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that sound； but simply a body which a little while before
appeared tome as perceptible under these forms； and which is
now perceptible under others。 But what； precisely； is it that
I imagine when I form such conceptions？ Let us attentively
consider this； and； abstracting from all that does not belong
to the wax； let us see what remains。 Certainly nothing
remains excepting a certain extended thing which is flexible
and movable。 But what is the meaning of flexible and movable？
Is it not that I imagine that this piece of wax being round is
capable of being square and of passing from a square to a
triangular figure？ No； certainly it is not that； since I
imagine it admits of an infinitude of similar changes； and I
nevertheless do not know how to pass the infinitude by my
imagination； and consequently this conception which I have of
the wax is not brought about by the faculty of imagination。
What now is this extension？ Is it not also unknown？ For it
bees greater when the wax is melted； greater when it is
boiled； and greater still when the heat increases； and I
should not conceive ＇clearly＇ according to truth what wax is；
if I did not think that even this piece that we are
considering is capable of receiving more variations in
extension than I have ever imagined。 We must then grant that
I could not even understand through the imagination what this
piece of wax is； and that it is my mind12 alone which
perceives it。 I say this piece of wax in particular； for as
to wax in general it is yet clearer。 But what is this piece
of wax which cannot be understood excepting by the
＇understanding or＇ mind？ It is certainly the same that I see；
touch； imagine； and finally it is the same which I have always
believed it to be from the beginning。 But what must
particularly be observed is that its perception is neither an
act of vision； nor of touch； nor of imagination； and has never
been such although it may have appeared formerly to be so； but
only an intuition13 of the mind； which may be imperfect and
confused as it was formerly； or clear and distinct as it is at
present； according as my attention is more or less directed to
the elements which are found in it； and of which it is
posed。
Yet in the meantime I am greatly astonished when I
consider ＇the great feebleness of mind＇ and its proneness to
fall ＇insensibly＇ into error； for although without giving
expression to my thought I consider all this in my own mind；
words often impede me and I am almost deceived by the terms of
ordinary language。 For we say that we see the same wax； if it
is present； and not that we simply judge that it is the same
from its having the same colour and figure。 From this I
should conclude that I knew the wax by means of vision and not
simply by the intuition of the mind； unless by chance I
remember that； when looking from a window and saying I see men
who pass in the street； I really do not see them； but infer
that what I see is men； just as I say that I see wax。 And yet
what do I see from the window but hats and coats which may
cover automatic machines？ Yet I judge these to be men。 And
similarly solely by the faculty of judgment which rests in my
mind； I prehend that which I believed I saw with my eyes。
A man who makes it his aim to raise his knowledge above
the mon should be ashamed to derive the occasion for
doubting from the forms of speech invented by the vulgar； I
prefer to pass on and consider whether I had a more evident
and perfect conception of what the wax was when I first
perceived it； and when I believed I knew it by means of the
external senses or at least by the mon sense14 as it is
called； that is to say by the imaginative faculty； or whether
my present conception is clearer now that I have most
carefully examined what it is； and in what way it can be
known。 It would certainly be absurd to doubt as to this。 For
what was there in this first perception which was distinct？
What was there which might not as well have been perceived by
any of the animals？ But when I distinguish the wax from its
external forms； and when； just as if I had taken from it its
vestments； I consider it quite naked； it is certain that
although some error may still be found in my judgment； I can
nevertheless not perceive it thus without a human mind。
But finally what shall I say of this mind； that is； of
myself； for up to this point I do not admit in myself anything
but mind？ What then； I who seem to perceive this piece of wax
so distinctly； do I not know myself； not only with much more
truth and certainty； but also with much more distinctness and
clearness？ For if I judge that the wax is or exists from the
fact that I see it； it certainly follows much more clearly
that I am or that I exist myself from the fact that I see it。
For it may be that what I see is not really wax； it may also
be that I do not possess eyes with which to see anything； but
it cannot be that when I see； or （for I no longer take account
of the distinction） when I think I see； that I myself who
think am nought。 So if I judge that the wax exists from the
fact that I touch it； the same thing will follow； to wit； that
I am； and if I judge that my imagination； or some other cause；
whatever it is； persuades me that the wax exists； I shall
still conclude the same。 And what I have here remarked of wax
may be applied to all other things which are external to me
＇and which are met with outside of me＇。 And further； if the
＇notion or＇ perception of wax has seemed to me clearer and
more distinct； not only after the sight or the touch； but also
after many other causes have rendered it quite manifest to me；
with how much more ＇evidence＇ and distinctness must it be said
that I now know myself； since all the reasons which contribute
to the knowledge of wax； or any other body whatever； are yet
better proofs of the nature of my mind！ And there are so many
other things in the mind itself which may contribute to the
elucidation of its nature； that those which depend on body
such as these just mentioned； hardly merit being taken into
account。
But finally here I am； having insensibly reverted to the
point I desired； for； since it is now manifest to me that even
bodies are not properly speaking known by the senses or by the
faculty of imagination； but by the understanding only； and
since they are not known from the fact that they are seen or
touched； but only because they are understood； I see clearly
that there is nothing which is easier for me to know than my
mind。 But because it is difficult to rid oneself so promptly
of an opinion to which one was accustomed for so long； it will
be well that I should halt a little at this point； so that by
the length of my meditation I may more deeply imprint on my
memory this new knowledge。
Meditation III。
Of God： that He exists。
I shall now close my eyes； I shall stop my ears； I shall
call away all my senses； I shall efface even from my thoughts
all the images of corporeal things； or at least （for that is
hardly possible） I shall esteem them as vain and false； and
thus holding converse only with myself and considering my own
nature； I shall try little by little to reach a better
knowledge of and a more familiar acquaintanceship with myself。
I am a thing that thinks； that is to say； that doubts；
affirms； denies； that knows a few things； that is ignorant of
many ＇that loves； that hates＇； that wills； that desires； that
also imagines and perceives； for as I remarked before；
although the things which I perceive and imagine are perhaps
nothing at all apart from me and in themselves； I am
nevertheless assured that these modes of thought that I call
perceptions and imaginations； inasmuch only as they are modes
of thought； certainly reside ＇and are met with＇ in me。
And in the little that I have just said； I think I have
summed up all that I really know； or at least all that
hitherto I was aware that I knew。 In order to try to extend
my knowledge further； I shall now look around more carefully
and see whether I cannot still discover in myself some other
things which I have not hitherto perceived。 I am certain that
I am a thing which thinks； but do I not then likewise know
what is requisite to render me certain of a truth？ Certainly
in this first knowledge there is nothing that assures me of
its truth； excepting the clear and distinct perception of that
which I state； which would not indeed suffice to assure me
that what I say is true； if it could ever happen that a thing
which I conceived so clearly and distinctly could be false；
and accordingly it seems to me that already I can establish as
a general rule that all things which I perceive15 very clearly
and very distinctly are true。
At the same time I have before received and admitted many
things to be very certain and manifest； which yet I afterwards
recognised as being dubious。 What then were these things？
They were the earth； sky； stars and all other objects which I
apprehended by means of the senses。 But what did I clearly
＇and distinctly＇ perceive in them？ Not