按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
from which reason repelled me； I did not believe that I should
trust much to the teachings of nature。 And although the ideas
which I receive by the senses do not depend on my will； I did
not think that one should for that reason conclude that they
proceeded from things different from myself； since possibly
some faculty might be discovered in me￥though hitherto unknown
to me￥which produced them。
But now that I begin to know myself better； and to
discover more clearly the author of my being； I do not in
truth think that I should rashly admit all the matters which
the senses seem to teach us； but； on the other hand； I do not
think that I should doubt them all universally。
And first of all； because I know that all things which I
apprehend clearly and distinctly can be created by God as I
apprehend them； it suffices that I am able to apprehend one
thing apart from another clearly and distinctly in order to be
certain that the one is different from the other； since they
may be made to exist in separation at least by the omnipotence
of God； and it does not signify by what power this separation
is made in order to pel me to judge them to be different：
and； therefore； just because I know certainly that I exist；
and that meanwhile I do not remark that any other thing
necessarily pertains to my nature or essence； excepting that I
am a thinking thing； I rightly conclude that my essence
consists solely in the fact that I am a thinking thin ＇or a
substance whose whole essence or nature is to think＇。 And
although possibly （or rather certainly； as I shall say in a
moment） I possess a body with which I am very intimately
conjoined； yet because； on the one side； I have a clear and
distinct idea of myself inasmuch as I am only a thinking and
unextended thing； and as； on the other； I possess a distinct
idea of body； inasmuch as it is only an extended and
unthinking thing； it is certain that this I ＇that is to say；
my soul by which I am what I am＇； is entirely and absolutely
distinct from my body； and can exist without it。
I further find in myself faculties imploying modes of
thinking peculiar to themselves； to wit； the faculties of
imagination and feeling； without which I can easily conceive
myself clearly and distinctly as a plete being； while； on
the other hand； they cannot be so conceived apart from me；
that is without an intelligent substance in which they reside；
for ＇in the notion we have of these faculties； or； to use the
language of the Schools＇ in their formal concept； some kind of
intellection is prised； from which I infer that they are
distinct from me as its modes are from a thing。 I observe
also in me some other faculties such as that of change of
position； the assumption of different figures and such like；
which cannot be conceived； any more than can the preceding；
apart from some substance to which they are attached； and
consequently cannot exist without it； but it is very clear
that these faculties； if it be true that they exist； must be
attached to some corporeal or extended substance； and not to
an intelligent substance； since in the clear and distinct
conception of these there is some sort of extension found to
be present； but no intellection at all。 There is certainly
further in me a certain passive faculty of perception； that
is； of receiving and recognising the ideas of sensible things；
but this would be useless to me ＇and I could in no way avail
myself of it＇； if there were not either in me or in some other
thing another active faculty capable of forming and producing
these ideas。 But this active faculty cannot exist in me
＇inasmuch as I am a thing that thinks＇ seeing that it does not
presuppose thought； and also that those ideas are often
produced in me without my contributing in any way to the same；
and often even against my will； it is thus necessarily the
case that the faculty resides in some substance different from
me in which all the reality which is objectively in the ideas
that are produced by this faculty is formally or eminently
contained； as I remarked before。 And this substance is either
a body； that is； a corporeal nature in which there is
contained formally ＇and really＇ all that which is objectively
＇and by representation＇ in those ideas； or it is God Himself；
or some other creature more noble than body in which that same
is contained eminently。 But； since God is no deceiver； it is
very manifest that He does not municate to me these ideas
immediately and by Himself； nor yet by the intervention of
some creature in which their reality is not formally； but only
eminently； contained。 For since He has given me no faculty to
recognise that this is the case； but； on the other hand； a
very great inclination to believe ＇that they are sent to me
or＇ that they are conveyed to me by corporeal objects； I do
not see how He could be defended from the accusation of deceit
if these ideas were produced by causes other than corporeal
objects。 Hence we must allow that corporeal things exist。
However； they are perhaps not exactly what we perceive by the
senses； since this prehension by the senses is in many
instances very obscure and confused； but we must at least
admit that all things which I conceive in them clearly and
distinctly； that is to say； all things which； speaking
generally； are prehended in the object of pure mathematics；
are truly to be recognised as external objects。
As to other things； however； which are either particular
only； as； for example； that the sun is of such and such a
figure； etc。； or which are less clearly and distinctly
conceived； such as light； sound； pain and the like； it is
certain that although they are very dubious and uncertain； yet
on the sole ground that God is not a deceiver； and that
consequently He has not permitted any falsity to exist in my
opinion which He has not likewise given me the faculty of
correcting； I may assuredly hope to conclude that I have
within me the means of arriving at the truth even here。 And
first of all there is no doubt that in all things which nature
teaches me there is some truth contained； for by nature；
considered in general； I now understand no other thing than
either God Himself or else the order and disposition which God
has established in created things； and by my nature in
particular I understand no other thing than the plexus of
all the things which God has given me。
But there is nothing which this nature teaches me more
expressly ＇nor more sensibly＇ than that I have a body which is
adversely affected when I feel pain； which has need of food or
drink when I experience the feelings of hunger and thirst； and
so on； nor can I doubt there being some truth in all this。
Nature also teaches me by these sensations of pain；
hunger； thirst； etc。； that I am not only lodged in my body as
a pilot in a vessel； but that I am not only lodged in my body
as a pilot in a vessel； but that I am very closely united to
it； and so to speak so intermingled with it that I seem to
pose with it one whole。 For if that were not the case；
when my body is hurt； I； who am merely a thinking thing；
should not feel pain； for I should perceive this wound by the
understanding only； just as the sailor perceives by sight when
something is damaged in his vessel； and when my body has need
of drink or food； I should clearly understand the fact without
being warned of it by confused feelings of hunger and thirst。
For all these sensations of hunger； thirst； pain； etc。 are in
truth none other than certain confused modes of thought which
are produced by the union and apparent intermingling of mind
and body。
Moreover； nature teaches me that many other bodies exist
around mine； of which some are to be avoided； and others
sought after。 And certainly from the fact that I am sensible
of different sorts of colours； sounds； scents； tastes； heat；
hardness； etc。； I very easily conclude that there are in the
bodies from which all these diverse sense…perceptions proceed
certain variations which answer to them； although possibly
these are not really at all similar to them。 And also from
the fact that amongst these different sense…perceptions some
are very agreeable to me and others disagreeable； it is quite
certain that my body （or rather myself in my entirety；
inasmuch as I am formed of body and soul） may receive
different impressions agreeable and disagreeable from the
other bodies which surround it。
But there are many other things which nature seems to
have taught me； but which at the same time I have never really
received from her； but which have been brought about in my
mind by a certain habit which I have of forming inconsiderate
judgments on things； and thus it may easily happen that these
judgments contain some error。 Take； for example； the opinion
which I hold that all space in which there is nothing that
affects ＇or makes an impression on＇ my senses is void； that in
a body which is warm there is something entirely similar to
the idea of heat which is in me； that in a white or green body
there is the same whiteness or greenness that I perceive； that
in a bitter or sweet body there is the same taste； and so on