按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
the decline was precipitated by two forces that I discussed in last year's report and that I warned you would have a negative effect on look…through earnings。
然而去年我们的透视盈余不但没有增加，反而减少了14％，这样的下滑主要导源于去年年报就曾经向各位提过的两项因素，那时我就曾经警告各位那对我们的透视盈余将会有负面的影响。
First； I told you that our media earnings … both direct and look…through … were 〃sure to decline〃 and they in fact did。 The second force came into play on April 1； when the call of our Gillette preferred stock required us to convert it into mon。 The after…tax earnings in 1990 from our preferred had been about 45 million； an amount somewhat higher than the bination in 1991 of three months of dividends on our preferred plus nine months of look…through earnings on the mon。
首先我告诉各位旗下媒体事业的盈余，不管是帐面直接或是间接透视一定会减少，而事实证明确是如此，第二个因素发生在4月1号我们吉列特别股被要求转为普通股，1990年来自特别股的税后盈余是4；500万美元，大概比1991年一季的股利总和加上三季的普通股透视盈余还多一点。
Two other outes that I did not foresee also hurt look…through earnings in 1991。 First； we had a break…even result from our interest in Wells Fargo （dividends we received from the pany were offset by negative retained earnings）。 Last year I said that such a result at Wells was 〃a low…level possibility … not a likelihood。〃 Second； we recorded significantly lower … though still excellent … insurance profits。
另外有二项我没有意料到的结果，也影响到我们1991年的透视盈余，首先我们在Well…Fargo的利益大概仅维持损益两平（所收到的股利收入被其累积亏损所抵消），去年我说这样的可能性很低的说法，其可信度存疑，第二我们的保险业盈余虽然算是不错，但还是比往年低。
The following table shows you how we calculate look…through earnings； although I warn you that the figures are necessarily very rough。 （The dividends paid to us by these investees have been included in the operating earnings itemized on page 6； mostly under 〃Insurance Group： Net Investment Ine。〃）
各位可以从下表看出我们是如何计算透视盈余的，不过我还是要提醒各位这些数字有点粗糙，（被投资公司所分配的股利收入已经包含在保险事业的净投资收益项下）
Berkshire's Share of Undistributed Berkshire's Approximate Operating Earnings Berkshire's Major Investees Ownership at Yearend （in millions）
Capital Cities/ABC Inc The Coca…Cola pany Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp。 The Gillette pany GEICO Corp。 The Washington Post pany Wells Fargo & pany
1991 18。1％ 7。0％ 3。4％（1） 11。0％ 48。2％ 14。6％ 9。6％
1990 17。9％ 7。0％ 3。2％（1） … 46。1％ 14。6％ 9。7％
1991 61 69 15 23（2） 69 10 （17）
1990 85 58 10 … 76 18 19（3）
Berkshire's share of
undistributed earnings of major investees 230 266
Hypothetical tax on these undistributed investee earnings （30） （35）
Reported operating earnings of Berkshire 316 371
Total look…through earnings of Berkshire 516 602
1。 Net of minority interest at Wesco已扣除Wesco的少数股权
2。 For the nine months after Berkshire converted its preferred on April 1仅含Berkshire于4月1日申请转换为普通股后的九个月
3。 Calculated on average ownership for the year以年平均持有股权比例计算
We also believe that investors can benefit by focusing on their own look…through earnings。 To calculate these； they should determine the underlying earnings attributable to the shares they hold in their portfolio and total these。 The goal of each investor should be to create a portfolio （in effect； a 〃pany〃） that will deliver him or her the highest possible look…through earnings a decade or so from now。
我们也相信投资人可以透过研究自己的透视盈余而受益，在算这个东西时，他们就会了解到其个别投资组合所应分配到的真正盈余的合计数，所有投资人的目标，应该是要建立一项投资组合可以让其透视盈余在从现在开始的十年内极大化。
An approach of this kind will force the investor to think about long…term business prospects rather than short…term stock market prospects； a perspective likely to improve results。 It's true； of course； that； in the long run； the scoreboard for investment decisions is market price。 But prices will be determined by future earnings。 In investing； just as in baseball； to put runs on the scoreboard one must watch the playing field； not the scoreboard。
这样的方式将会迫使投资人思考企业真正的长期远景而不是短期的股价表现，从而藉此改善其投资绩效，当然无可否认就长期而言，投资决策的绩效还是要建立在股价表现之上，但价格将取决于未来的获利能力，投资就像是打棒球一样，想要得分大家必须将注意力集中到场上，而不是紧盯着计分板。
A Change in Media Economics and Some Valuation Math媒体产业的变化与其评价的算式
In last year's report； I stated my opinion that the decline in the profitability of media panies reflected secular as well as cyclical factors。 The events of 1991 have fortified that case： The economic strength of once…mighty media enterprises continues to erode as retailing patterns change and advertising and entertainment choices proliferate。 In the business world； unfortunately； the rear…view mirror is always clearer than the windshield： A few years back no one linked to the media business … neither lenders； owners nor financial analysts … saw the economic deterioration that was in store for the industry。 （But give me a few years and I'll probably convince myself that I did。）
在去年的报告中，我曾经表示媒体事业获利能力衰退主要是反应景气的循环因素，但在1991年发生的情况则不是那么一回事，由于零售业形态的转变加上广告与娱乐事业的多元化，以往曾经一度风光的媒体事业，其竞争力已受到严重的侵蚀，然而不幸的是在商业世界中，从后照镜所看到的景象永远比挡风玻璃的还清楚，几年前几乎没有人，包含银行、股东与证券分析师在内，会不看好媒体事业的发展，（若是再多给我几年，我可能就能正确判断出这个产业正在走下坡）。
The fact is that newspaper； television； and magazine properties have begun to resemble businesses more than franchises in their economic behavior。 Let's take a quick look at the characteristics separating these two classes of enterprise； keeping in mind； however； that many operations fall in some middle ground and can best be described as weak franchises or strong businesses。
事实是报纸、电视与杂志等媒体的行为，越来越超越身为特许行业所应该做的事，让我们很快地看一下特许事业与一般事业在特性上的不同，不过请记住，很多公司事实上是介于这两者之间，所以也可以将之形容为弱势的特许事业或是强势的一般企业。
An economic franchise arises from a product or service that： （1） is needed or desired； （2） is thought by its customers to have no close substitute and； （3） is not subject to price regulation。 The existence of all three conditions will be demonstrated by a pany's ability to regularly price its product or service aggressively and thereby to earn high rates of return on capital。 Moreover； franchises can tolerate mis…management。 Inept managers may diminish a franchise's profitability； but they cannot inflict mortal damage。
藉由特定的产品或服务，一家公司可以成为特许的行业（1）它确有需要或需求（2）被顾客认定为找不到其它类似的替代品（3）不受价格上的管制，一家公司到底有没有具有以上三个特点可能从他是否能积极地为本身所提供的产品与服务订定价格的能力，从而赚取更高的资本报酬率，更重要的特许事业比较能够容忍不当的管理，无能的经理人虽然会降低特许事业的获利能力，但是并不会造成致命的伤害。
In contrast； 〃a business〃 earns exceptional profits only if it is the low…cost operator or if supply of its product or service is tight。 Tightness in supply usually does not last long。 With superior management； a pany may maintain its status as a low…cost operator for a much longer time； but even then unceasingly faces the possibility of petitive attack。 And a business； unlike a franchise； can be killed by poor management。
相对的，一般事业想要获致高报酬就只有靠着节省成本或是当其所提供的产品或服务供需不均之时，但是这种供给不足的情况通常维持不了多久，倒是透过优良的管理，一家公司却可以长期维持低成本的营运，但即使是如此，还是会面临竞争对手持续不断的攻击，而不像特许事业，一般事业有可能因为管理不善而倒闭。
Until recently； media properties possessed the three characteristics of a franchise and consequently could both price aggressively and be managed loosely。 Now； however； consumers looking for information and entertainment （their primary interest being the latter） enjoy greatly broadened choices as to where to find them。 Unfortunately； demand can't expand in response to this new supply： 500 million American eyeballs and a 24…hour day are all that's available。 The result is that petition has intensified； markets have fragmented； and the media industry has lost some … though far from all … of its franchise strength。
直到最近，媒体产业还拥有特许事业这三项特质，因此还能够订定侵略性的价格并容忍宽松的管理，不过现在的消费大众不断地寻找不同的信息与娱乐来源，也越来越能够接受各种不同的选择，另一方面很不幸的是消费者的需求并不会随着供给的增加而变大，五亿只美国眼睛，一天24小时，就这么多，不可能再增加了。所以结果可想而知竞争会变得更激烈，市场被区隔开，媒体产业因而丧失了部份原有的特许能力。
The industry's weakened franchise has an impact on its value that goes far beyond the immediate effect on earnings。 For an understanding of this phenomenon； let's look at some much over…simplified； but relevant； math。
媒体产业转为弱势，除了让短期盈余获利受到冲击之外，对其本身的价值将有更深远的影响，为了让大家了解这种现象，让我们来看看稍微简化但却颇为相关的数学算式。
A few years ago the conventional wisdom held that a newspaper； television or magazine property would forever increase its earnin