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oney is moved from the active to the patient。 （With tongue only partly in check； I suggest that recent events indicate that the much…maligned 〃idle rich〃 have received a bad rap： They have maintained or increased their wealth while many of the 〃energetic rich〃 … aggressive real estate operators； corporate acquirers； oil drillers； etc。 … have seen their fortunes disappear。）
一如往常，以上这张表显示我们李伯大梦式的投资方式，健力士Guinness是我们最新的投资部位，至于其它七项主要的投资都持有一年以上（如果把吉列从特别股转换成普通股也包含在内的话），其中六项投资甚至连持股数都没有变动，唯一的例外是联邦家庭贷款抵押（Freddie Mac），我们投资的股数略微增加，我们以不变应万变的做法主要是反应我们把股票市场当作是财富重分配的中心，而钱通常由积极的份子流到有耐性的投资人手中，（我嘴巴可能闭的不够紧，我认为最近几件事情显示许多躺着赚的有钱人招到许多攻击，因为他们好象没做什么事就使得本身的财富暴涨，而在此同时过去那些积极活跃的有钱人，如房地产大亨、企业购并家与石油钻探大亨等，却眼睁睁地看着自己的财产一点一滴地缩水）。
Our Guinness holding represents Berkshire's first significant investment in a pany domiciled outside the United States。 Guinness； however； earns its money in much the same fashion as Coca…Cola and Gillette； U。S。…based panies that garner most of their profits from international operations。 Indeed； in the sense of where they earn their profits … continent…by…continent … Coca…Cola and Guinness display strong similarities。 （But you'll never get their drinks confused … and your Chairman remains unmovably in the Cherry Coke camp。）
我们在健力士Guinness的持股代表Berkshire第一次对海外公司进行大规模的投资，不过Guinness所赚的钱与可口可乐、吉列刮胡刀等美国公司却极为类似，主要都是仰赖国际部门的营运，确实以国际性的眼光来看，Guinness与可口可乐的获利来源有相当的共通性，（但是大家绝对不能将自己最爱的饮料搞混掉，像我个人的最爱依旧是樱桃可口可乐）。
We continually search for large businesses with understandable； enduring and mouth…watering economics that are run by able and shareholder…oriented managements。 This focus doesn't guarantee results： We both have to buy at a sensible price and get business performance from our panies that validates our assessment。 But this investment approach … searching for the superstars … offers us our only chance for real success。 Charlie and I are simply not smart enough； considering the large sums we work with； to get great results by adroitly buying and selling portions of far…from…great businesses。 Nor do we think many others can achieve long…term investment success by flitting from flower to flower。 Indeed； we believe that according the name 〃investors〃 to institutions that trade actively is like calling someone who repeatedly engages in one…night stands a romantic。
我们还是持续地在寻找大型的企业，那种令人容易了解、具有持续性且让人垂涎三尺的事业，并且由有能力才干并以股东利益为优先的经营阶层，虽然这些要求的重点并不一定保证结果就一定令人满意，当然我们一定要以合理的价格投资并且确保我们的被投资公司绩效表现与我们当初所评估的一致，这样的投资方法…寻找产业的超级明星，是我们唯一能够成功的机会，查理跟我的天资实在是有限，以我们目前操作的资金规模，实在是无法靠着买卖一些平凡普通的企业来赚取足够的利益，当然我们也不认为其它人就有办法以这种小蜜蜂飞到西、飞到东的方法成功，事实上我们认为将这些短线进出如此频繁的法人机构称为投资人，就好象是把一个每天寻找一夜情的花花公子称作为浪漫情人一样。
If my universe of business possibilities was limited； say； to private panies in Omaha； I would； first； try to assess the long…term economic characteristics of each business； second； assess the quality of the people in charge of running it； and； third； try to buy into a few of the best operations at a sensible price。 I certainly would not wish to own an equal part of every business in town。 Why； then； should Berkshire take a different tack when dealing with the larger universe of public panies？ And since finding great businesses and outstanding managers is so difficult； why should we discard proven products？ （I was tempted to say 〃the real thing。〃） Our motto is： 〃If at first you do succeed； quit trying。〃
今天假设我的投资天地仅限于比如说奥玛哈地区的私人企业，那么首先我们仔细地评估每家企业长期的竞争力，第二我会再评估经营者的特质，之后再以合理的价格买进一小部份的股权，既然我不可能雨露均沾地去买镇上所有公司的股权，那么为什么Berkshire在面对全美一大堆上市大公司时，就要采取不同的态度，也因为要找到好的事业并加上好的经理人是如此的困难，那么为什么我们要拋弃那些已经被证明过的投资对象呢？ （通常我喜欢把它们称做是狠角色），我们的座右铭是如果你第一次就成功了，那就不要费力再去试别的了。
John Maynard Keynes； whose brilliance as a practicing investor matched his brilliance in thought； wrote a letter to a business associate； F。 C。 Scott； on August 15； 1934 that says it all： 〃As time goes on； I get more and more convinced that the right method in investment is to put fairly large sums into enterprises which one thinks one knows something about and in the management of which one thoroughly believes。 It is a mistake to think that one limits one's risk by spreading too much between enterprises about which one knows little and has no reason for special confidence。 。 。 。 One's knowledge and experience are definitely limited and there are seldom more than two or three enterprises at any given time in which I personally feel myself entitled to put full confidence。〃
著名经济学家凯恩斯，他的投资绩效跟他的理论思想一样杰出，在1934年8月15日他曾经写了一封信给生意伙伴Scott上面写到，随着时光的流逝，我越来越相信正确的投资方式是将大部分的资金投入在自己认为了解且相信的事业之上，而不是将资金分散到自己不懂且没有特别信心的一大堆公司，每个人的知识与经验一定有其限度，就我本身而言，我很难同时有两三家以上的公司可以让我感到完全的放心。
Mistake Du Jour实时供应的错误
In the 1989 annual report I wrote about 〃Mistakes of the First 25 Years〃 and promised you an update in 2015。 My experiences in the first few years of this second 〃semester〃 indicate that my backlog of matters to be discussed will bee unmanageable if I stick to my original plan。 Therefore； I will occasionally unburden myself in these pages in the hope that public confession may deter further bumblings。 （Post…mortems prove useful for hospitals and football teams； why not for businesses and investors？）
在1989年的年报中，我曾经写过Berkshire头25所犯的错误，而且承诺在2015年还会再有更新的报告，但是第二阶段的头几年让我觉得若是坚持原来的计画的话，可能让这些记录多到难以管理，因此我决定每隔一段时间会在这里丢出一点东西，所谓自首无罪，抓到双倍，希望我公开的忏悔能够免于大家继续对我的轰炸（不管是医院的死后验尸或是足球队常常用到的事后检讨，我想应该也能够适用在企业与投资人之上）。
Typically； our most egregious mistakes fall in the omission； rather than the mission； category。 That may spare Charlie and me some embarrassment； since you don't see these errors； but their invisibility does not reduce their cost。 In this mea culpa； I am not talking about missing out on some pany that depends upon an esoteric invention （such as Xerox）； high…technology （Apple）； or even brilliant merchandising （Wal…Mart）。 We will never develop the petence to spot such businesses early。 Instead I refer to business situations that Charlie and I can understand and that seem clearly attractive … but in which we nevertheless end up sucking our thumbs rather than buying。
通常我们很多重大的错误不是发生在我们已经做的部份，而是在于我们没有去做的那部份，虽然因为各位看不到这些失误，所以查理跟我可以少一点难堪，但看不到不代表我们就不必付出代价，而这些我公开承认的错误，并不是指我错过了某些革命性的新发明（就像是全录像印技术）、高科技（像是苹果计算机）或是更优秀的通路零售商（像是威名百货），我们永远不可能拥有在早期发掘这些优秀公司的能力，反而我指的是那些查理跟我可以很容易就了解且很明显对我们有吸引力的公司，无奈在当时我们只是不断地咬着指甲犹豫不决，就是不能下定决心把他们买下来。
Every writer knows it helps to use striking examples； but I wish the one I now present wasn't quite so dramatic： In early 1988； we decided to buy 30 million shares （adjusted for a subsequent split） of Federal National Mortgage Association （Fannie Mae）； which would have been a 350…400 million investment。 We had owned the stock some years earlier and understood the pany's business。 Furthermore； it was clear to us that David Maxwell； Fannie Mae's CEO； had dealt superbly with some problems that he had inherited and had established the pany as a financial powerhouse … with the best yet to e。 I visited David in Washington and confirmed that he would not be unfortable if we were to take a large position。
每位作者都知道，要让读者了解其意思最好的方式就是举个例子，不过希望我现在举的例子不会过于极端，回顾1988年当时我们决定以3。5亿到4亿美元之间，买进3；000万股（经过事后的分割调整）的联邦国家贷款协会，简称Fannie Mae，我们之前曾经拥有过这家公司的股份，也对其所处的产业相当了解，另外很显然的，也很清楚David Maxwell也就是Fannie Mae的总裁，有能力处理他所接下的一堆问题，同时进一步将公司建立成为一个金融巨擘，一切可说是前景看好，为此我还特地到华盛顿拜访David，确认他对于我们持有该公司一大部分的股权不会感到任何的不愉快。
After we bought about 7 million shares； the price began to climb。 In frustration； I stopped buying （a mistake that； thankfully； I did not repeat when Coca…Cola stock rose similarly during our purchase program）。 In an even sillier move； I surrendered to my distaste for holding small positions and sold the 7 million shares we owned。
只不过当我们