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What constitutes an appropriate price； of course； is difficult to determine。 Catastrophe insurers can't simply extrapolate past experience。 If there is truly 〃global warming；〃 for example； the odds would shift； since tiny changes in atmospheric conditions can produce momentous changes in weather patterns。 Furthermore； in recent years there has been a mushrooming of population and insured values in U。S。 coastal areas that are particularly vulnerable to hurricanes； the number one creator of super…cats。 A hurricane that caused x dollars of damage 20 years ago could easily cost 10x now。
当然何谓合理的价格实在是很难去界定，灾害保险业者实在是很难依据过去的经验来预估未来，例如若是全球温室效应确实存在的话，意外变量一定会增多，只要大气状况有任何些微的转变就有可能造成气象形态的巨幅波动，更有甚者，最近几年美国海岸地区人口爆炸性成长，使得这些地区的被保标的特别容易受到飓风的侵袭，而飓风正是超级意外最常发生的第一名，现在一次飓风所发生的损失可能是二十年前的十倍以上。
Occasionally； also； the unthinkable happens。 Who would have guessed； for example； that a major earthquake could occur in Charleston； S。C。？ （It struck in 1886； registered an estimated 6。6 on the Richter scale； and caused 60 deaths。） And who could have imagined that our country's most serious quake would occur at New Madrid； Missouri； which suffered an estimated 8。7 shocker in 1812。 By parison； the 1989 San Francisco quake was a 7。1 … and remember that each one…point Richter increase represents a ten…fold increase in strength。 Someday； a U。S。 earthquake occurring far from California will cause enormous losses for insurers。
而且有时还会有意想不到的事情发生，比如说谁会想到Charleston地区竟然会发生大地震（它在1886年发生，芮氏规模6。6，造成60个人死亡），又有谁知道美国史上最严重的地震是1812年发生在密苏里州估计规模8。7的那次地震，比较起来1989年发生在旧金山的大地震，规模只有7。1，大家要知道每增加0。1级代表其释放的力量就要增加10倍，哪一天要是加州发生大地震的话，将会对所有保险业者造成难以估计的损失。
When viewing our quarterly figures； you should understand that our accounting for super…cat premiums differs from our accounting for other insurance premiums。 Rather than recording our super…cat premiums on a pro…rata basis over the life of a given policy； we defer recognition of revenue until a loss occurs or until the policy expires。 We take this conservative approach because the likelihood of super…cats causing us losses is particularly great toward the end of the year。 It is then that weather tends to kick up： Of the ten largest insured losses in U。S。 history； nine occurred in the last half of the year。 In addition； policies that are not triggered by a first event are unlikely； by their very terms； to cause us losses until late in the year。
当各位在检视我们每季的数字时，大家一定要知道我们霹雳猫保险的会计原则与一般保险有些许的不同，没有将霹雳猫的保费收入按保单发行期间平均分摊认列，我们必须等到整个保单期间结束或是损失发生后才全部一次认列，我们之所以采取这样保守的做法，原因在于霹雳猫保单在年度截止之前特别容易发生意情，尤其是天气状况更是如此，在历史上前十大意外灾害中，有九件是发生在下半年，此外由于许多保单在第一次重大灾害发生时，并不理赔，所以若真的发生损失的话，通常会是在下半年。
The bottom…line effect of our accounting procedure for super…cats is this： Large losses may be reported in any quarter of the year； but significant profits will only be reported in the fourth quarter。
对于霹雳猫保险我们的会计原则底限就是，钜额的损失可能会发生在任何一季，但钜额的获利只有在每年的第四季才有可能出现。
As I've told you in each of the last few years； what counts in our insurance business is 〃the cost of funds developed from insurance；〃 or in the vernacular； 〃the cost of float。〃 Float … which we generate in exceptional amounts … is the total of loss reserves； loss adjustment expense reserves and unearned premium reserves minus agents' balances； prepaid acquisition costs and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance。 The cost of float is measured by our underwriting loss。
就像是前几年向各位提过的，真正重要的是我们从保险业所取得的资金，其资金成本到底是多少，套句专业术语，就是浮存金成本，浮存金…系指我们靠保险业所取得大量的资金，系指将所有的损失准备、损失费用调整准备与未赚取保费加总后，再扣除应付佣金、预付购并成本及相关再保递延费用，至于浮存金的成本则是以我们所发生的承保损失来衡量。
The table below shows our cost of float since we entered the business in 1967。
下表是我们在1967年进入保险业后，浮存金的成本统计：
（1） （2） Yearend Yield
Underwriting Approximate on Long…Term
Loss Average Float Cost of Funds Govt。 Bonds （In Millions） （Ratio of 1 to 2）
1967 profit 17。3 less than zero 5。50％ 1980 profit 237。0 less than zero 11。94％
1968 profit 19。9 less than zero 5。90％ 1981 profit 228。4 less than zero 13。61％
1969 profit 23。4 less than zero 6。79％ 1982 21。56 220。6 9。77％ 10。64％
1970 0。37 32。4 1。14％ 6。25％ 1983 33。87 231。3 14。64％ 11。84％
1971 profit 52。5 less than zero 5。81％ 1984 48。06 253。2 18。98％ 11。58％
1972 profit 69。5 less than zero 5。82％ 1985 44。23 390。2 11。34％ 9。34％
1973 profit 73。3 less than zero 7。27％ 1986 55。84 797。5 7。00％ 7。60％
1974 7。36 79。1 9。30％ 8。13％ 1987 55。43 1；266。7 4。38％ 8。95％
1975 11。35 87。6 12。96％ 8。03％ 1988 11。08 1；497。7 0。74％ 9。00％
1976 profit 102。6 less than zero 7。30％ 1989 24。40 1；541。3 1。58％ 7。97％
1977 profit 139。0 less than zero 7。97％ 1990 26。65 1；637。3 1。63％ 8。24％
1978 profit 190。4 less than zero 8。93％ 1991 119。59 1；895。0 6。31％ 7。40％
1979 profit 227。3 less than zero 10。08％ 1992 108。96 2；290。4 4。76％ 7。39％
Last year； our insurance operation again generated funds at a cost below that incurred by the U。S。 Government on its newly…issued long…term bonds。 This means that in 21 years out of the 26 years we have been in the insurance business we have beaten the Government's rate； and often we have done so by a wide margin。 （If； on average； we didn't beat the Government's rate； there would be no economic reason for us to be in the business。）
去年我们保险营运所产生的资金成本还是一样低于美国政府当年所新发行的公债利率，意思是说在过去26年的保险事业经营中，我们有21年是远胜于政府公债发行利率，而且差距的幅度通常都相当可观，（那天要是我们平均的资金成本高于政府公债的利率的话，我们实在就没有理由继续留在保险业了）。
In 1992； as in previous years； National Indemnity's mercial auto and general liability business； led by Don Wurster； and our homestate operation； led by Rod Eldred； made excellent contributions to our low cost of float。 Indeed； both of these operations recorded an underwriting profit last year； thereby generating float at a less…than…zero cost。 The bulk of our float； meanwhile； es from large transactions developed by Ajit。 His efforts are likely to produce a further growth in float during 1993。
1992年，如同以往年度，由Don Wurster领导的国家产物意外险公司所经营的汽车与一般责任保险以及Rod Eldred领导的Homestate营运，对于我们取得低廉的资金有相当的贡献，事实上，在去年这两家公司都有承保获利，也就是说所产生的保险浮存金的资金成本都是低于零，当然我们也有一大笔的浮存金是来自于Ajit所开发出来的大型案件，展望1993年这方面所贡献的保费收入还会增加。
Charlie and I continue to like the insurance business； which we expect to be our main source of earnings for decades to e。 The industry is huge； in certain sectors we can pete world…wide； and Berkshire possesses an important petitive advantage。 We will look for ways to expand our participation in the business； either indirectly as we have done through GEICO or directly as we did by acquiring Central States Indemnity。
查理跟我还是相当喜爱保险业，这也是我们预期未来十年盈余的主要来源，这个产业规模够大，在某些类别我们可以与全世界业者竞争，同时Berkshire在这方面也拥有特殊的竞争力，我们会继续寻找在这行增加参与的机会，不管是间接透过GEICO、或是以取得中央州立保险公司的股权那样直接参与。
mon Stock Investments股票投资
Below we list our mon stock holdings having a value of over 100 million。 A small portion of these investments belongs to subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns less than 100％。
下表是我们超过一亿美元以上的普通股投资，一部份的投资系属于Berkshire关系企业所持有）。
12/31/92 Shares pany Cost Market （000s omitted）
3；000；000 93；400；000 16；196；700 34；250；000 4；350；000 24；000；000 38；335；000 1；727；765 6；358；418
Capital Cities/ABC； Inc。 The Coca…Cola pany Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp。 （〃Freddie Mac〃） GEICO Corp General Dynamics Corp The Gillette pany Guinness PLC The Washington Post pany Wells Fargo & pany
517；500 1；023；920 414；257 45；713 312；438 600；000 333；019 9；731 380；983
1；523；500 3；911；125 783；515 2；226；250 450；769 1；365；000 299；581 396；954 485；624
Leaving aside splits； the number of shares we held in these panies changed during 1992 in only four cases： We added moderately to our holdings in Guinness and Wells Fargo； we more than doubled our position in Freddie Mac； and we established a new holding in General Dynamics。 We like to buy。
除了股票分割，我们1992年在这些主要投资的持股只有四项变动，我们小幅增加Guinness与Wells Fargo的持股，另外将Freddie Mac的持股增加一倍，至于通用动力则是全新增加的投资。
Selling； however； is a different story。 There； our pace of activity resembles that forced upon a traveler who found himself stuck in tiny Podunk's only hotel。 With no T。V。 in his room； he faced an evening of boredom。 But his spirits soared when he spied a book on the night table entitled 〃Things to do in Podunk。〃 Opening it； he found just a single se