worth more than that。
我们在1991年所经历帐面数字的超额成长是一种不太可能再发生的现象,受惠于可口可乐与吉列刮胡刀本益比的大幅飙升,光是这两家公司就合计贡献了我们去年21亿美元净值成长中的16亿美元,三年前当我们大笔敲进可口可乐股票的时候,Berkshire的净值大约是34亿美元,但是现在光是我们持有可口可乐的股票市值就超过这个数字。
Coca…Cola and Gillette are two
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