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me； which； by the organs of my senses； or by some other method
whatever it might be； conveyed these ideas or images to me
＇and imprinted on me their similitudes＇。
But there is yet another method of inquiring whether any
of the objects of which I have ideas within me exist outside
of me。 If ideas are only taken as certain modes of thought； I
recognise amongst them no difference or inequality； and all
appear to proceed from me in the same manner； but when we
consider them as images； one representing one thing and the
other another； it is clear that they are very different one
from the other。 There is no doubt that those which represent
to me substances are something more； and contain so to speak
more objective reality within them ＇that is to say； by
representation participate in a higher degree of being or
perfection＇ than those that simply represent modes or
accidents； and that idea again by which I understand a supreme
God； eternal； infinite； ＇immutable＇； omniscient； omnipotent；
and Creator of all things which are outside of Himself； has
certainly more objective reality in itself than those ideas by
which finite substances are represented。
Now it is manifest by the natural light that there must
at least be as much reality in the efficient and total cause
as in its effect。 For； pray； whence can the effect derive its
reality； if not from its cause？ And in what way can this
cause municate this reality to it； unless it possessed it
in itself？ And from this it follows； not only that something
cannot proceed from nothing； but likewise that what is more
perfect￥that is to say； which has more reality within
itself￥cannot proceed from the less perfect。 And this is not
only evidently true of those effects which possess actual or
formal reality； but also of the ideas in which we consider
merely what is termed objective reality。 To take an example；
the stone which has not yet existed not only cannot now
mence to be unless it has been produced by something which
possesses within itself； either formally or eminently； all
that enters into the position of the stone ＇i。e。 it must
possess the same things or other more excellent things than
those which exist in the stone＇ and heat can only be produced
in a subject in which it did not previously exist by a cause
that is of an order ＇degree or kind＇ at least as perfect as
heat； and so in all other cases。 But further； the idea of
heat； or of a stone； cannot exist in me unless it has been
placed within me by some cause which possesses within it at
least as much reality as that which I conceive to exist in the
heat or the stone。 For although this cause does not transmit
anything of its actual or formal reality to my idea； we must
not for that reason imagine that it is necessarily a less real
cause； we must remember that ＇since every idea is a work of
the mind＇ its nature is such that it demands of itself no
other formal reality than that which it borrows from my
thought； of which it is only a mode ＇i。e。 a manner or way of
thinking＇。 But in order that an idea should contain some one
certain objective reality rather than another； it must without
doubt derive it from some cause in which there is at least as
much formal reality as this idea contains of objective
reality。 For if we imagine that something is found in an idea
which is not found in the cause； it must then have been
derived from nought； but however imperfect may be this mode of
being by which a thing is objectively ＇or by representation＇
in the understanding by its idea； we cannot certainly say that
this mode of being is nothing； nor consequently； that the idea
derives its origin from nothing。
Nor must I imagine that； since the reality that I
consider in these ideas is only objective； it is not essential
that this reality should be formally in the causes of my
ideas； but that it is sufficient that it should be found
objectively。 For just as this mode of objective existence
pertains to ideas by their proper nature； so does the mode of
formal existence pertain tot he causes of those ideas （this is
at least true of the first and principal） by the nature
peculiar to them。 And although it may be the case that one
idea gives birth to another idea； that cannot continue to be
so indefinitely； for in the end we must reach an idea whose
cause shall be so to speak an archetype； in which the whole
reality ＇or perfection＇ which is so to speak objectively ＇or
by representation＇ in these ideas is contained formally ＇and
really＇。 Thus the light of nature causes me to know clearly
that the ideas in me are like ＇pictures or＇ images which can；
in truth； easily fall short of the perfection of the objects
from which they have been derived； but which can never contain
anything greater or more perfect。
And the longer and the more carefully that I investigate
these matters； the more clearly and distinctly do I recognise
their truth。 But what am I to conclude from it all in the
end？ It is this； that if the objective reality of any one of
my ideas is of such a nature as clearly to make me recognise
that it is not in me either formally or eminently； and that
consequently I cannot myself be the cause of it； it follows of
necessity that I am not alone in the world； but that there is
another being which exists； or which is the cause of this
idea。 On the other hand； had no such an idea existed in me； I
should have had no sufficient argument to convince me of the
existence of any being beyond myself； for I have made very
careful investigation everywhere and up to the present time
have been able to find no other ground。
But of my ideas； beyond that which represents me to
myself； as to which there can here be no difficulty； there is
another which represents a God； and there are others
representing corporeal and inanimate things； others angels；
others animals； and others again which represent to me men
similar to myself。
As regards the ideas which represent to me other men or
animals； or angels； I can however easily conceive that they
might be formed by an admixture of the other ideas which I
have of myself； of corporeal things； and of God； even although
there were apart from me neither men nor animals； nor angels；
in all the world。
And in regard to the ideas of corporeal objects； I do not
recognise in them anything so great or so excellent that they
might not have possibly proceeded from myself； for if I
consider them more closely； and examine them individually； as
I yesterday examined the idea of wax； I find that there is
very little in them which I perceive clearly and distinctly。
Magnitude or extension in length； breadth； or depth； I do so
perceive； also figure which results from a termination of this
extension； the situation which bodies of different figure
preserve in relation to one another； and movement or change of
situation； to which we may also add substance； duration and
number。 As to other things such as light； colours； sounds；
scents； tastes； heat； cold and the other tactile qualities；
they are thought by me with so much obscurity and confusion
that I do not even know if they are true or false； i。e。
whether the ideas which I form of these qualities are actually
the ideas of real objects or not ＇or whether they only
represent chimeras which cannot exist in fact＇。 For although
I have before remarked that it is only in judgments that
falsity； properly speaking； or formal falsity； can be met
with； a certain material falsity may nevertheless be found in
ideas； i。e。 when these ideas represent what is nothing as
though it were something。 For example； the ideas which I have
of cold and heat are so far from clear and distinct that by
their means I cannot tell whether cold is merely a privation
of heat； or heat a privation of cold； or whether both are real
qualities； or are not such。 And inasmuch as ＇since ideas
resemble images＇ there cannot be any ideas which do not appear
to represent some things； if it is correct to say that cold is
merely a privation of heat； the idea which represents it to me
as something real and positive will not be improperly termed
false； and the same holds good of other similar ideas。
To these it is certainly not necessary that I should
attribute any author other than myself。 For if they are
false； i。e。 if they represent things which do not exist； the
light of nature shows me that they issue from nought； that is
to say； that they are only in me so far as something is
lacking to the perfection of my nature。 But if they are true；
nevertheless because they exhibit so little reality to me that
I cannot even clearly distinguish the thing represented from
non…being； I do not see any reason why they should not be
produced by myself。
As to the clear and distinct idea which I have of
corporeal things； some of them seem as though I might have
derived them from the idea which I possess of myself； as those
which I have of substance； duration； number； and such like。
For ＇even＇ when I think that a stone is a substance； or at
least a thing capable of existing of itself； and that I am a
substance also； although I conceive that I am a thing that
thinks