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s would be quick to criticize Congress for employing 〃cash…basis〃 thinking in respect to Social Security promises or other programs creating future liabilities of size。
而我相信之所以会有这种不顾后果的行为，一部份原因是由于会计原则并没有要求公司将这种潜藏的退休金负债呈现在会计帐上，相反地，会计原则允许业者采取现金基础制，此举大大地低估了负债，而公司的经营阶层与签证会计师所采取的态度就是眼不见为净，而讽刺的是，这些经理人还常常批评国会对于社会保险采用现金基础的思惟，根本就不顾未来年度所可能产生的庞大负债。
Managers thinking about accounting issues should never forget one of Abraham Lincoln's favorite riddles： 〃How many legs does a dog have if you call his tail a leg？〃 The answer： 〃Four； because calling a tail a leg does not make it a leg。〃 It behooves managers to remember that Abe's right even if an auditor is willing to certify that the tail is a leg。
经理人在思索会计原则时，一定要谨记林肯总统本身最常讲的一句俚语：「如果一只狗连尾巴也算在内的话，总共有几条腿﹖ 答案还是四条腿，因为不论你是不是把尾巴当作是一条腿，尾巴永远还是尾巴！」，这句话提醒经理人就算会计师愿意帮你证明尾巴也算是一条腿，你也不会因此多了一条腿。
The most egregious case of let's…not…face…up…to…reality behavior by executives and accountants has occurred in the world of stock options。 In Berkshire's 1985 annual report； I laid out my opinions about the use and misuse of options。 But even when options are structured properly； they are accounted for in ways that make no sense。 The lack of logic is not accidental： For decades； much of the business world has waged war against accounting rulemakers； trying to keep the costs of stock options from being reflected in the profits of the corporations that issue them。
提到公司主管与会计师鸵鸟心态，最极端的例子就是发行认股权这档子事，在Berkshire 1985年的年报中，我曾经对于认股权的滥用表示过个人的看法，但是即便是认股权规划得当，在许多方面这种做法还是显得相当没有道理，然而缺乏逻辑绝对不是第一次，几十年来，企业界就不断地向会计原则制定者进行攻击，意图将发行认股权的相关成本排除在企业的损益表之外。
Typically； executives have argued that options are hard to value and that therefore their costs should be ignored。 At other times managers have said that assigning a cost to options would injure small start…up businesses。 Sometimes they have even solemnly declared that 〃out…of…the…money〃 options （those with an exercise price equal to or above the current market price） have no value when they are issued。
通常企业主管会辩称很难衡量选择权的价值，也因此其成本应该可以被忽略，有时经理人也会说若认列这方面的成本，将不利于新成立公司的发展，有时他们甚至义正词严地指出处于价外（亦即行使的价格等于或是高于现在的股价）的选择权在发行时并没有价值。
Oddly； the Council of Institutional Investors has chimed in with a variation on that theme； opining that options should not be viewed as a cost because they 〃aren't dollars out of a pany's coffers。〃 I see this line of reasoning as offering exciting possibilities to American corporations for instantly improving their reported profits。 For example； they could eliminate the cost of insurance by paying for it with options。 So if you're a CEO and subscribe to this 〃no cash…no cost〃 theory of accounting； I'll make you an offer you can't refuse： Give us a call at Berkshire and we will happily sell you insurance in exchange for a bundle of long…term options on your pany's stock。
很奇怪的是机构投资人协会这时也插进来表示不同的意见，他们认为选择权不应当被视作为一种成本，因为从头到尾公司根本就不需要从口袋里掏出一毛钱，我认为这样的理由等于是给了所有美国企业大幅改善帐面获利的难得良机，例如他们可以以选择权的方式来支付公司的保险费，所以如果由你来担任CEO，同时充分地运用这种不付现金就没又支出的会计理论，我绝对可以提出一个你无法拒绝的条件，打个电话到Berkshire给我们，我们很愿意以取得贵公司长期认股权的代价，接受你们的保单。
Shareholders should understand that panies incur costs when they deliver something of value to another party and not just when cash changes hands。 Moreover； it is both silly and cynical to say that an important item of cost should not be recognized simply because it can't be quantified with pinpoint precision。 Right now； accounting abounds with imprecision。 After all； no manager or auditor knows how long a 747 is going to last； which means he also does not know what the yearly depreciation charge for the plane should be。 No one knows with any certainty what a bank's annual loan loss charge ought to be。 And the estimates of losses that property…casualty panies make are notoriously inaccurate。
公司股东们必须了解当公司将某些有价值的东西交给别人，实际上就已经发生成本了，而不是等到现金付出去时才算，还有一点，如果有人说因为所付出的实在是难以准确衡量，因此就可以不须认列成本，这实在是既愚蠢又让人啼笑皆非的说法。会计这档子事本来就充满的不确定性，有哪一个经理人或是会计师可以正确的预估一架波音747客机的寿命到底有多久，那么难道他就不能估列这架飞机一年所需分担的折旧费用有多少吗？ 何况像是产险业的损失估计更是有名的不准。
Does this mean that these important items of cost should be ignored simply because they can't be quantified with absolute accuracy？ Of course not。 Rather； these costs should be estimated by honest and experienced people and then recorded。 When you get right down to it； what other item of major but hard…to…precisely…calculate cost … other； that is； than stock options … does the accounting profession say should be ignored in the calculation of earnings？
所以难道这类重大的成本项目，就可以因为一句难以估计而加以省略吗？ 当然不行，相反地这些成本应该由诚实有经验的人加以估算并认列在帐上，而说到这里，没有其它任何成本，会像员工认股权成本金额既高影响更重大的了，难道会计师在计算年度损益时真的可以将这个项目刻意省略不计吗？
Moreover； options are just not that difficult to value。 Admittedly； the difficulty is increased by the fact that the options given to executives are restricted in various ways。 These restrictions affect value。 They do not； however； eliminate it。 In fact； since I'm in the mood for offers； I'll make one to any executive who is granted a restricted option； even though it may be out of the money： On the day of issue； Berkshire will pay him or her a substantial sum for the right to any future gain he or she realizes on the option。 So if you find a CEO who says his newly…issued options have little or no value； tell him to try us out。 In truth； we have far more confidence in our ability to determine an appropriate price to pay for an option than we have in our ability to determine the proper depreciation rate for our corporate jet。
更何况，选择权也不是那么地难以估计，虽然授与经理人的选择权，因为加了许多限制条款，而使得计算的难度增加，所代表的价值也略微减少，但却从不表示他们就完全没有价值，事实上，如果我们旗下的经理人愿意，我也可以提供给他们有限制的认股权作为报酬奖励，而在发行的那天，虽然行使的价格远高于现在的市价，但Berkshire还是必须因此付出一大笔金额，好让他们能在未来年度行使这项认股权，所以如果若你遇到任何一位总裁跟你说他发行的认股权一点价值都没有的话，告诉他来找我们试一试，事实上比起决定企业专机每年的折旧费用，对于认股权的评价我们觉得有信心多了。
It seems to me that the realities of stock options can be summarized quite simply： If options aren't a form of pensation； what are they？ If pensation isn't an expense； what is it？ And； if expenses shouldn't go into the calculation of earnings； where in the world should they go？
总而言之，个人对于认股权的看法可以归纳为以下简单几点。如果认股权不算是对经理人的一种报酬的话，那么它又算是什么？ 而如果一家公司可以不必把报酬列为是一种费用的话，那么它又算是什么？ 又如果一家公司可以不必把费用列入盈余计算的话，那么它到底又跑到哪里去了呢？
The accounting profession and the SEC should be shamed by the fact that they have long let themselves be muscled by business executives on the option…accounting issue。 Additionally； the lobbying that executives engage in may have an unfortunate by…product： In my opinion； the business elite risks losing its credibility on issues of significance to society … about which it may have much of value to say … when it advocates the incredible on issues of significance to itself。
会计学者以及证管会应该对于选择权会计长期受到企业牵制而感到羞愧，此外企业长期不遗余力的游说也会产生相当不良的副作用，个人认为，企业人士竟会为了一己之私利而干冒为社会尽一份心力、失去重大议题公信力的风险。
Miscellaneous其它事项
We have two pieces of regrettable news this year。 First； Gladys Kaiser； my friend and assistant for twenty…five years； will give up the latter post after the 1993 annual meeting； though she will certainly remain my friend forever。 Gladys and I have been a team； and though I knew her retirement was ing； it is still a jolt。
今年我们有两件遗憾的消息，首先Gladys Kaiser我个人的朋友同时也是我25年的助理决定在1993年股东会后，辞去后面那项职务，虽然她永远都是我的好朋友，长久以来Gladys与我已培养出相当好的团队默契，虽然我老早就知道她准备退休的计画，但一时之间我还是不太能够接受这项事实。
Secondly； in September； Verne McKenzie relinquished his role as Chief Financial Officer after a 30…year association with me that began when he was the outside auditor of Buffett Partnership； Ltd。 Verne is staying on as a consultant； and though that job description is often a euphemism； in this case it has real meaning。 I expect Verne to continue to fill an important role at Berkshire but to do so at his own pace。 Marc Hamburg； Verne's understudy for five years； has succeeded him as