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t of float。〃
于是Berkshire旗下的保险事业将与公司本身或产业经营绩效越来越不相关的综合比率做了一番修正，对我们来说真正重要的是我们从保险业所得到的资金的成本，套句行话就是浮存金的成本。
Float … which we generate in exceptional amounts … is the total of loss reserves； loss adjustment expense reserves and unearned premium reserves minus agents balances； prepaid acquisition costs and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance。 And the cost of float is measured by our underwriting loss。
浮存金…我们靠保险业所取得大量的资金，系指将所有的损失准备、损失费用调整准备与未赚取保费加总后，再扣除应付佣金、预付购并成本及相关再保递延费用，至于浮存金的成本则是以我们所发生的承保损失来衡量。
The table below shows our cost of float since we entered the business in 1967。
下表是我们在1967年进入保险业后，浮存金的成本统计：
（1） （2） Yearend YieldUnderwriting Approximate on Long…TermLoss Average Float Cost of Funds Govt。 Bonds
（承保损失） （平均浮存金） （平均资金成本） （长期公债殖利率）
（In Millions） （Ratio of 1 to 2）
1967 profit 17。3 less than zero 5。50％ 1980 profit 237。0 less than zero 11。94％
1968 profit 19。9 less than zero 5。90％ 1981 profit 228。4 less than zero 13。61％
1969 profit 23。4 less than zero 6。79％ 1982 21。56 220。6 9。77％ 10。64％
1970 0。37 32。4 1。14％ 6。25％ 1983 33。87 231。3 14。64％ 11。84％
1971 profit 52。5 less than zero 5。81％ 1984 48。06 253。2 18。98％ 11。58％
1972 profit 69。5 less than zero 5。82％ 1985 44。23 390。2 11。34％ 9。34％
1973 profit 73。3 less than zero 7。27％ 1986 55。84 797。5 7。00％ 7。60％
1974 7。36 79。1 9。30％ 8。13％ 1987 55。43 1；266。7 4。38％ 8。95％
1975 11。35 87。6 12。96％ 8。03％ 1988 11。08 1；497。7 0。74％ 9。00％
1976 profit 102。6 less than zero 7。30％ 1989 24。40 1；541。3 1。58％ 7。97％
1977 profit 139。0 less than zero 7。97％ 1990 26。65 1；637。3 1。63％ 8。24％
1978 profit 190。4 less than zero 8。93％ 1991 119。6 1；895。0 6。31％ 7。40％
1979 profit 227。3 less than zero 10。08％
As you can see； our cost of funds in 1991 was well below the U。 S。 Government's cost on newly…issued long…term bonds。 We have in fact beat the government's rate in 20 of the 25 years we have been in the insurance business； often by a wide margin。 We have over that time also substantially increased the amount of funds we hold； which counts as a favorable development but only because the cost of funds has been satisfactory。 Our float should continue to grow； the challenge will be to garner these funds at a reasonable cost。
各位可以看到我们1991年的资金成本甚至比美国政府新发行的长期公债利率还低，事实上在过去25年的保险事业经营中，我们有20年是远胜于政府公债发行利率，而且差距的幅度通常都相当可观，同时所持有的浮存金数量也以惊人的幅度成长，当然这只有在资金成本低的情况下，才称得上是好现象，展望未来，浮存金的数量还会继续成长，对我们而言，最大的挑战是这些资金是否能有合理的成本取得。
Berkshire continues to be a very large writer … perhaps the largest in the world … of 〃super…cat〃 insurance； which is coverage that other insurance panies buy to protect themselves against major catastrophic losses。 Profits in this business are enormously volatile。 As I mentioned last year； 100 million in super…cat premiums； which is roughly our annual expectation； could deliver us anything from a 100 million profit （in a year with no big catastrophe） to a 200 million loss （in a year in which a couple of major hurricanes and/or earthquakes e along）。
Berkshire一直都是霹雳猫保单相当大的发行公司，或许规模已是全世界最大的，这类保单通常是由其它保险公司买来分散他们本身在重大意外事故所需承担的风险，这类保险的获利情况变化相当的大，就像是去年我曾经提过的，一亿美元的保费收入，这大约是我们预期一年所能接到的业务量，可能可以让我们有一亿美元的获利（只要当年度没有重大灾害发生），也可能让我们产生二亿美元的损失（只要当年度发生连续几个飓风或地震）。
We price this business expecting to pay out； over the long term； about 90％ of the premiums we receive。 In any given year； however； we are likely to appear either enormously profitable or enormously unprofitable。 That is true in part because GAAP accounting does not allow us to set up reserves in the catastrophe…free years for losses that are certain to be experienced in other years。 In effect； a one…year accounting cycle is ill…suited to the nature of this business … and that is a reality you should be aware of when you assess our annual results。
当我们在订价时，长期而言我们预期只要支付出90％收到的保费收入，当然在任何一个特定年度，我们可能大赚或是大亏，一部份的原因在于一般公认会计原则并不允许我们在没有重大灾害发生的年度提拨损失准备，以弥补其它年度一定会发生的损失，事实上以一年为期的会计期间并不适合这类的保险业务，所以换句话说当你在评断我们公司的年度绩效时，一定要特别注意到这一点。
Last year there appears to have been； by our definition； one super…cat； but it will trigger payments from only about 25％ of our policies。 Therefore； we currently estimate the 1991 underwriting profit from our catastrophe business to have been about 11 million。 （You may be surprised to learn the identity of the biggest catastrophe in 1991： It was neither the Oakland fire nor Hurricane Bob； but rather a September typhoon in Japan that caused the industry an insured loss now estimated at about 4…5 billion。 At the higher figure； the loss from the typhoon would surpass that from Hurricane Hugo； the previous record…holder。）
去年照我们的定义可能会有一件霹雳猫保单要付上我们年度保费收入的25％，因此我们预计1991年这类业务的承保获利大约是1；100万美元（或许你很好奇想要知道1991年所发生的最大灾害是什么？ 它既不是奥克兰大火也不是Bob飓风，而是九月在日本发生的台风造成的损失估计在40…50亿美元上下，若以上限估计，这个数字将超过Hugo飓风先前所创下的最高损失记录）。
Insurers will always need huge amounts of reinsurance protection for marine and aviation disasters as well as for natural catastrophes。 In the 1980's much of this reinsurance was supplied by 〃innocents〃 … that is； by insurers that did not understand the risks of the business … but they have now been financially burned beyond recognition。 （Berkshire itself was an innocent all too often when I was personally running the insurance operation。） Insurers； though； like investors； eventually repeat their mistakes。 At some point … probably after a few catastrophe…scarce years … innocents will reappear and prices for super…cat policies will plunge to silly levels。
保险业者总会需要大量的再保险来规避航海与航空以及天然灾害等意外事故，在1980年代许多再保险保单都是由外行人来承接，这些人根本就不知道这类保险的风险有多高，所以现在他们已经被烫的不省人事，（就连Berkshire在本人经营这项业务时也是如此），保险业者如同投资人一样，还是会一再重复所发生的错误，只要有一、两年意外灾害较少，就会有无知的业者跳出来以极低的价格杀价竞争抢单。
As long as apparently…adequate rates prevail； however； we will be a major participant in super…cat coverages。 In marketing this product； we enjoy a significant petitive advantage because of our premier financial strength。 Thinking insurers know that when 〃the big one〃 es； many reinsurers who found it easy to write policies will find it difficult to write checks。 （Some reinsurers can say what Jackie Mason does： 〃I'm fixed for life … as long as I don't buy anything。〃） Berkshire's ability to fulfill all its mitments under conditions of even extreme adversity is unquestioned。
然而只要市场上费率看起来合理，我们就会继续留在这一行里，而在推销这类保单时，我们所拥有的最大竞争优势就是我们的财务实力，有远见的客户都知道许多再保业者可以很轻松地接下保单，但是当重大的意外灾害接连发生时，要他们支付赔偿金可能就有点困难，（有些再保业者就像Jackie Mason所说的一样，我可以一辈子不花钱，只要我不买任何东西），相对地Berkshire在任何极端的状况下，都能够履行他所做出的承诺。
Overall； insurance offers Berkshire its greatest opportunities。 Mike Goldberg has acplished wonders with this operation since he took charge and it has bee a very valuable asset； albeit one that can't be appraised with any precision。
总的来说，保险业提供Berkshire相当大的机会，Mike Goldberg在他接手这项业务之后，就一直缔造出优异的成绩，也使得保险子公司成为我们非常宝贵的资产，虽然我们无法以精确的数字来衡量。
Marketable mon Stocks有价证券股票投资
On the next page we list our mon stock holdings having avalue of over 100 million。 A small portion of these investments belongs to subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns less than 100％。
下表是我们超过一亿美元以上的普通股投资，一部份的投资系属于Berkshire关系企业所持有）。
Shares pany Cost Market（000s omitted） 12/31/91
3；000；000 46；700；000 2；495；200 6；850；000 24；000；000 31；247；000 1；727；765 5；000；000
Capital Cities/ABC； Inc。 The Coca…Cola pany Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp GEICO Corp The Gillette pany Guinness PLC The Washington Post pany Wells Fargo & pany
517；500 1；023；920 77；245 45；713 600；000 264；782 9；731 289；431
1；300；500 3；747；675 343；090 1；363；150 1；347；000 296；755 336；050 290；000
As usual the list reflects our Rip Van Winkle approach to investing。 Guinness is a new position。 But we held the other seven stocks a year ago （making allowance for the conversion of our Gillette position from preferred to mon） and in six of those we hold an unchanged number of shares。 The exception is Federal Home Loan Mortgage （〃Freddie Mac〃）； in which our shareholdings increased slightly。 Our stay…put behavior reflects our view that the stock market serves as a relocation center at which money is moved from the active to the patient。 （With tongue only partly in check； I suggest that rece