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ry 4； 1993； and of some holders electing to receive mon shares rather than the cash that was their alternative。 Most holders of the debentures who converted into mon waited until January to do it； but a few made the move in December and therefore received shares in 1992。 To sum up what happened to the 476 million of bonds we had outstanding： 25 million were converted into shares before yearend； 46 million were converted in January； and 405 million were redeemed for cash。 The conversions were made at 11；719 per share； so altogether we issued 6；106 shares。
回顾过去一年，Berkshire的净值增加了15。2亿美元，其中98％系来自于盈余与投资组合的增值，剩下的2％则是因为发行新股的缘故，这些股份是因为我们赎回在1993年1月4日所发行的可转换特别股，其中有部份持有人不要现金而选择领取本公司的普通股，大部分的持有人选择在1月进行转换，另外有一小部份则在去年12月就径行转换，总计当初我们发行总值4。76亿美元的债券中，4；600万在一月转换，另外4。05亿美元则以现金赎回，转换价订为11；719美元一股，换算下来一共发行了6；106股。
Berkshire now has 1；152；547 shares outstanding。 That pares； you will be interested to know； to 1；137；778 shares outstanding on October 1； 1964； the beginning of the fiscal year during which Buffett Partnership； Ltd。 acquired control of the pany。
Berkshire目前流通在外股数为1；152；547股，相较于1964年10月1日当初，巴菲特合伙取得Berkshire控制权时的1；137；778股来说，增加的股数实属有限。
We have a firm policy about issuing shares of Berkshire； doing so only when we receive as much value as we give。 Equal value； however； has not been easy to obtain； since we have always valued our shares highly。 So be it： We wish to increase Berkshire's size only when doing that also increases the wealth of its owners。
对于发行新股我们有相当严格的规定，那就是除非我们确信所收到的价值与我们付出的一致时，我们才会考虑这样做，当然同等的价值不是那么容易达到，因为我们一向自视甚高，不过那又如何，除非确定公司股东的财富也会增加，否则我们不会随便扩大规模。
Those two objectives do not necessarily go hand…in…hand as an amusing but value…destroying experience in our past illustrates。 On that occasion； we had a significant investment in a bank whose management was hell…bent on expansion。 （Aren't they all？） When our bank wooed a smaller bank； its owner demanded a stock swap on a basis that valued the acquiree's net worth and earning power at over twice that of the acquirer's。 Our management … visibly in heat … quickly capitulated。 The owner of the acquiree then insisted on one other condition： 〃You must promise me；〃 he said in effect； 〃that once our merger is done and I have bee a major shareholder； you'll never again make a deal this dumb。〃
大家要知道这两个目的不一定就会自然吻合，事实上在我们过去所举过的例子中，有些就是看起来有趣但却是让价值受到减损的经验，在那次经验中，我们在一家银行有相当大的投资，而银行经理人对于扩张却有极度偏好，（他们不都是如此吗？），当我们投资的银行在追求另外一家较小的银行时，对方开出的价码是以其净值与获利能力作为基础后的两倍，当时我们的经理人因为正在热头上，所以很快就答应了，这时对方又得寸进尺开出另外一项条件，他说：「你必须答应我，在整个购并案完成后，我可以变成公司最大的股东，同时以后你也不能在做类似这次交易那样愚蠢的购并案」。
You will remember that our goal is to increase our per…share intrinsic value … for which our book value is a conservative； but useful； proxy … at a 15％ annual rate。 This objective； however； cannot be attained in a smooth manner。 Smoothness is particularly elusive because of the accounting rules that apply to the mon stocks owned by our insurance panies； whose portfolios represent a high proportion of Berkshire's net worth。 Since 1979； generally accepted accounting principles （GAAP） have required that these securities be valued at their market prices （less an adjustment for tax on any net unrealized appreciation） rather than at the lower of cost or market。 Run…of…the…mill fluctuations in equity prices therefore cause our annual results to gyrate； especially in parison to those of the typical industrial pany。
大家一定要记得，我们的终极目标是希望能让公司每年以15％稳定的速度来增加每股的实质价值，当然公司的帐面价值虽然保守了点，但却是相当有用的替代性指针，不过这样的目标很难以平稳地态势达成，这在Berkshire尤其困难，因为会计原则规定，我们旗下保险事业所持有，占Berkshire相当大部分的股票投资必须以市价列示。自从1979年以来，一般公认会计原则就要求它们以市价方式而非原先的成本与市价孰低法列在公司帐上（当然要扣除未实现资本利得估计应支付的税负），股票价格如同水车滚轮般上上下下，也使得我们每年结算的成绩变化很大，尤其是在与一般公司产业比较时更为明显。
To illustrate just how volatile our progress has been … and to indicate the impact that market movements have on short…term results … we show on the facing page our annual change in per…share net worth and pare it with the annual results （including dividends） of the S&P 500。
为了解释我们净值变化的程度以及股票市场波动对于公司帐面盈余短期的影响，从今年起我们决定在年报的首页放置每年公司净值变化以及与S&P 500指数（含现金股利）之间的比较。
You should keep at least three points in mind as you evaluate this data。 The first point concerns the many businesses we operate whose annual earnings are unaffected by changes in stock market valuations。 The impact of these businesses on both our absolute and relative performance has changed over the years。 Early on； returns from our textile operation； which then represented a significant portion of our net worth； were a major drag on performance； averaging far less than would have been the case if the money invested in that business had instead been invested in the S&P 500。 In more recent years； as we assembled our collection of exceptional businesses run by equally exceptional managers； the returns from our operating businesses have been high … usually well in excess of the returns achieved by the S&P。
大家在评估这份资料时至少必须要注意三个重点，第一、我们旗下许多事业每年年度的获利并不受股市波动的影响，而这些企业对于我们绝对或相对的影响每年也都不一样，就早期而言，由于我们在纺织事业的报酬占我们净值相当大的部份，所以要是在这方面投资不当，我们的绩效可能会远远落后于将钱摆在S&P 500指数相关类股之上，不过到了最近，当我们逐渐利用投资组成一支由优秀经理人经营的优秀企业团队时，这些企业所带来的报酬通常远高于投资S&P 500指数。
A second important factor to consider … and one that significantly hurts our relative performance … is that both the ine and capital gains from our securities are burdened by a substantial corporate tax liability whereas the S&P returns are pre…tax。 To prehend the damage； imagine that Berkshire had owned nothing other than the S&P index during the 28…year period covered。 In that case； the tax bite would have caused our corporate performance to be appreciably below the record shown in the table for the S&P。 Under present tax laws； a gain for the S&P of 18％ delivers a corporate holder of that index a return well short of 13％。 And this problem would be intensified if corporate tax rates were to rise。 This is a structural disadvantage we simply have to live with； there is no antidote for it。
第二项应该要特别注意的因素…也是影响我们相对表现的因素，那就是我们投资证券所产生的收益与资本利得必须要负担相当重的税负，而在此同时S&P 500指数却是以免税基础计算的，为了让大家了解这期间的差异性，假设Berkshire在过去28年间就只投资S&P 500指数，则最后所得到的投资报酬将远低于S&P 500指数本身的表现，依照目前的税率，若是S&P 500上涨18％，则在课税后投资人真正得到的报酬只有13％不到，而这个问题若是考量目前税率即将调高的情况，将会变得更严重，这是一个我们必须要忍受的结构性问题，基本上没有办法可解。
The third point incorporates two predictions： Charlie Munger； Berkshire's Vice Chairman and my partner； and I are virtually certain that the return over the next decade from an investment in the S&P index will be far less than that of the past decade； and we are dead certain that the drag exerted by Berkshire's expanding capital base will substantially reduce our historical advantage relative to the index。
第三点包含两个预测，查理孟格…Berkshire的副主席兼主要合伙人，跟我都相当清楚，那就是未来十年内S&P 500指数的表现将无法像过去十年那样的好，而我们同样也相信以Berkshire目前资本规模越来越大的趋势，将会大大影响过去我们大幅超越指数的表现。
Making the first prediction goes somewhat against our grain： We've long felt that the only value of stock forecasters is to make fortune tellers look good。 Even now； Charlie and I continue to believe that short…term market forecasts are poison and should be kept locked up in a safe place； away from children and also from grown…ups who behave in the market like children。 However； it is clear that stocks cannot forever overperform their underlying businesses； as they have so dramatically done for some time； and that fact makes us quite confident of our forecast that the rewards from investing in stocks over the next decade will be significantly smaller than they were in the last。 Our second conclusion … that an increased capital base will act as an anchor on our relative performance … seems incontestable。 The only open question is whether we can drag the anchor along at some tolerable； though slowed； pace。
做出第一项预测有违我们的本性，一直以来我们认为股市预言家唯一的价值就是让算命先生看起来像那么一回事，即便是现在，查理跟我还是相信短期股市的预测是毒药，应该要把他们摆在最安全的地方，远离儿童以及那些在股市中的行为像小孩般幼稚的投资人，虽然有时股市的表现会有相当大的起伏，然而很明显的股