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就像我们在美国航空的投资，在我们签发支票的墨水还没干之前，产业情况就已经开始恶化，如同先前所提到的，没有人强迫我，是我自己心干情愿跳下水的，没错，我的确预期到这个产业竞争会变得相当激烈，但我没想到这个产业的领导者竟会从事长期自杀性的行为，过去两年以来，航空业者的行为就好象觉得自己是公务人员抢着办退休好领退休金一样，为求尽快达到目的而不择手段。
Amidst this turmoil； Seth Schofield； CEO of USAir； has done a truly extraordinary job in repositioning the airline。 He was particularly courageous in accepting a strike last fall that； had it been lengthy； might well have bankrupted the pany。 Capitulating to the striking union； however； would have been equally disastrous： The pany was burdened with wage costs and work rules that were considerably more onerous than those encumbering its major petitors； and it was clear that over time any high…cost producer faced extinction。 Happily for everyone； the strike was settled in a few days。
在一遍混乱之中，美国航空的总裁…Seth Schofield在重新调整该公司体质之上，花了不少的工夫，尤其是去年秋天他勇于承担一次罢工事件，若是处置不当，再拖延下去很可能让公司面临倒闭的命运，而若是屈服于工会抗争的压力，则其下场一样悲惨，该公司所面对沉重的薪资成本与工会要求比起其它竞争同业来说，又更繁杂许多，而事实很明显任何成本过高的业者到最后终将面临淘汰的命运，还好罢工事件在发生几天后圆满地落幕。
A petitively…beset business such as USAir requires far more managerial skill than does a business with fine economics。 Unfortunately； though； the near…term reward for skill in the airline business is simply survival； not prosperity。
对那些为竞争所苦的行业，如美国航空来说，比起一般产业更需要好的管理技巧，不过很不幸的是，这种技巧所带来的好处，只不过是让公司得以继续存活下去，并不能让公司如何地飞黄腾达。
In early 1993； USAir took a major step toward assuring survival … and eventual prosperity … by accepting British Airways' offer to make a substantial； but minority； investment in the pany。 In connection with this transaction； Charlie and I were asked to join the USAir board。 We agreed； though this makes five outside board memberships for me； which is more than I believe advisable for an active CEO。 Even so； if an investee's management and directors believe it particularly important that Charlie and I join its board； we are glad to do so。 We expect the managers of our investees to work hard to increase the value of the businesses they run； and there are times when large owners should do their bit as well。
在1993年初，美国航空为确保存活以及长远发展，做了一项重大的决定…接受英国航空所提出的钜额的投资，透过这次的交易，查理跟我本人被邀请担任该公司的董事，我们同意接受，虽然此举将使得我要同时担任五家公司的外部董事，远超过我个人认为对公司能做的贡献，不过即便如此，只要我们的被投资公司以及其董事认为查理跟我加入其董事会，会对其公司有所帮助，我们还是会欣然接受，在我们期望旗下事业经理人拼死拼活为我们打拼以增加公司价值之时，身为公司大股东的我们有时也应该多尽一点自己的本分。
Two New Accounting Rules and a Plea for One More两个会计新原则，还有一个亟待增加的原则
A new accounting rule having to do with deferred taxes bees effective in 1993。 It undoes a dichotomy in our books that I have described in previous annual reports and that relates to the accrued taxes carried against the unrealized appreciation in our investment portfolio。 At yearend 1992； that appreciation amounted to 7。6 billion。 Against 6。4 billion of that； we carried taxes at the current 34％ rate。 Against the remainder of 1。2 billion； we carried an accrual of 28％； the tax rate in effect when that portion of the appreciation occurred。 The new accounting rule says we must henceforth accrue all deferred tax at the current rate； which to us seems sensible。
一项与递延所得税有关的新颁会计原则在1993年开始生效，它取消了先前曾经在年报中提过会计帐上的二分法，而这又与我们帐上未实现投资利益所需提列的应付所得税有关，以1992年年底计，我们这部份未实现高达76亿美元，其中64亿我们以34％的税率估列应付所得税，剩下的12亿美元则以发生时点的28％估列，至于新的会计原则则要求我们以现行税率一体估计所得税，而我们也认为这样的做法较合理。
The new marching orders mean that in the first quarter of 1993 we will apply a 34％ rate to all of our unrealized appreciation； thereby increasing the tax liability and reducing net worth by 70 million。 The new rule also will cause us to make other minor changes in our calculation of deferred taxes。
新颁的命令代表我们从1993年的第一季开始我们股票未实现利益就必须以34％的税率来估算，因而增加我们所得税的负债，并使净值减少7；000万美元，新规定也使我们在计算递延所得税时，在几个地方做了点修正。
Future changes in tax rates will be reflected immediately in the liability for deferred taxes and； correspondingly； in net worth。 The impact could well be substantial。 Nevertheless； what is important in the end is the tax rate at the time we sell securities； when unrealized appreciation bees realized。
往后若税率有做任何变动时，我们的递延所得税负债以及净值也必须马上跟着做调整，这个影响数可能会很大，不过不论如何，真正重要的是我们在最后出售证券而实现增值利益时，所适用的税率到底是多少。
Another major accounting change； whose implementation is required by January 1； 1993； mandates that businesses recognize their present…value liability for post…retirement health benefits。 Though GAAP has previously required recognition of pensions to be paid in the future； it has illogically ignored the costs that panies will then have to bear for health benefits。 The new rule will force many panies to record a huge balance…sheet liability （and a consequent reduction in net worth） and also henceforth to recognize substantially higher costs when they are calculating annual profits。
另一项会计原则的重大变动在1993年1月1日开始实行，要求所有企业必须认列公司员工应计的退休金负债，虽然先前一般公认会计原则也曾要求企业必须先认列未来必须支付的退休金，但却不合理地忽略企业未来必须承受的健康保险负担，新规定将会使得许多公司在资产负债表上认列一大笔负债（同时也会使得净值大幅减少），另一方面往后年度在结算成果时，也会因为须认列这方面的成本而使得获利缩水。
In making acquisitions； Charlie and I have tended to avoid panies with significant post…retirement liabilities。 As a result； Berkshire's present liability and future costs for post…retirement health benefits … though we now have 22；000 employees … are inconsequential。 I need to admit； though； that we had a near miss： In 1982 I made a huge mistake in mitting to buy a pany burdened by extraordinary post…retirement health obligations。 Luckily； though； the transaction fell through for reasons beyond our control。 Reporting on this episode in the 1982 annual report； I said： 〃If we were to introduce graphics to this report； illustrating favorable business developments of the past year； two blank pages depicting this blown deal would be the appropriate centerfold。〃 Even so； I wasn't expecting things to get as bad as they did。 Another buyer appeared； the business soon went bankrupt and was shut down； and thousands of workers found those bountiful health…care promises to be largely worthless。
另一方面查理跟我在进行购并时，也会尽量避开那些潜藏高额退休金负债的公司，也因此虽然Berkshire目前拥有超过22；000名的员工，但在退休金这方面的问题并不严重，不过我还是必须承认，在1982年时我曾经差点犯下大错买下一家背有沉重退休金负债的公司，所幸后来交易因为某项我们无法控制的因素而告吹，而在1982年年报中报告这段插曲时，我曾说：「如果在年报中我们要报告过去年度有何令人觉得可喜的进展，那么两大页空白的跨页插图，可能最足以代表当年度告吹的交易」不过即便如此，我也没有预期到后来情况会如此恶化，当时另外一家买主出现买下这家公司，结果过了没多久公司便走上倒闭关门的命运，公司数千名的员工也发现大笔的退休金健保承诺全部化为乌有。
In recent decades； no CEO would have dreamed of going to his board with the proposition that his pany bee an insurer of uncapped post…retirement health benefits that other corporations chose to install。 A CEO didn't need to be a medical expert to know that lengthening life expectancies and soaring health costs would guarantee an insurer a financial battering from such a business。 Nevertheless； many a manager blithely mitted his own pany to a self…insurance plan embodying precisely the same promises … and thereby doomed his shareholders to suffer the inevitable consequences。 In health…care； open…ended promises have created open…ended liabilities that in a few cases loom so large as to threaten the global petitiveness of major American industries。
最近几十年来，没有一家公司的总裁会想到，有一天他必须向董事会提出这种没有上限的退休健保计画，他不须要具有专业的医学知识也知道越来越高的预期寿命以及健保支出将会把一家公司给拖垮，但是即便如此，很多经理人还是闭着眼睛让公司透过内部自保的方式，投入这种永无止尽的大坑洞，最后导致公司股东承担后果血本无归，就健保而言，没有上限的承诺所代表的就是没有上限的负债，这种严重的后果，甚至危急了一些美国大企业的全球竞争力。
I believe part of the reason for this reckless behavior was that accounting rules did not； for so long； require the booking of post…retirement health costs as they were incurred。 Instead； the rules allowed cash…basis accounting； which vastly understated the liabilities that were building up。 In effect； the attitude of both managements and their accountants toward these liabilities was 〃out…of…sight； out…of…mind。〃 Ironically； some of these same managers would be quick to criticize Congress for employing 〃cash…basis〃 thinking in respect to Social Secu